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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the question of what claims to resources and positive obligations 
are inherent in an effective respect for the rights protected by the ECHR. I advance my 
thesis first by way of a negative argument about where we cannot look for answers: in 
flawed categorizations and distinctions between different types of rights and duties and in 
formalistic or conventional interpretations of the ECHR.  Instead, I treat this as an 
interpretive question that invites substantive moral arguments about what the content and 
extent of such claims may be in light of the principles and values underlying the 
Convention. I highlight the significant progress but also the inconsistency and uncertainty 
in the case law of the ECtHR and offer examples that point to the need for a coherent set 
of principles by which to determine the content and fair scope of positive obligations and 
claims to resources. 
I investigate three different conceptions of the value of liberty as the core value 
underlying the ECHR. I consider the problems in employing the theories of I. Berlin and 
J. Raz as the basis for an account of rights and positive obligations. In contrast to these, I 
develop an interpretation of Ronald Dworkin’s integrated conception of the values of 
liberty and equality, by which his two principles of dignity and the abstract right to equal 
concern and respect may give rise to rights as fair shares in a just distribution of the 
available resources. The idea of proportionality, I suggest, so prevalent in human rights 
theory and practice, cannot answer the question of what is a fair share but points to the 
central problem of when can individuals challenge a distribution of resources or 
opportunities as disproportionate, unreasonable or unfair. Besides, I highlight the 
significant flaws of minimum core and capabilities theories as the basis for construing the 
content of rights and claims to resources and positive obligations.  
As a more attractive alternative, I closely examine Dworkin's theory of equality of 
resources and defend an interpretation of his hypothetical insurance device as a safety net 
strategy for determining the content of claims to resources and positive obligations under 
the ECHR. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In this thesis, I aim to shed some moral light on the question of what claims to resources 
and positive obligations are inherent in an effective respect for the rights protected by the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In a nutshell, my argument is that substantive 
moral reasoning and principles of political morality1 lead us to construe the content of 
claims to resources and positive obligations as claims to fair shares under a just 
distribution of resources, in light of an integrated account of the values of liberty and 
equality as the core values underlying the ECHR rights. The European Court on Human 
Rights has from the outset acknowledged that real, practical and effective respect for the 
ECHR rights cannot be confined to negative obligations of non-interference but may entail 
positive obligations and claims to resources: to take positive steps such as legislative, 
institutional, social and economic measures, to provide goods, benefits or opportunities. 
The practice of the Court has made remarkable progress in this field but it is often rightly 
criticized as overly cautious and incoherent, especially when it assumes that these cases 
raise complex resource allocation decisions. I believe that the Court’s reluctance and 
incoherence is due to its uncertainty about which principles should determine the content 
and limits of claims to resources and positive obligations.  
The problem is significant and calls for urgent attention as the challenge for the Court 
and those advocating a proactive role of the state in the protection of human rights 
becomes all the more complex: advancements in technology, science, medicine or in 
social morals, attitudes and institutions offer greater potential for improving various 
aspects of the lives of individuals. The challenge then is that social changes and increase 
in the availability of new and useful resources goes hand in hand with increased demand 
to a share of those resources as a matter of ECHR rights. A claim for accommodation of 
our social environment for people with various forms of disability or claims to be provided 
with new medicines or medical treatments or with robotic limbs are just some indicative 
examples from the case law of the Court. On the other hand, the global financial crisis 
means many countries face extreme scarcity of resources, while their people, more so than 
ever, claim protection of their basic social and economic entitlements against a backdrop 
of a dramatic change of circumstances in their lives. Dealing with these claims in a piece-
meal fashion raises justified concerns of either undue restraint or rights-inflation. I will 
                                                 
1 By principles of political morality I mean principles that define how we should treat others and 
have a prominent role in determining what opportunities and resources people are rightfully entitled 
to have. Ethics, on the other hand, governs how one must live her own life. See R Dworkin, Justice 
for Hedgehogs, (Belknap, Harvard, 2011), p. 371. I discuss this further in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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argue that we must draw the principles necessary for assessing these claims from an 
integrated interpretation of the core values underlying the ECHR. That is, from a particular 
interpretation of the value of liberty in light of the value of equality and Dworkin’s 
fundamental abstract obligation of government to treat all with equal concern and respect.  
My thesis takes the following form. I begin by dispelling certain misconceptions 
around the concept of positive obligations that hinder the development of a principled 
approach and I establish that the question of what positive obligations are inherent in 
effective respect invites substantive moral reasoning. Although significant, this move 
merely opens rather than settles the question. The confusion and restraint of the Court 
when dealing with what it considers to be difficult resource allocation decisions proves 
this point: the Court needs a set of clear principles for assessing claims to resources and 
positive obligations. The interpretive question of what effective respect requires cannot 
be answered with reference to the notions of effectiveness or the margin of appreciation 
as this would be circular: we need substantive moral reasons to distinguish between 
justified rights claims whose content should be determined by the Court and policy issues 
that should better be left to the margin of appreciation of the national authorities.  
For this reason, I then shift the focus of the debate at the intersection between human 
rights and political philosophy and explore different interpretations of the values of liberty 
and equality as the core values underlying the ECHR rights. I explore the weaknesses in 
these alternative interpretations inspired by the work of Isaiah Berlin and Joseph Raz and 
argue in favour of Ronald Dworkin’s integrated account of liberty and equality and the 
corresponding fundamental principle that the state must treat all with equal concern and 
respect. My central argument is that, following this principle of political morality, we must 
construe claims to resources and positive obligations as claims to the fair shares that 
people would have been entitled to under a just distribution of resources. The debate about 
the content of positive obligations needs to turn on the question of what constitutes a fair 
distribution of resources and what claims are justified as claims to fair shares: that is, when 
they can reasonably challenge the fairness in the distribution of resources within a state as 
a violation of ECHR rights. My argument concludes that people have justified claims to 
those resources and positive obligations that ensure the conditions or capabilities for 
certain choices about their lives: those choices that they would have had were other 
morally arbitrary circumstances more nearly equal. I suggest that the content and limits of 
these claims could be determined in a plausible and fair way through Dworkin’s 
hypothetical insurance device. This could operate as a ‘safety net’ device that estimates 
fair shares and entitlements based on the level of insurance that an average prudent person 
would have opted for against the risk of lacking certain conditions and capabilities for 
choice within the ECHR spheres of freedom granted to her. 
10 
 
As I said earlier, my research and writing for this thesis is located on the intersection 
between human rights and political philosophy. For this reason, it is crucial for me to 
acknowledge the limitations of my endeavours and ambitions in this project. To begin 
with, in this thesis, I have sought to shed moral light on the question of what claims to 
resources and positive obligations are inherent in an effective respect for human rights. 
To do so, I have mainly focused on exploring the interpretation of the values underlying 
the ECHR rights in particular and trying to draw a framework of principles from them to 
facilitate coherent adjudication of claims to resources and positive obligations. This means 
that I have focused my study in the context of the ECHR and have not adopted a 
comparative methodology, e.g. looking at relevant developments and ideas in the 
Canadian or South African Supreme Court or in the context of the European Social Charter 
or the UN International Covenants. Also, reference to case law of the ECtHR in this thesis 
is neither exhaustive nor detailed. My aim with respect to the practice of the Court has 
been to identify trends in the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the interpretation of 
positive obligations and claims to resources and to highlight the progress and problems in 
the relevant case law. For this reason, although I have surveyed the relevant case law I 
discuss only representative examples of established and emerging trends. It is part of my 
argument in this thesis, that the Court needs a set of principles in order to bring coherence 
to its practice in this area and, for this reason, my inquiry has focused on identifying and 
explaining these principles as well as suggesting what their implications may be. Ideas 
and principles drawn from normative analysis of this kind can then be applied, with 
necessary adjustments, in any other context with a view to suggest the necessary 
background theoretical framework for any given national or international legal order. 
At the same time, in order to support my argument in this thesis I assume certain 
positions within deep and controversial debates about the nature of law and interpretation 
in legal theory and engage in substantive discussion of views and theories in political 
philosophy, in particular theories of distributive justice. However, my thesis is not 
intended as a contribution in any of these fields. Although I have made every effort to 
raise all points that I consider crucial to my thesis, I cannot claim to have covered all of 
the issues implicated in depth. My aim is much more modest: it is to emphasize the need 
and centrality of principles of political morality for the interpretation of the ECHR and, in 
particular, the importance of values of fairness, equality and theories of distributive justice 
for determining what resources people are rightly entitled to as a matter of rights and 
freedoms in the ECHR in particular. Of course, I aim to justify my positions in these 
debates by way of a critical analysis of opposing views, anticipating objections, expanding 
on the views I support and discussing how they fit with the practice of the ECHR.  
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Claims to resources, positive obligations and the objections of legitimacy and 
institutional competence 
 
Given that I treat the question about what claims to resources and positive obligations are 
inherent in effective respect for the ECHR rights as a question about the content of these 
rights, I have downplayed the relevance of two other debates to my thesis. The one has to 
do with the classification of rights as civil and political or social and economic and the 
nature of rights and duties as negative or positive. The other has to do with the legitimacy 
and institutional competence of the ECtHR in dealing with claims to resources and 
positive obligations. I assume that these debates are largely misplaced and I offer here 
some of the most important reasons that justify this position.  
To begin with, although it is true that the ECHR is a civil and political rights 
instrument this does not necessarily mean that these rights are essentially negative or cost-
free and that the normative principles that apply to them may not yield and justify certain 
socio-economic entitlements – albeit different from those in the context of social rights 
treaties. In order to justify this position it is not necessary –and is quite possibly wrong- 
to assume that all international human rights treaties and instruments have the same 
underlying principles or point and purpose. What we need to argue is that the particular 
principles that underpin the ECHR as a civil and political rights treaty may entail both 
negative and positive rights and duties and include elements of social and economic rights. 
Indeed, as I argue in Chapter 1 of this thesis, if we follow an interpretive approach to the 
ECHR and employ moral reasoning in order to identify and protect the substance of the 
ECHR rights in light of its underlying values, then we accept that this kind of reasoning 
may yield positive obligations and claims to resources as inherent in effective respect for 
these rights. As the Court put it in the famous Airey case, the Convention 'must be 
interpreted in the light of the present-day conditions' and it is 'designed to safeguard the 
individual in a real and practical way', so, although it 'sets forth what are essentially civil 
and political rights, many of them have implications of a social and economic nature', 
therefore 'the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may extend into the sphere 
of social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against such an interpretation; 
there is no water-tight division separating that sphere from the field covered by the 
Convention'.2  
Indeed, following the reasoning in Airey, the Court has acknowledged the existence 
of a significant number of positive obligations as inherent in effective respect, has largely 
                                                 
2Airey v Ireland (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305. 
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accepted the indivisibility of civil and political and socio-economic rights3 and has 
adopted an 'integrated approach' to the interpretation of the ECHR. That is, it accepts that 
elements of socio-economic rights may be integrated into the civil and political rights 
protected by the Convention and that, for this reason, it must be interpreted also in light 
of other international instruments of human rights protection, be they of civil and political 
or social and economic rights.4 However, as I will show in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the 
ECtHR's reasoning is often restrained or incoherent when dealing with cases that appear 
to the Court to involve difficult resource allocation decisions. This shows that the question 
of what socio-economic entitlements may be integrated into the ECHR rights invites a 
difficult interpretive question which puzzles the Court and triggers objections about the 
nature of the duties involved, the legitimacy and institutional competence of the ECtHR 
to decide such matters. In the absence of clear principles to deal with such claims, the 
Court often leaves them to a wide margin of appreciation of the national authorities. 
Although a big step forward, it is not enough to proclaim the indivisibility of rights and 
duties and the collapse of traditional distinctions between civil and political and socio-
economic rights or between negative and positive rights or obligations. In my view, in 
order to be clear and consistent about what indivisibility entails in practice we need to turn 
to the problem that it poses for the Court: the problem of determining the content of claims 
brought before it in a principled and coherent manner. Because, it is one thing to say that 
civil and political rights may entail socio-economic entitlements and another to justify 
which ones in particular should be integrated into the ECHR rights. This is why my 
research in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis focuses on the values and principles that 
underlie the ECHR in search of a coherent and plausible normative framework for 
determining the content of claims to resources and positive obligations.  
Besides, this interpretive approach to the ECHR is supported by a largely undisputed 
argument in the theory of human rights against formalistic conceptions of the nature of 
rights and obligations and arbitrary classifications between categories of rights. This is the 
argument that protection of all kinds of rights inevitably involves a mixture of negative 
                                                 
3 IE Koch, Human Rights as Indivisible Rights. The Protection of Socio-Economic Demands Under 
the European Convention on Human Rights, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009). See also S 
Fredman, Human Rights Transformed. Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2008), who treats the debate about the justiciability of positive duties as a debate 
about their content and implications, casting aside formalist categorizations between civil and 
political and social and economic rights. 
4 For the 'integrated approach' in general see M Scheinin, ‘Economic and Social Rights as Legal 
Rights’, in E, Krause and A Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2002), p. 32, and for its application in the ECHR with respect to protecting 
aspects of labour rights in the context of ECHR rights in light of the International Labour 
Organization and the European Social Charter, see V Mantouvalou, 'Labour Rights in the European 
Convention on Human Rights: An Intellectual Justification for an Integrated Approach to 
Interpretation', Human Rights Law Review (2013), pp. 1-27. 
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and positive duties, significant cost and resource allocation decisions.5 Respect for the 
right to life under the ECHR requires wide-ranging action on the part of the authorities in 
organizing and undertaking large-scale investigations of unlawful killings or 
disappearances.6 The protection of ECHR rights, such as those to bodily integrity, the 
peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions or the right to respect for one's home or private 
life require an efficient policing and law enforcement mechanism that entails significant 
public spending and complex resource allocation decisions. Similarly, the right to a fair 
trial has significant cost in maintaining a fair and effective system for the administration 
of justice and the right to vote necessitates the costly undertaking to organize and hold 
elections that meet demanding organizational requirements of efficiency, transparency 
and fairness. Notice that all these costly public services are considered essential to 
guarantee rights that are traditionally referred to as civil and political but evidently depend 
on resources. And this is not a conceptual but a moral question that is answered with 
reference to principles of political morality about the best interpretation of the value of 
liberty and the choices and resources that people are morally entitled to under a reasonably 
just distribution of resources. The Court has attempted to identify criteria to demarcate the 
extent of the state's responsibility in respecting the right to life through policing7 or the 
right to a fair trial through the provision of fair, independent and impartial judicial 
procedures. In the same way, it must also try to discover the principles that justify what 
resources can a disabled or a near-destitute individual claim to be essential for an effective 
respect for her right to private life.  
                                                 
5 For these arguments, see generally H Shue, Basic Rights. Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, (Princeton University Press, 1980) and C Sunstein and S Holmes, The Cost of Rights: Why 
Liberty Depends on Taxes (W.W.W. Norton & Co, New York, 1999). These, among other, theories 
of rights debunked the flawed idea, prevalent in human rights theory by then, that civil and political 
rights can be realized with 'fairly simple legislation', whereas it is impracticable or impossible to 
realize social and economic rights due to the demands they make on resources. For these arguments 
against the justiciability of social and economic rights, see M Cranston, What Are Human Rights, 
(Taplinger Publishing, New York, 1973), pp. 66-67. Also H A Bedau, “Human Rights and Foreign 
Assistance Programs”, in P G Brown and D MacLean (eds.), Human Rights and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, (Lexington Books: Lexington, Mass., 1979), pp. 36-37, who argued that the criterion for 
deciding whether a right is fundamental should be whether it requires resources and wealth that the 
state cannot provide for its protection. 
6 As to the potentially extraordinary length and cost of an effective police investigation or inquiry 
one need not look much further than the recently completed multi million pound ‘Bloody Sunday 
Inquiry’, which aimed at 'inquiring into a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely the 
events on Sunday, 30 January 1972 which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in 
Londonderry on that day, taking account of any new information relevant to events on that day', 
see http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk/  
7 The criterion that was devised in Osman v United Kingdom was that a violation of the right to life 
would be found if the authorities 'knew or ought to have known' of the 'clear and immediate risk' 
to life and did not take all the steps that were reasonably expected of them in the circumstances. I 
will discuss examples in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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Now, my position on the debates of legitimacy and institutional competence of the 
ECtHR in deciding issues with resource allocation implications is closely connected with 
the arguments discussed in the previous paragraphs. If we accept that all human rights 
may entail positive obligations and resource allocation decisions then it follows that, in 
principle, some claims to resources and positive obligations are matters of human rights 
and fall within the ECtHR's legitimate role. Of course, some aspects of resource allocation 
are matters of social or economic policy that should better be left to the margin of 
appreciation of the national authorities –as the ECtHR often reiterates. Nevertheless, it 
would be wholly circular to distinguish which particular claims fall within this margin of 
appreciation and outside of the legitimate role of the ECtHR merely with reference to the 
idea of a margin of appreciation –as it often happens in the practice of the ECtHR. For 
this reason, I assume that the question of which claims are matters of ECHR rights and 
which ones are matters of state policy largely rests on the interpretation of the content of 
the ECHR rights in light of the values and principles of political morality that underlie 
them. So, if we accept that the point and purpose of the ECHR is to protect certain moral 
rights of individuals in a practical and effective way then the interpretive task of arguing 
about the content and requirements of these rights falls, in principle, within the legitimate 
role of the ECtHR.  
Following this, the famous principle behind the doctrine of the margin of appreciation 
i.e. the principle that the role of the ECtHR is meant to be subsidiary8 to that of the national 
authorities, can only be taken to mean that national authorities have a chronological rather 
than a normative priority9 in determining what effective respect for the ECHR rights 
requires. As Article 1 of the ECHR proclaims, national authorities are those primarily 
entrusted with ensuring the ECHR rights but it is essential for the ECtHR to scrutinize the 
states' actions and omissions in order to fulfil its legitimate role as the ultimate guardian 
of these rights in a real and practical way. The whole point of the ECHR is futile if the 
claims that individuals raise against unfair treatment by their national authorities are 
ultimately left to the will of those authorities without any substantive justification 
whatsoever.10 The ECtHR has a distinctively prominent role in promoting cohesion in the 
                                                 
8 The principle of subsidiarity is very common among international law theorists and is often hailed 
as one of the most important principles underlying the Convention, by word of the former President 
of the Court R Ryssdall in ‘The Coming of Age of the European Convention on Human Rights’, 
European Human Rights Law Review (1996), p. 18-29. Note that Protocol 15 amends the Preamble 
of the ECHR to make special reference to this principle. 
9 For this distinction see G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation for the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 4.  
10 For an extensive overview of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation see HC Yourow, The 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of the European Human Rights Jurisprudence, 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996) and Y Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia, 2002), who 
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interpretation and protection of fundamental freedoms11 and realising the promise of 
international enforcement of human rights that overcomes national policies and the 
sovereign will of the states, through the consistent and principled application of the 
Convention guarantees.12 Of course, the question is always open for the national 
authorities or the ECtHR to establish that there is no unfairness or no denial of the moral 
entitlements of individuals under the ECHR. But this, properly understood, is a matter of 
principles of political morality about what constitutes unfair treatment or about what 
claims to resources or positive obligations are justified under the ECHR. 
Concerns about the institutional competence of the ECtHR, on the other hand, can be 
recast once we have set clear principles for determining the content of claims to resources 
and positive obligations. To be sure, resource allocation decisions raise controversial 
questions about the fairness of a given distribution of resources, the entitlements of 
individuals and the positive duties of the state. But the ECtHR often undertakes to resolve 
other controversial cases, e.g. in relation to sensitive moral issues, by seeking to provide 
substantive moral reasoning and deliver a principled judgment about what rights people 
have. If we accept that this is a legitimate interpretive approach then the Court should face 
any controversial issue in the same way. Of course, resource allocation decisions pose the 
significant problem of polycentricity:13 they require a good appreciation and analysis of a 
broad range of parameters and can have various consequences and implications. So, 
although in principle they may be part of what we would like the ECtHR to be doing, in 
practice that could be impossible or risky and compromising our aim to secure the ECHR 
rights effectively. However, this would be the case if we asked the Court to substitute the 
national authorities in making resource allocation decisions or to decide what would have 
                                                 
describes the doctrine of the margin of appreciation as the other side of the principle of 
proportionality. Also MacDonald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’, in R St J MacDonald, F Matcher 
and H Petzold (eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (1993), who rightly 
points out that when the Court uses the margin of appreciation doctrine it often does not provide 
any reasons for or against the applicant’s claim itself and therefore ultimately does not give any 
decision at all on the matter –let alone a justified one. Also, R Singh et. al. ‘Is there a role for the 
“Margin of Appreciation” in national law after the Human Rights Act?’ (1999) 1 European Human 
Rights Law Review p. 4. 
11 This feature distinguishes human rights treaties in that it requires interpretation that is sensitive 
to a different set of values than those underlying other kinds of international treaties. See Bernhardt, 
‘Thoughts on the Interpretation of Human-rights Treaties’, in F Matscher and H Petzfold (eds.), 
Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension (1990), p. 65 and Letsas, A Theory of 
Interpretation for the European Convention on Human Rights, ch. 1.   
12 E Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards’, 31 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics (1998-1999), p. 844. 
13 For the problem of polycentricity in positive obligations cases under the ECHR see De Schutter 
Olivier, ‘The Protection of Social Rights by the European Court of Human Rights’ in Van Der 
Auweraert P., J Sarkin  & Others (eds.), Social, Economic and Cultural Rights: An Appraisal of 
Current European and International Developments (Maklu, 2002). Also, for an argument for 
judicial caution in cases of social and economic rights due to the problem of polycentricity see J 
King, Judging Social Rights, (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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been the optimum or ideally just distribution. Instead, we are asking the Court to make a 
reasonable and principled judgment about whether there seems to be an unfairness in the 
particular allocation of resources.14 In the same way as we ask the Court to decide e.g. 
about the private and family life rights of homosexuals or post-operative transsexuals we 
may also expect the Court to determine whether the lack of access to public buildings for 
people with impaired mobility show that their state treats them with less than equal 
concern and respect. In both cases, we appeal to the same principles of political morality 
to work out what people are entitled to, only our arguments are, so far, underdeveloped in 
the second type of controversial questions.  
Besides, if we understand the task of the Court in this way, then we have very good 
reasons to believe that this kind of judgment can actually better be made by the ECtHR:  
judges are institutionally required to provide impartial, coherent and reasoned answers 
about the moral rights and entitlements of individuals, i.e. about their claims that they 
have been treated unfairly, with less than equal concern and respect. To this end, they 
must detach themselves from the interests at stake and employ and apply those principles 
of political morality that could determine the content of claims to resources and positive 
obligations. At the same time, they can draw technical expertise from the pool of experts 
available to the Council of Europe and from various other national and international 
organizations, such as the International Labour Organization, the European Committee on 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment etc.  
Moreover, note that the ECtHR regularly refers to and relies upon the findings, reports or 
recommendations of such international organizations, drawing on their technical expertise 
as well as their interpretive principles to apply in areas where there is an overlap with the 
issues covered by the ECHR.15 Besides, national authorities and officials regularly employ 
experts to assist and consult them in all fields relevant to public policy, e.g. economics, 
town planning, health administration, energy or environmental issues etc. National courts 
too rely on expert opinion when confronted with extremely complex and technical matters, 
such as those arising in patents cases where specialist knowledge of technology or 
biotechnology and the various effects of patents based on them may be called for.16 But 
                                                 
14 Contrary to Holmes's and Sunstein's argument that 'courts are not in a good position to assess 
claims that involve resource allocation', in The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes, p. 
96. 
15 On this point see Judge Rozakis' analysis in,'The European Judge as a Comparatist' (2005) 80 
Tulane Law Review 257 at p. 268, cited in Mantouvalou, 'Labour Rights in the European 
Convention on Human Rights: An Intellectual Justification for an Integrated Approach to 
Interpretation', p. 539.  
16 On the effect of patent scope decisions and the courts' reasoning on the fine line between patent 
protection, financial incentives and scientific invention or technological development see RP 
Merges and RR Nelson, 'On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope', (1990) Columbia Law 
Review, 90: 839. See also, Association for Molecular Pathology et al v Myriad Genetics Inc, et al, 
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ultimately, they use this knowledge to place the facts of the case in a wider context and 
resolve the individual case by appeal to broader and deeper considerations and principles. 
In addition, both the national authorities and the ECHR regularly rely on the informed 
opinions and evidence submitted to help them reach decisions in all kinds of sensitive and 
controversial cases with significant budgetary or other social policy implications. In a very 
recent case, the ECtHR had to decide whether the conditions under which an individual 
with impairments in her mental capacity was deprived of her legal capacity and was placed 
under compulsory legal guardianship violated her rights to private and family life.17 Notice 
how the Court distinguished the sensitive technical question of the impairment of a 
person's mental faculties by physicians and the overall assessment of the person's 
circumstances and the proportionality of the measures to be taken in relation to those 
circumstances, which should be left to the judge: 
 
'The Court notes that the decision to partly deprive the applicant of her legal 
capacity relied to a decisive extent on the report drawn up by two 
psychiatrists. The Court is aware of the relevance of medical reports 
concerning persons suffering from impairment to their mental faculties and 
agrees that any decision based on an assessment of a person’s mental health has 
to be supported by relevant medical documents. However, it is the judge and 
not a physician who is required to assess all relevant facts concerning the 
person in question and his or her personal circumstances. It is the function of 
the judge conducting the proceedings to decide whether such an extreme 
measure is necessary or whether a less stringent measure might suffice. When 
such an important interest for an individual’s private life is at stake a judge has 
to carefully balance all relevant factors in order to assess the proportionality 
of the measure to be taken. The necessary procedural safeguards require that 
any risk of arbitrariness in that respect is reduced to a minimum...' [my 
emphasis]18 
 
With this example, I aim to highlight the point that expert opinion and knowledge is often 
necessary but always insufficient on its own to settle questions that reach the courts 
because these are interpretive questions of political morality, i.e. about the best 
interpretation of moral and political concepts, values and principles, about the kind of 
treatment or resources people are entitled to and about what obligations others and the 
state have towards them. This kind of judgment will always take into account expert 
opinion and specialist knowledge but will place it in a wider context of the individual's 
other circumstances, rights and entitlements, notions of reasonable burdens and benefits, 
                                                 
569 US Supreme Court (13 June 2013), where the US Supreme Court placed the technical matter 
of which human genes can be patented under the light of a principle that excludes laws of nature, 
natural phenomena and abstract ideas from patent protection; the Court found, in line with past 
judicial rulings on similar matters, that disregarding this principle 'would be at odds with the very 
point of patents which exist to promote creation.'  
17 Ivinovic v Croatia, Application no. 13006/13 (18 September 2014) 
18 Ibid, para. 40. 
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fairness, liberty and equality, respect for dignity, regard for other individual or communal 
goals etc. 
The crucial point then is that the ECtHR is not required to deploy all country-specific 
or comparative social and economic information and knowledge in order to dictate to the 
national authorities what an optimum or cost-effective distribution or what a universally 
ideal distribution of resources would be.  Instead, what the applicants are asking and what 
the Court should aim to do is to use all necessary expertise to answer the interpretive 
question of what is the share of resources that people are entitled to as a matter of ECHR 
rights, interpreted in light of principles of fairness and equal respect and concern. For this 
reason, in this thesis, I focus exclusively on the need for such principles, the problems that 
the lack of them causes in the jurisprudence of the Court and the implications that they 
have in determining what claims to resources and positive obligations are inherent in an 
effective respect for the ECHR rights. 
 
Thesis overview 
 
In Chapter 1 (Positive Obligations in the ECHR: Towards a Better 
Understanding of the Effectiveness Principle) I aim to establish that the question of 
what positive obligations and claims to resources are inherent in an effective respect for 
human rights is a matter of substantive moral reasoning and must be settled with reference 
to principles of political morality. I begin by briefly tracing the emergence of the concept 
of positive obligations in the case law of the Court through the 'effectiveness principle': 
the idea that the Convention is meant to guarantee rights that are 'real and practical' and 
not 'theoretical or illusory'. By and large, judges and scholars have accepted that this idea 
challenges widely assumed distinctions between civil and political and social and 
economic rights as well as between negative and positive obligations. Still, certain 
misconceptions about the interpretation of the ECHR and the source of positive 
obligations persist and hinder the development of a principled approach to these cases. I 
place them under the heading of 'conventional effectiveness' to connote that all these views 
assume limitations to the claims to resources and positive obligations based on supposed 
conventions or agreements. In particular, I explain that it would be circular to rely on the 
plain meaning of the words of the text or the intentions of the drafters since these give rise 
to the disagreement in the first place. Following Dworkin, I argue that this disagreement 
is moral and to resolve it we need to interpret the words of the text and the intentions of 
the drafters in light of substantive moral arguments about the essence of the rights at stake. 
I discuss the Court’s interpretation of what effective respect requires in light of the present 
day conditions, as a shift from a conventional reading of the Convention to a moral 
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understanding of the substance of rights and the corresponding claims to obligations and 
resources. This 'substantive effectiveness approach' commits us, I argue, to the position 
that claims to resources or, in general, claims with social and economic implications, are 
an integral part of the ECHR rights. Of course, from that alone does not follow which 
claims to resources or positive obligations are inherent in effective respect for the ECHR 
rights and which are matters of policy that should better be left to the margin of 
appreciation of the national authorities. To overcome the interpretive limitations of a 
conventional effectiveness approach does not provide any answers or principles to the 
question of what effective protection for ECHR rights requires. It merely explains where 
we cannot look for answers. We may have recast our initial problem as one of substantive 
political morality but it still remains open as the case law of the Court seems to lack the 
coherent set of principles by which to resolve it. Before I begin to discuss the values and 
principles that I believe underpin the ECHR rights I discuss, in the following chapter, 
examples that are indicative of this weakness in the Court’s overall remarkable progress 
in the field.    
In Chapter 2 (Claims to Resources and Positive Obligations in the Practice of the 
ECtHR: Progress and Problems) I aim to highlight the inconsistency in the Court’s 
treatment of claims to resources and positive obligations. I discuss representative 
examples of two broad categories of cases that represent two different trends in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. The Court has tried to develop certain substantive criteria for deciding what 
the principle of effectiveness requires in those cases that are closer to traditional functions 
of the state, such as the administration of justice, the operation of public authorities, the 
police and the military services. In these cases, I argue, the Court takes into account 
considerations about the potential socio-economic implications but, nonetheless, proceeds 
to a substantive examination of the merits of the claims and their limitations. On the other 
hand, when the Court views the applicants’ claims as raising sensitive issues or welfare 
state responsibilities, it defers the matter to a wide margin of appreciation of the national 
authorities as supposedly better placed given the resource allocation decisions required. 
In these cases, the Court’s decisions are largely unjustified or with poor reasoning, 
indicating that it is reluctant to examine any of the questions raised substantively: the 
question of justification (the fair balance test), the question of interference or even the 
question of applicability. I argue that this is understandable due to the lack of those 
principles that could help the Court to distinguish which claims to resources or positive 
obligations are inherent in an effective respect for the ECHR rights and which are matters 
of social or economic policy that fall outside of the legitimate role of the Court. From this 
point on, the focus of my thesis turns to the question of what these principles may be and 
how they could shape claims to resources and positive obligations under the ECHR. 
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In Chapter 3 (Three Concepts of Liberty as the Core Value Underlying the 
ECHR Rights) I argue that Ronald Dworkin's integrated interpretation of the value of 
liberty in light of the value of equality offers the best moral foundation for claims to 
resources and positive obligations under the ECHR. I advance my argument firstly by way 
of a critical analysis of two other interpretations of the value of liberty that have been or 
could be employed to justify the content of human rights and obligations. Firstly, I 
examine Isaiah Berlin's conception of liberty construed independently of the moral 
demands of other values, such as equality or social justice. I argue that this is an 
unattractive theory because it aims to drain an account of liberty from any moral 
evaluative judgments about what is valuable about liberty or about what freedoms people 
are morally entitled to in light of principles of fairness or equality. In this way, the 
continuum of the value of liberty extends between two unacceptable extremes: from a 
position where people may be considered free in the absence of any resources or 
conditions that would make their freedom worthwhile and to the opposite end where they 
may claim prima facie freedoms and resources at the expense of the moral rights of others. 
Given its descriptive nature, I conclude that this theory lacks any principled criteria by 
which to determine the value and weight of various claims to freedoms and resources and 
resolve conflicts between these claims and other competing considerations. Besides, I find 
this account of liberty to be at odds with the practice of the ECHR, which acknowledges 
certain claims to resources and positive obligations as necessary conditions for the 
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention to be worthwhile and meaningful. 
Secondly, I evaluate Joseph Raz's conception of liberty in light of the value of 
autonomy. I find that this account of liberty is problematic as a basis for human rights 
claims as it runs contrary to certain distinctive features of human rights. To begin with, 
following Raz, liberty is valuable insofar as it serves personal autonomy, which in turn is 
a particular conception of well-being. The problem is that, in Raz's theory, personal 
autonomy is understood as a perfectionist and social value. Following this, the state may 
have wide-ranging positive duties to promote the conditions of autonomy but not those 
that individuals choose as valuable and consistent with their conception of the good life. 
Instead, the state may respect and provide only those choices, opportunities and resources 
that it finds to be conducive to a particular conception of what are good or valuable 
autonomy options, as pre-determined by sustaining social practices. I argue that, if we 
relied on this theory, human rights claims under the ECHR could be largely dependent on 
prevailing social practices and therefore lose their distinctive force as anti-paternalistic 
guarantees of the moral independence of the individual.  
Finally, I explore Dworkin's integrated account of the values of liberty and equality 
as the core values underlying claims to resources and positive obligations. To begin with, 
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I reinforce Dworkin's position that the task of identifying the meaning and requirements 
of values is an interpretive task that rests on moral judgments about what is good or 
worthwhile about them. Following this, it makes best moral sense to try to construe the 
values of liberty and equality in light of each other rather than assume that they conflict: 
whether these abstract values cohere or conflict is not a matter of fact but, again, a matter 
of moral judgment that we cannot avoid but should better face with an interpretive spirit. 
In this vein, I argue that the best moral conception of the value of liberty encompasses the 
ways in which we believe people ought to be free, based on other moral judgments about 
what people are entitled to according to a fair and equitable distribution of resources. To 
discuss the implications that such an interpretation of these values can have as a moral 
basis for human rights claims I develop an interpretation of Dworkin's two fundamental 
principles of dignity that bring together the demands of the values of liberty and equality: 
firstly, the principle of equal concern for the objective moral worth and importance of 
each individual's life and, secondly, the principle of special, personal responsibility of 
each individual for making the ethical choices that bring success and value in her own life.  
I argue that these principles entail both rights as trumps against impermissible 
considerations but also rights as fair shares in the distribution of freedoms, opportunities 
and resources. Following this, I suggest that equal respect requires that we grant 
individuals certain inviolable spheres of freedom of choice but that equal concern 
demands that we also pay attention to any morally arbitrary circumstances pertaining 
within these spheres of freedom. The question, then, of the content of claims to resources 
and positive obligations turns on the question of what constitutes a fair distribution of 
resources, i.e. which disadvantageous circumstances would it have to mitigate and what 
conditions for the exercise of these freedoms should it aim to ensure. 
Against the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 3, I move on in Chapter 4 
(Three Approaches to the Content of Claims to Resources and Positive Obligations 
under the ECHR) to assess the relevance and merits of three different approaches that 
have been or could be employed to deal with the question of the content of claims to 
resources and positive obligations. I argue that the doctrine of proportionality is used in 
ways that are either inappropriate or inadequate to provide a principled framework for 
determining the content of claims to resources and positive obligations. In particular, I 
reinforce the view that cost-benefit analysis is an inappropriate way of conceiving of the 
idea of proportionality or balancing as it echoes a utilitarian outlook that is incompatible 
with human rights adjudication: it underestimates the special weight and force that should 
be given to crucial moral considerations and especially the moral rights of the individuals 
involved. On the other hand, I assess the view that we should use the doctrine of 
proportionality as an institutional tool that aims to help the Court assess the content and 
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limits of claims to resources and positive obligations in light of a theory of rights to 
autonomy interests. I accept that the test of proportionality may be used as a judicial tool 
that can serve the institutional concerns of conducting the reasoning process with clarity, 
transparency and certain conditions of legitimacy.  
Still, I argue that the suitability and success of proportionality as an institutional tool 
depends on what principles we feed into it. In the absence of any principles whatsoever, 
the proportionality or balancing assessment is ad hoc and therefore risks being arbitrary 
and incoherent. If, on the other hand, we rely on a theory of rights to autonomy interests 
then we face two problems. If we determine those autonomy interests with reference to 
which ones are valuable according to a particular conception of well-being then we run 
the risk of perfectionism that I argue against in chapter 3. If, in order to avoid this, we 
allow for a wholly subjective account of autonomy interests from the point of view of the 
agent then we may end up with an account of prima facie rights to pretty much everything 
and with no clear principles as to how we can weight or prioritize them at a later limitations 
stage. To the contrary, I argue that the moral concern behind the idea of proportionality is 
better served by egalitarian principles that determine a fair and equitable distribution of 
resources and opportunities within a society, i.e. principles that can answer the question 
of what claims to resources and positive obligations are justified claims to a fair share and 
do not impose an unreasonable burden on others. For this purpose, I assess two egalitarian 
approaches that have been widely used in international human rights theory and practice 
to justify what claims to resources people are entitled to under an equitable distribution of 
resources.  
The minimum core approach, I argue, justifies rights and obligations to a minimum 
content share of resources and opportunities on the basis of the importance and urgency 
of the needs of individuals, irrespective of any account of responsibility they may have 
for their inability to serve these needs and independently of any cost that satisfaction of 
those needs may impose on others. In this way, it treats as inherently unfair distributions 
that may not necessarily be unfair and imposes obligations for the satisfaction of those 
needs irrespective of any consideration about whether the burden that these entail for 
others is reasonable. I examine two alternatives to this. If we adopt a low threshold of 
survival needs as a minimum core, we still may face the same problem of justification in 
countries that are in conditions of extreme scarcity of resources. In more affluent societies, 
such as most Member States of the ECHR, this would cover too little to be of any 
relevance and use for the point and practice of the Convention. On the other hand, if we 
determine the minimum core anywhere above that threshold to serve some fundamental 
needs at a level of sufficiency then we would need a principle that could justify which 
claims it is fair to assign priority to at the expense of others. Besides, even in this case, the 
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justification problem persists and the principles of equal concern and respect is violated if 
some are receiving unfair shares of resources to pursue their life plans at the expense of 
others.  
Despite its great appeal, I argue that the capabilities approach mainly developed by 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, also fails to provide a defensible interpretation of 
the fundamental principle of equal concern and respect as a basis for claims to resources 
and positive obligations. Although it assigns a very proactive role to the state in equalizing 
people in their capabilities to achieve functionings it rests on welfarist notions and 
interpersonal comparisons and is, therefore, open to the criticism of subjectivism and of 
the inability to determine the relative weight and priority between the different capability 
sets of individuals. If, in order to avoid this, it relies upon a list of specific functionings as 
central to the well-being of all individuals, it runs the risk of perfectionism and it 
undermines the special responsibility that individuals should have for determining what 
adds value to their lives. For these reasons, I argue that the best interpretation of the 
capabilities approach aims to turn egalitarian concern and action to those personal and 
impersonal resources that are necessary to achieve various functionings. Although I agree 
with the view that this interpretation causes the capabilities approach to collapse into a 
theory of equality of resources I suggest that in this way the significant insights of 
capabilities theorists may complement the application of equality of resources in a real 
world context, such as that of the ECtHR practice. I explore this possibility further in 
Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 5 (Claims to Fair Capabilities through Equality of Resources) I argue 
that Dworkin's theory of equality of resources too aims to mitigate the disadvantageous 
circumstances that individuals find themselves in and provide a safety net of minimum 
conditions necessary to render freedoms and rights meaningful. In particular, I suggest 
that Dworkin's equality of resources interpreted in light of his two principles of dignity 
best accommodates both respect for individual choices and personal responsibility but 
also concern for the morally arbitrary circumstances that unfairly influence what choices 
individuals are actually left with. I reinforce Dworkin's emphasis on the importance of 
individuals' responsibility for their choices in a fair distribution of resources: one should 
be the author of one's life plan but cannot expect others to bear the cost of realizing that 
life plan. I argue that the egalitarian critics who view this emphasis on personal 
responsibility as harsh and unforgiving underestimate the role of Dworkin's hypothetical 
insurance device in ensuring the conditions that allow individuals to assume this 
responsibility for their lives. In this way, a distribution of resources is fair and shows equal 
respect and concern for all because not only is it sensitive to the choices of individuals but 
it also mitigates the impact of disadvantageous circumstances by compensating those who 
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suffer from them. Of course, given that in real life it is impossible to distinguish whether 
a particular disadvantage can be attributed to choices or circumstances we need an 
alternative strategy to transfer this ideal theory model in a real world context.  
I defend Dworkin's strategy: instead of asking what people need according to a 
particular conception of well-being, the hypothetical insurance device aims to compensate 
people based on what premium a prudent insurer would have deemed reasonable to spend 
from her overall resources in order to insure herself against the risk of suffering from 
various forms of disadvantage or loss of choices. I argue that this strategy best applies the 
fundamental requirement of equal concern and respect: it does not measure or compensate 
disadvantage based on personal preferences and needs or a particular conception of well-
being but transforms it into an interpretive exercise that primarily requires moral 
reasoning. In particular, I explain that in order to bring the hypothetical insurance device 
from ideal theory to the real-world context of human rights adjudication we need to make 
justified moral assumptions about what kind and level of insurance and for which forms 
of disadvantage would a prudent insurer have deemed inherent in an effective enjoyment 
for the freedoms granted to her. This kind of safety net, I suggest, offers a principled basis 
for judging claims to resources and positive obligations against a universal fundamental 
moral standard of equal concern and respect but would, at the same time, have the 
flexibility to determine the kind and level of protection and compensation depending on 
the social and economic conditions in different countries.  
To this end, I argue that the work of capabilities theorists in identifying and analysing 
the various forms in which disadvantage appears in the real world can offer significant 
insights for the application of an ideal theory to a real world context realm, such as the 
practice of the ECtHR. My final point then is that any attempt to determine unfair 
disadvantage in the distribution of resources will have to refer to capabilities and 
functionings as personal or impersonal resources but the question whether or not they 
warrant compensation in the form of justified claims to resources and positive obligations 
will be answered through the hypothetical insurance device and not with reference to a 
list of capabilities or functionings that are deemed important for the well-being of 
individuals. In this sense, I suggest that we should be looking to determine claims to 
resources and positive obligations as claims to fair capabilities, i.e. those conditions for 
the effective enjoyment of the ECHR freedoms that an impartial criterion of fairness 
towards individuals entails: to be treated with equal concern and respect.     
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CHAPTER 1 
POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 
TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE EFFECTIVENESS PRINCIPLE 
 
Introduction:  
The effectiveness principle and the emergence of the concept of positive obligations 
 
Right from the outset, the ECtHR has challenged the classic liberal conception of civil 
and political rights merely as limitations to state interference. The Court’s case-law has 
established that the ECHR does not merely impose negative obligations, that is obligations 
to abstain from interference with the free exercise of rights. To the contrary, the Court has 
interpreted the Convention as giving rise also to positive obligations, usually described as 
obligations to take positive steps for the protection of human rights through various forms 
of action.1 This approach is significant because it challenges the understanding of the 
Convention rights as essentially negative rights2, calls for a proactive role of the state and 
allows the possibility of state liability for the omission to take adequate or appropriate 
legislative or organisational but also institutional, social and economic measures for the 
protection of the Convention rights.  
The very first article of the ECHR declares that the fundamental obligation of the High 
Contracting Parties is to respect human rights, which is further defined as the obligation 
'to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms' enshrined in the 
Convention. But is the obligation 'to secure' any different from the obligation 'to respect' 
human rights? What is the nature and extent of the States’ obligation to respect and secure 
human rights? As early as 1968, in the well-documented Belgian Linguistics Case, the 
Court for the first time acknowledged a positive obligation with reference to the 'principle 
of effectiveness', or else, the general aim of the Contracting Parties 'to provide effective 
protection of fundamental human rights' through the medium of the Convention.3 Over 
the past fifty years the ECtHR has gradually established4 that the whole Convention must 
                                                 
1 For an extensive survey of the Court’s case-law on positive obligations see A Mowbray, The 
Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the 
European Court of Human Rights, (Hart Publishing, 2004). 
2 The Court itself has not admitted to this wholeheartedly though and still today refers to the rights 
enshrined in the Convention as ‘essentially negative’, ever since the first such reference in the Case 
'Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the use of Languages in Education in Belgium' v 
Belgium (the ‘Belgian Linguistics Case’), (1968) 1 EHRR 252 para. 7. This was the first case where 
a positive obligation of the state was identified, albeit as an exception to the ‘essentially negative’ 
character of most of the Convention’s provisions. 
3 ‘Belgian Linguistics Case’, Section I, B at para. 5. 
4 And the Committee of Ministers has reaffirmed in Guaranteeing the Effectiveness of the ECHR, 
Collected Texts, Directorate General of Human Rights, Council of Europe, 2004. Particularly the 
‘Declaration of the Committee of Ministers: Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Implementation of 
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be interpreted in light of the general obligation under Article 1 'to secure' the ECHR rights 
and the idea that states must protect rights in a 'real and practical way' so there may be 
positive obligations 'inherent in effective respect' for human rights5. In the literature, this 
came to be known as the effectiveness principle.6  
Even though there is no disagreement as to whether effective protection for the 
Convention rights may as well entail positive obligations, there is still no coherent method 
for identifying their source and scope.7 It is often argued that the Convention embodies a 
limited number of 'express' but might as well give rise to 'implied' positive obligations. 
This distinction often conceals uncertainty as to what is the source of positive obligations: 
are we to focus on the plain meaning of the words of the text or focus on the intentions of 
the drafters or the consensus within the international community? If this is so, then are all 
other obligations that might be interpretively derived from the text actually not included 
therein, are they unstated, unenumerated, new obligations, judicially created by discretion 
often on the verge between the proper judicial function and a self-asserted quasi-
legislative role?8  
By and large, the ECtHR has rejected this approach to the interpretation of the ECHR 
in favour of an evolutive interpretive method, setting aside historical and majoritarian 
conceptions of the Convention’s provisions, reading it as a living instrument that must be 
interpreted in light of present-day conditions,9 focusing on how to make best moral sense 
of the abstract concepts embodied in the text10 and looking for their point and substance 
in light of principles derived from an interpretation of the values that underlie the ECHR.11  
                                                 
the ECHR at National and European Levels’ (12 May 2004), where they reaffirmed the central role 
of the Convention ‘as a constitutional instrument of European public order.’ 
5 See Marckx v. Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330, Airey v. Ireland (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305, Artico v. 
Italy (1981) 3 EHRR 1 for the first references to the idea of positive obligations as inherent in 
effective respect. 
6 The ‘effectiveness principle’ is not a new principle in international law; for an early account of 
how this principle influences the interpretation of treaties see H Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive 
Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties’ (1949) 26 British 
Yearbook of International Law 48. For an early discussion of the principle of effectiveness in the 
context of the ECHR and positive obligations in particular see JG Merrills, The Development of 
International Law by the European Court of Human Rights, (Manchester University Press, 1993 
2nd edition).  
7 In a concurring opinion in Stjerna v. Finland, (1997) 24 EHRR 194, Judge Wildhaber – former 
President of the Court – admits that the jurisprudence of the Court on positive obligations is 
‘established but still somewhat incoherent’.  
8 P Van Dijk, ‘Positive Obligations’ Implied in the European Convention on Human Rights: Are 
the States Still the ‘Masters’ of the Convention?’ in M Castermans, F van Hoof and J Smith (eds.), 
The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century, (Kluwer Law International, 1998) p. 17-33. 
9 Tyrer v. United Kingdom (1978) p. 15, para. 31 
10 For the distinction between concept and conception see J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 
1999), p. 5 and R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing: 1986), p. 90-101. 
11 See G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), and his more recent articles ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for 
the International Lawyer’, (2010) European Journal of International Law, Vol 21, No. 3, pp. 509-
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However, judges and scholars often appear overly cautious especially when applying 
this method of interpretation in order to determine the limits of the quest for effectiveness 
and identify the source and scope of positive obligations inherent in effective respect. 
Generally, the ECtHR has incorporated the concept of positive obligations well within its 
jurisprudence. One of the general definitions that the Court has used for the concept of 
positive obligations is that they require member states 'to take action in contrast to the 
negative obligations that require member states 'to refrain from action.'12 The Court also 
often notes that the boundaries between these two types of obligations 'do not lend 
themselves to precise definition' and should be examined in light of the same principles 
when investigating into their existence and scope or the reasons that could justify their 
violation.13 Besides, as judges and scholars point out, a claim may be presented in a 
negative or positive way: the right to family life gives rise to a negative obligation not to 
refuse a family reunion or a positive obligation to grant the authorization in order to make 
the family reunion possible.14 
Still, it is not surprising that uncertainty and restraint appear in the Court’s decisions 
particularly where evolutive interpretation leads to a reading of the ECHR that could give 
rise to obligations to provide goods, benefits or opportunities and to facilitate the 
enjoyment of rights through potentially costly social and economic measures or through 
controversial decisions in morally sensitive issues. In these areas, various concerns are 
expressed. For instance, some worry that the states may be held responsible for not 
discharging obligations that they have not agreed upon, have not anticipated or consider 
too burdensome to fulfil.15 Others, warn that the Court’s creativity in the quest to enhance 
effectiveness may go so far as to 'rewrite' the Convention, and that the ECtHR as an 
international court might be going beyond what can be regarded as interpretation and well 
into the realm of policy-making by exercising discretion.16  Especially so when it attempts 
                                                 
541 and 'The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy’, in A Follesdal et als 
(eds.), The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
12 Judge Martens, dissenting opinion in Gul v. Switzerland (1996), para. 7. 
13 See Gul v. Switzerland (1996) 22 EHRR 93, para. 38, Keegan v. Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342, 
para. 49 and Kroon & Others v. Netherlands (1995) 19 EHRR 263, para. 31 and most cases 
thereafter. Also, Judge Martens, dissenting opinion in Gul v. Switzerland, at para. 8. 
14 Ibid, para. 7. For examples on how other classifications may be made to appear either as negative 
or positive see O De Schutter, ‘The Protection of Social Rights by the European Court of Human 
Rights’, pp. 226-227.  
15 See P Van Dijk who, in an early discussion of positive obligations' cases, distinguished between 
'express' and 'implied' positive obligations in ‘Positive Obligations’ Implied in the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Are the States Still the ‘Masters’ of the Convention?’ in M 
Castermans, F van Hoof and J Smith (eds.), The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century, 
(Kluwer Law International, 1998) pp. 17-33. 
16 A Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’, (2005) Human Rights 
Law Review 5:1, pp. 57-79, at p. 68 and 79. In the Court’s case law similar concern was reflected 
in the initial reaction to the use of such an interpretive method by Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in 
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to delineate obligations that have far-reaching socio-economic implications17 or attempt 
to confirm advances in morals before they have been firmly established.18  
 
My aim in this chapter is to dispel these common misconceptions around the concept of 
positive obligations and the principle of effectiveness in the context of the ECHR. Firstly, 
I will draw attention to the flaws of a 'conventional effectiveness approach': the question 
of what positive obligations are inherent in effective respect for the ECHR rights and what 
the limits of the quest for effectiveness should be cannot be settled with reference to any 
form of agreement derived from the plain meaning of the text, the original intentions of 
the drafters or the consensus or the common practice and conditions among member states. 
To the contrary, I argue in favour of a 'substantive effectiveness approach': we should treat 
the effectiveness principle as an interpretive question that invites substantive moral 
reasoning with reference to the values underlying the Convention and the substance of the 
rights at stake. Of course, I do not mean to imply that the quest for effectiveness should 
have no limits but only to argue that it is the interpretive role of the ECtHR to set any such 
limits with reference to the substance of the ECHR rights and not the other way around.  
 
1. Conventional effectiveness approach  
 
Generally, judges and scholars alike view the creativity of the ECtHR through evolutive 
interpretation as legitimate and beneficial for the development of human rights law. 
However, some call for cautiousness and restraint when they believe that the boundaries 
of legitimate interpretation are crossed and the Court may be inappropriately making 
policy decisions in its attempt to provide a desirable outcome for the individual, especially 
in cases concerning the existence and scope of positive obligations19 or in areas where 
                                                 
his dissenting opinions in Golder v. United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524 and Marckx v. Belgium, 
by Judge Vilhjamsson in Airey v. Ireland – where he had famously said that ‘the war on poverty 
cannot be won through broad interpretations of the Convention’ – and among others, in the 
decisions of Johnston & Others v. Ireland (1987) 9 EHRR 203, on whether the right to found a 
family (art. 12) entails an obligation to provide also access to a dissolution of marriage. These cases 
will be discussed later in the text. 
17 Matscher, ‘Methods of Interpretation of the Convention’ in MacDonald, Matscher and Petzold 
(eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1993), p. 69-70. 
18 See Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’, at p. 68 and 79, who 
notes that creativity is welcome as long as ‘judicial innovation’ does not go so far as to ‘rewrite’ 
the Convention.  
19 Such concerns are expressed by Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human 
Rights’, Van Dijk, ‘Positive Obligations’ Implied in the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Are the States Still the ‘Masters’ of the Convention?’. In the case law see the early reaction to an 
evolutive interpretation of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinions in Golder v. 
United Kingdom and Marckx v. Belgium, by Judge Vilhjamsson in Airey v. Ireland, as well as the 
judgment of the ECtHR in Johnston & Others v. Ireland, and more recently, Pretty v. United 
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they want to assert a wider margin of appreciation and greater reliance of the Court on the 
existence of consensus. In particular, some wonder whether the legal basis of positive 
obligations is 'express textual requirements of the Convention' or whether they are 'implied 
judicial creations'.20 These concerns about the limits of the effectiveness principle are 
misplaced to the extent that they echo formalist and originalist ideas about legal 
interpretation that are at odds with the practice of the Court, the interpretive methods and 
principles that it has developed so far in light of the point and purpose of the Convention. 
For schematic purposes only, I will place all these ideas under the umbrella of a 
'conventional effectiveness approach': the question of what positive obligations effective 
respect requires can be settled with reference to the plain meaning of the words or the 
original meaning of the text (originalism),21 or the idea of consensus or common ground. 
The common feature of these different ideas about interpretation is that they treat the 
question of what effective respect requires as a matter of convention or agreement and do 
not acknowledge that it calls for substantive moral reasoning. This is the reason that I 
contrast this approach with the ‘substantive effectiveness approach’ discussed in section 
B. 
 
A. Ordinary meaning, express and implied positive obligations 
 
To begin with, a distinction between express and implied positive obligations is 
misleading when it implies that only a few express positive obligations can be found in 
the Convention in a clear and uncontroversial way without the need of interpretation.22 
This view also suggests that any implied positive obligations are an extension of the scope 
                                                 
Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 and Dickson v. United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41. These cases are 
discussed later in the text. 
20 Thus pointing to a potentially controversial exercise of judicial discretion to promote choices 
that supposedly belong to the policy-making competence of the Member states. See above n. 19. 
21 Originalism may take the form of textualism, i.e. the view that what is crucial is the meaning that 
the text had at the time of adoption in 1950 or the form of intentionalism, where we are supposed 
to focus on the concrete intentions of the drafters of the Convention. For originalist theories in the 
American constitutional theory see A Scalia, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil”, 57 Cincinnati Law 
Review 862, R Bork, The Tempting of America, (Sinclair-Stevenson 1990), Lyons, ‘Constitutional 
Interpretation and Original Meaning’, (1986) 4 Social Philosophy and Policy 85. 
22 Examples of provisions that give rise to ‘express’ positive obligations are usually thought to be 
the right to inform an arrested person of the reasons for arrest (Art. 5 (2)), to bring promptly before 
a judge detained suspects in order to determine bail or stay on remand (Art. 5 (3)), to determine the 
civil rights and obligations as well as criminal charges against individuals in a fair trial within a 
reasonable time and with a public judgment (Art. 6 (1)), to provide detailed information about 
accusations to charged individuals (Art. 6 (3)(a)), to provide free legal assistance to impecunious 
individuals facing serious charges (Art. 6 (3)(c)), to provide free interpretation services to 
defendants who cannot understand the language of the domestic court (Art.6 (3)(e)), the right to an 
effective remedy before a national authority (Art. 13) and the right to free elections under specific 
conditions as they are laid out in Art. 3 Protocol I of the Convention. 
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of the Convention by means of judicial discretion.23 What is misleading about this 
distinction is that it often carries with it a concealed false assumption about the source of 
these obligations. Namely, express positive obligations are thought to be included in the 
Convention itself because they are supposedly easily identified in the plain or ordinary 
meaning of the text. On the other hand, implied positive obligations are commonly 
considered as new obligations, created through the exercise of judicial discretion in order 
to fill gaps where the Convention appears to be silent and thus they represent an extension 
of the scope of the Convention in light of the effectiveness principle but often at the verge 
of legitimate interpretation.24  
To be sure, certain cases are indeed easy in the sense that we can identify a positive 
obligation with minimal reference to any substantive reasons that justify why this 
obligation is included in the meaning of the text. But this is not because the language is 
so plain and clear that requires no interpretation at all, or else, that the wording of the text 
alone gives away the meaning of the provision without recourse to any interpretive choice 
being made on the part of the judge. Rather, it is almost always the case that, in both cases, 
what judges put forward is nothing but an interpretation of what they consider essential or 
inherent in an effective respect for the right at stake. Only, in the supposedly easy or clear 
cases that interpretation is so widely acknowledged and undisputed that often remains 
unvoiced. In other words, easy cases are easy because the substantive reasons that we have 
for resolving them are so strong and generally undisputed that we do not even need to 
mention them. A case is not easy because the language is so explicit and concrete that 
                                                 
23 For the distinction between express and implied positive obligations and the assumption that 
implied obligations are an extension of the scope of the Convention in the search for effectiveness, 
that we should treat with cautiousness and restraint see Van Dijk, ‘Positive Obligations’ Implied 
in the European Convention on Human Rights: Are the States Still the ‘Masters’ of the 
Convention?’ at p. 17 and pp.32-33 and p. 22 where he argues that implied positive obligations 
may be read in the Convention by utilizing the effectiveness principle, but that this ‘reading in’ 
could at times ‘result in the creation of a completely new obligation, detached from the text of the 
provision’. Similarly argues Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’, 
p. 68 and 79. Also, Melchior argues that many of the provisions of the Convention entail primarily 
negative obligations of non-interference as this ‘clearly emerges from a literal reading of these 
provisions’ and any other positive obligations are not conventional but may be inferred by 
necessary implication depending on whether the Court decides to ‘be restrictive or on the contrary 
adopt the broad view’, see M Melchior ‘Rights Not Covered by the Convention’ in Macdonald et 
al. (eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Kluwer, 1993), p. 597-599. 
And C Droege, Positive Verplichtungen der Staaten in der Europaeischen 
Menschenrechtskonvention [:Positive Obligations of States in the European Convention of Human 
Rights] (Berlin: Springer, 2003), Summary in English, pp. 379-392, where the author finds (at p. 
387) the limits of positive obligations in the historic and systematic interpretation as well as in the 
wording of the specific provision so that the Convention will not be interpreted  ‘in a sense that 
would contradict their very wording and thereby render the jurisprudence arbitrary.’  
24 For instance, Mowbray considers that for the Court to decide in Pretty v. United Kingdom that 
states have a positive obligation to facilitate assisted suicide ‘would have required the Court to 
undertake a significant, and controversial, extension of the scope of Convention obligations beyond 
its authority’. See Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’, p. 68.  
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mere linguistic analysis and no substantive reasoning or interpretation is necessary to 
identify its meaning.25 To put it schematically, what is often implied is the method for 
identifying an inherent positive obligation and not the positive obligation itself. So, when 
we 'find' implied positive obligations in the ECHR, it is because in the particular case there 
is greater substantive disagreement about what the law requires and therefore the method 
and reasoning for making a choice needs to be voiced.  
To illustrate the point, I will provide some examples that show how, contrary to this 
assumption, even cases concerning straightforward provisions have prompted the Court 
to reflect on what was presumed by the respondent government to be obvious. This shows 
that interpretation is latent even in the apparently easy cases of express positive 
obligations and the Court articulates this interpretation only when there is a challenge to 
a supposedly clear provision. 
In De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp (well-known as the 'Vagrancy' cases)26 one of the early 
cases identifying the need for the state to undertake positive action, the applicants 
surrendered themselves to police as vagrants, were brought before police courts and were 
ordered to be detained 'at the disposal of the government' for up to two years. The ECtHR 
had to decide whether the proceedings before the police courts satisfied the requirements 
of Article 5 para. 4 for the right to access to a court for the speedy determination of the 
lawfulness of a person’s detention. The government argued that it was clear that the 
applicant's rights had not been violated since the applicants were brought before police 
courts. The wording of the text, they claimed, does not mention what kind of court is 
appropriate for the protection of the right to have the lawfulness of one’s detention 
determined, so, police courts fit the requirement of the Convention.  
However, the Court was not satisfied with this and considered whether the summary 
procedure offered to the applicants in the police courts could afford enough protection for 
their vital interest, which was the determination of the lawfulness of their detention. So, 
even though the case could have appeared as an easy one, concerning a rather concrete 
and explicit provision, the Court elaborated on the concept of the right to access to a court 
and considered the substantive reasons why the police courts would not offer the 
protection required by Article 5. It concluded that the summary procedure before the 
police courts did not have sufficient judicial features  
 
'to give to the magistrate the character of a “court” within the meaning of 
                                                 
25 For critical discussion of the assumptions behind the distinction between easy and hard cases and 
particularly of the positivist thesis that such a distinction necessarily leads to judicial discretion see 
R. Dworkin, ‘The Model of Rules II’ in Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 68-71, as well as his Law’s 
Empire, p. 353-354.  
26 De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium (1979) 1 EHRR 373 
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Article 5(4) when due account is taken of the seriousness of what is at stake, 
namely a long deprivation of liberty attended by various shameful 
consequences.'27 
 
Similarly, in the also seemingly easy case of Artico,28 the Court had to consider the 
supposedly express obligation of Article 6 (3)(c) to provide an impecunious individual 
facing a criminal charge with legal 'assistance'. The Court reflected on what it was exactly 
that the applicant was entitled to: the provision’s purpose was to ensure actual assistance 
through legal advice and representation and this obligation could not be discharged by 
mere nomination of an assistant. The Italian Court of Cassation had appointed a lawyer to 
represent Artico in his appeal, as he had requested. The lawyer declined to act in behalf 
of Artico claiming that other commitments and ill-health prevented him from undertaking 
this task. The Italian court repeatedly denied to replace the appointed lawyer and Artico 
was left to represent himself in criminal proceedings. In the case before the ECtHR, the 
Italian Government claimed that there was no such right and subsequently no obligation 
guaranteed in the Convention, i.e. a right to have an appointed lawyer replaced if she is 
not willing or capable to act. Rather, it is the right to have a lawyer appointed as such that 
the provision guarantees. The Court dismissed this formalistic argument by referring to 
the purpose of the Convention to guarantee rights that are practical and effective:  
 
'The ECtHR recalls that the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights 
that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective; … 
Article 6 (3)(c) speaks of “assistance” and not of “nomination”. Again, mere 
nomination does not ensure effective assistance since the lawyer appointed 
for legal aid purposes may die, fall seriously ill…If they are notified of the 
situation, the authorities must either replace him or cause him to fulfil his 
obligations. Adoption of the Government’s restrictive interpretation would 
lead to results that are unreasonable and incompatible with both the wording 
of sub-paragraph (c) and the structure of Article 6 taken as a whole; in many 
instances free legal assistance might prove to be worthless.'29 
 
The ECtHR here mentions that a restrictive interpretation would have an unreasonable 
outcome. That is, the duty of 'assistance' could not possibly be exhausted in mere 
nomination of a lawyer, without the public authorities showing any concern and action to 
ensure that the nominated person for legal assistance is physically and mentally capable 
of providing legal representation and advice and is actually doing so. The Court 
considered that extra steps were essential for the right to be protected effectively since the 
                                                 
27 Ibid, para. 79. 
28 Artico v. Italy (1981) 3 EHRR 1, see above p. 13-14. 
29 Ibid, at para. 33. 
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purpose of the provision is to serve the interests of justice30 through a fair trial where all 
parties are represented efficiently. So, the relevant authorities should have taken all those 
steps necessary to ensure that the nominated assistant could provide actual assistance and 
replace him if he was unwilling or unable to do so. The government’s formalistic 
interpretation was rejected then because the Court invoked the substantive reasons relating 
to the interests of justice in a fair trial, which suggested that the government’s proposed 
interpretation was contrary to the meaning and purpose of the very wording of the 
provision and would render the right to free legal assistance illusory or worthless.31  
Both of these examples, highlight the point that a case may be easy because it is not 
very difficult to justify which one of the competing substantive arguments is the most 
compelling and justified and not because there are no competing arguments as the 
language settles the issue without any need for providing reasons for one or the other 
decision.32 Disagreement may appear both at the core (the easy cases) and the periphery 
(the hard cases) of all of the Convention’s provisions and all implicated parties, including 
the Court, cannot rely on linguistic analysis but must provide substantive arguments for 
resolving this disagreement.33 The fact that certain provisions of the Convention provoke 
little or easily resolved disagreement about their content does not mean that they do not 
require interpretation and that their requirements are obvious to the parties and the Court 
by a perusal of the plain meaning of the text. Reflection upon the possible interpretations 
of the concepts found in the Convention is sometimes an easy task that requires little 
justification for the choice made by the Court. It is a choice between competing 
interpretations of the purpose and content of the law that needs to be sustained by 
substantive reasons, no matter how obvious.  
Besides, note that the fact that although some terms and concepts appear today to be 
clear and unambiguous they were not always uncontested and might as well become 
contested in the future. It is quite possible that concepts whose interpretation appears to 
be settled now will still pose difficult issues of interpretation for the Court in different 
circumstances. This is largely contingent upon the moral and political outlook of our 
societies at different points in time. Consider how once settled concepts (such as fair trial, 
court, reasonable detention, access to court and representatives) have become contested 
                                                 
30 Note that Article 6 (3)(c), stresses that free legal assistance for someone who cannot provide for 
himself should be made available ‘when the interests of justice so require’. 
31 Artico v. Italy, para 33. 
32 The method we use then in easy cases is the same we also apply to hard, more controversial cases 
where the level of abstraction will pose ‘at least some doubt whether the statute would be better 
performance of the legislative function read one way than another’, see Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 
p. 353. 
33 G Letsas, ‘The Truth in Autonomous Concepts: How to Interpret the ECHR’, (2004) European 
Journal of International Law 279. 
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again under the pressure of the threat of terrorism. This should serve as a reminder that 
today's easy cases were once hard or may become hard again in future. 
 Finally, it would beg the question to argue that the wording of the text itself points to 
one or another choice since this often gives rise to the disagreement in the first place even 
in previously settled, easy cases. Equally, a choice is required in hard cases where the 
interpretations offered are more controversial and the reasons to justify them will be 
widely and deeply contested. But this does not inevitably lead the Court to transgress the 
limits of its legitimate role. If we accept that disagreement is pertinent in legal practice 
and indicates that it is an interpretive practice then judges’ choices in hard and 
controversial cases are as much legitimate as they are in easy cases.34 Or maybe not? 
If supposedly easy cases like these may give rise to disagreement then how should we 
approach those ECHR provisions that have a declaratory form and are framed in abstract 
terms, such as the provision of Article 2 that 'everyone's right to life shall be protected by 
law'?35 Even more, how are we to decide what are the requirements of respect for family 
and private life (Article 8)? The sceptics' fear is that when the Court will come across 
these vague terms within the Convention it will have to exercise discretion36 by making 
choices in order to determine what their meaning is and create new obligations that are 
not expressly included in the text.37 The sceptic's worry is that this may lead the Court to 
read into the Convention social rights and entitlements that do not belong in this document 
or impose obligations, which the member states did not intend to include originally.38 In 
sum, everyone acknowledges that the Convention rights must be practical and effective 
and that we should not approach the text in a formalistic way that would leave rights empty 
statements. Nevertheless, as some judges and scholars argue, the Court should be cautious 
                                                 
34 R Dworkin has famously argued, against the 'plain fact' view of law, that both easy and hard, 
more controversial, cases call for interpretation. See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986), ch. 1. For 
a defence of the view that the existence of legal disagreement in the context of the ECHR –
instantiated by the autonomous concepts- makes it inevitable for the Court to make choices in 
interpretation that do not amount to judicial discretion but are the very task of applying the law of 
the Convention see Letsas, ‘The Truth in Autonomous Concepts: How to Interpret the ECHR’ and 
his A Theory of Interpretation for the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP, 2007) ch. 2, 
especially pp. 53-55.  
35 Similarly, that of Article 3 that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9), the 
right to freedom of expression (Article 10), the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to 
freedom of association with others (Article 11), the right to marry and to found a family (Article 
12), the right to education (Protocol I, Article 2). 
36 De Blois, ‘The Fundamental Freedom of the European Convention of Human Rights’ in R 
Lawson and M De Blois (eds.), The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights, (Dordrecht, 
London: Nijhoff, 1994), p. 51.  
37 P Mahoney, ‘Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism’, (1998) 19 
Human Rights Law Journal, p. 2.  
38 L R Helfer, ‘Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention of Human Rights’, 26 Cornell 
International Law Journal (1993) p. 135. See also Van Dijk, above n. 5. 
Positive Obligations under the ECHR 35 
 
of the limits as to how far interpretation can go in order to achieve the desirable outcome 
of effectiveness, especially in the most controversial cases with far-reaching implications.  
 
B. An Originalist Approach 
 
An originalist approach would be to suggest that when we seek to set limits to the quest 
for effectiveness and resolve disagreement about what positive obligations are inherent in 
effective respect for the ECHR rights we should look for the meaning that the text had at 
the time of enactment (textualism) or to the original intentions of the drafters 
(intentionalism).39 As I will explain in the following section, the Court and commentators 
have largely rejected such an approach to the interpretation of the ECHR but some 
exceptions still appear sporadically mainly in cases of positive obligations.   
In one of these rare examples, in Johnston & Others v Ireland, the Court refused to 
read in the provision of Article 12 for the right to marry, an obligation on the part of the 
state to make divorce legally possible. The Court decided that the preparatory works 
'disclose no intention to include in Article 12 any guarantee of a right to have the ties of 
marriage dissolved by divorce' and set a limit to the living instrument' approach: 
 
'It is true that the Convention and its Protocols must be interpreted in the light 
of the present-day conditions (…) However the Court cannot by means of an 
evolutive interpretation, derive from these instruments a right that was not 
included therein at the outset. This is particularly so here, where the omission 
was deliberate.'40 
 
The Court refused to interpret the 'right to marry' in Article 12 as imposing on the states a 
positive obligation to make divorce legally possible on the basis that the ordinary meaning 
of the words and the preparatory works are contrary to such an interpretation. The 
weakness in this view is, as explained earlier, that it fails to acknowledge the interpretive 
question we are faced with, which is whether marriage is best understood as an insoluble 
or as a voluntary union among individuals who should be free to choose to dissolve it. 
Instead the Court determined the ordinary meaning of the words 'right to marry' only in 
light of the drafters' particular conception of the concept and value of marriage.  
                                                 
39 Brest, ‘The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding’, 60 Boston University Law 
Review (1980), p. 207-8. Also see references above in n. 21. Such an approach is suggested by Van 
Dijk who presumes that certain positive obligations cannot be inferred from the text because the 
concepts found there are often open-ended and debatable and that when the Court derives them 
from the text these obligations are new and judicially created because they ‘have not been willingly 
and knowingly subscribed to by the Contracting States when ratifying the Convention’, see Van 
Dijk ‘Positive Obligations’ Implied in the European Convention on Human Rights: Are the States 
Still the ‘Masters’ of the Convention?’, p. 33. 
40 Johnston & Others v. Ireland, para. 52-53. 
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Scholars who call for cautiousness and limits to the effectiveness principle41 and argue 
that the drafters intended to make only a limited, 'first step' by guaranteeing some civil 
and political rights,42 invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and 
the principles of interpretation that it sets out in Articles 31 and 33 in support for an 
originalist approach:  
 
Article 31 
General rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
 (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
 (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
 (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
 (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
 (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties 
so intended. 
 
Article 32 
Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including 
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, 
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, 
or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
 (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 
However, notice that these rules of treaty interpretation do not necessarily prescribe an 
originalist approach, as they place a primary role to the object and purpose of the treaty to 
be interpreted.43 Now, as to the object and purpose of the ECHR in particular, nothing 
within the wording of it excludes the possibility that the drafters had an abstract as well 
as a limited goal in mind. That is, they may as well have had an abstract goal to lay down 
                                                 
41 Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights, p. 
119-122  
42 Van Dijk, ‘Positive Obligations’ Implied in the European Convention on Human Rights: Are the 
States Still the ‘Masters’ of the Convention?’, p. 17. 
43 See Letsas, 'Strasbourg's Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer', p. 514, who 
also rightly argues that it is the substantive arguments about the object and purpose of a treaty that 
will determine which intentions of the drafters are crucial and not the other way around. 
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moral principles as the foundations on which the future generations could build and 
always update the requirements of effective human rights protection. This could be the 
underlying idea in the speech of M. Robert Schuman in Rome in 1950:  
 
'This Convention which we are signing is not as full or as precise as many of 
us would have wished. However, we have thought it our duty to subscribe to 
it as it stands. It provides foundations on which to base the defence of human 
personality against all tyrannies and against all forms of totalitarianism.' 44 
 
But finding hints like this – or contrary to this – in the preparatory works of the Convention 
does not necessarily determine or confirm the object and purpose of the ECHR and the 
meaning and requirements of its provisions (as article 32 of the VCLT prescribes). It 
would be circular to argue that we should focus on the specific or the abstract intentions 
of the drafters because this is what they intended us to do: we need to make our choice as 
to which intentions count based on reasons outside of the drafters' intentions.45 Because 
the fact that the Convention contains a provision that calls for the right to respect for 
private and family life does not in itself preclude the possibility that it was the concept 
rather than the particular understanding, the conception that the drafters had of the concept 
that we are supposed to show fidelity to. It is one thing to agree that we must show fidelity 
to what the drafters say and quite another to give effect to their particular interpretation or 
conception of the concepts that they used.46 Neither is it enough for us to argue that we 
should focus on the abstract concepts because the language of the text is abstract – as in 
fact is the language of the Convention – although it might be a reason in favour of such 
an interpretation. Instead, we need substantive reasons for believing that this is the way to 
show our respect for what the Convention grants and requires. Just as a sergeant who is 
asked to take the most experienced men on patrol47 and is supposed to choose for his own 
reasons which men would carry out the role most effectively, we may consider the ECtHR 
too as an institution that is bound by an obligation to discover the interpretation of the text 
                                                 
44 Sixth Session of the Committee of Ministers, Rome November 1950. See J G Merrills and A H 
Robertson, Human Rights in Europe, A Study of the European Convention on Human Rights, (4th 
edition, 2001) p. 5. [my emphasis] 
45 R Dworkin, ‘The Forum of Principle’ in his A Matter of Principle (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 
1985), p. 52-54. On this point about the interpretation of the ECHR see Letsas, 'Strasbourg's 
Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer', p. 536-538. 
46 See R Dworkin, Freedom's Law. The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996) p. 10, for the argument that history is only 
relevant in order to establish what the drafters intended to say and not in order to find out what 
other intentions they had, i.e. what they intended the interpretation and effect of what they said to 
be.   
47 R Dworkin, ‘The Model of Rules II’ in Taking Rights Seriously, (Duckworth: London, 1977), p. 
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that will secure human rights in the most effective way.48 Following this line of argument, 
when we seek to determine what positive obligations are inherent in effective respect we 
need to set aside formalist and originalist approaches to the text and construct moral 
arguments about the substance of the right at stake. In the following section, I examine 
the development of this approach to the interpretation of the effectiveness principle. 
 
2. Substantive effectiveness approach 
A. Living instrument approach and evolutive interpretation  
 
The Court made the first remarkable step away from a conventional effectiveness 
approach quite early in its jurisprudence, in the landmark Golder v. United Kingdom 
case.49 The applicant claimed that he had a right to consult a solicitor with a view to 
initiating libel proceedings against a prison officer, even though Article 6(1) determines 
the right generally as an entitlement to a fair and public hearing – 'the right to a fair trial' 
as its title proclaims. The government denied the existence of a right of access to court 
due to the lack of an explicit provision: the applicant would be entitled to a fair trial if he 
reached the court but there was no obligation on the part of the state to allow or facilitate 
his access to court. The ECtHR decided in favour of the applicant that a 'right to access' 
is 'inherent' in the right stated by Article 6 and that this right. Therefore, the obligation of 
the state to secure that right, the Court explained, is not an 'extensive interpretation forcing 
new obligations on the Contracting States: it is based on the very terms of the first sentence 
of Article 6(1) read in its context and having regard to the object and purpose of the 
Convention'.50 The reference made here is to the VCLT principles for treaty interpretation, 
which the Court applied in a different way than a conventional effectiveness approach 
would have suggested: the language of the text did not 'necessarily refer only to 
proceedings already pending' but could as well apply to the present case.  
Most importantly, the Court noted that the object and purpose of the Convention, as 
determined also by the Preamble to the ECHR, refers to the 'common heritage of political 
traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law' and therefore requires the Court to stress 
that ‘in civil matters one can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being a 
possibility of having access to courts.51 As a result, because the denial of the right to access 
                                                 
48 In this sense the Court is subject to the ‘rigorous demand’ that an agent is subject when instructed 
to meet an abstract standard by deciding for her own substantive reasons what meets that standard, 
‘which is of course a different question form the question of what some person – any person – 
thinks meets the standard’, see R Dworkin, Justice in Robes, (Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 
124. 
49 Golder v. United Kingdom, (1975) 1 EHRR 524. 
50 Ibid, para. 36. 
51 Ibid, para. 34. 
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to court would have serious consequences for the rule of law, the court concluded that this 
right is 'inherent' in the right to fair trial (Article 6 para. 1) and explained that this is not 
an 'extensive interpretation forcing new obligations on the Contracting States: it is based 
on the very terms of the first sentence of Article 6 para. 1 read in its context and having 
regard to the object and purpose of the Convention'.52 It is worth noting here that the Court 
did not consider it necessary to resort to supplementary means of interpretation, as the 
Vienna Convention (Article 32) allows when the meaning of the provision after the 
application of the general rule (Article 31) is left 'ambiguous or obscure'. The Court found 
this interpretation to be based on the very terms, on the very wording of the provision 
contrary to the government’s contention that the silence of the text means that the drafters 
wanted to exclude this right from the ambit of this provision. 
The next significant development took place when the Court tied the notion of 
effectiveness with that of respect found in the provision of Article 8 of the Convention, 
i.e. that 'everyone has a right to an effective respect for his private and family life.'  The 
idea of 'effective respect' introduced a different understanding of the state’s fundamental 
obligation to secure the ECHR rights. In Marckx v. Belgium, the Court had to decide 
whether the right to respect for the family life of an unmarried mother and her child born 
out of wedlock had been violated by Belgian legislation that recognized immediately as 
family ties only those created within marriage. The applicant argued that by not endorsing 
the maxim ‘mater semper certa est’ the legislation put 'illegitimate' families – those created 
outside wedlock – in the unfavourable position of having to establish through various legal 
procedures the status of a family, something which was automatically recognized to 
'legitimate' families. In that way, the applicant claimed that her right to respect for her 
family life had not been respected (Article 8) and she had been discriminated against 
(Article 14) because the state did not automatically accept her family ties with her 
biological child whereas this was the case for married mothers and their children. The 
Court decided that there had been a violation of the applicant’s rights on the basis that the 
object of the right to respect for one’s private and family life may essentially be that of 
protecting the individual against arbitrary interference but that it 
 
'does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in 
addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive 
obligations inherent in an effective respect for family life '53 
 
                                                 
52 Ibid, para. 36. 
53 Marckx v. Belgium, at para. 31, as well as Airey v. Ireland, at para. 32, X and Y v. Netherlands, 
(1986) 8 EHRR 235 at para. 23 and a long sequence of other judgments with regards to the right 
to respect for private and family life. 
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The Court also relied on the finding that significant change had taken place in the 
understanding and endorsement of the distinction between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' 
families, as indicated by the 'evolution of rules and attitudes'54 in modern societies. 
However, this was of minor importance because the decisive reason was that it had 
discovered something that, as in the Artico case, was essential to the very nature of the 
right at stake, an obligation that was inherent in an effective respect. This choice was not 
justified on the basis that the member states seemed at that time to have endorsed a new 
positive obligation in their domestic legislations, which would have been indicative of a 
common ground in legislative policy. On the contrary, the Court made this choice because 
it found this obligation to be inherent, built-in the substance of the right to family life as 
protected in the text of the Convention.  
This case is important for two reasons: the first is that it sets the effectiveness principle 
as the bedrock of the concept of positive obligations and the second that it ties it with the 
'living instrument approach' in order to identify what obligations might be 'inherent in an 
effective respect.' The method that helped the Court discover this inherent obligation was 
that it put the concept of family in the light of the present-day conditions and found that 
the way that modern societies understand this concept does no longer leave room for a 
distinction or differential treatment between 'illegitimate' and 'legitimate' families:   
 
It is true that, at the time when the Convention of 4 November 1950 was 
drafted, it was regarded as permissible and normal in many European 
countries to draw a distinction in this area between the 'illegitimate' and the 
'legitimate' family. However, the Court recalls that this Convention must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions (Tyrer judgment of 25 April 
1978, Series A no. 26, p. 15, para. 31).55 
 
The Court’s approach to the interpretation of the Convention 'in light of the present-day 
conditions' had been introduced in the earlier Tyrer56 case where the Court famously 
decided that the corporal punishment inflicted by policemen on juveniles on the Isle of 
Man amounted to degrading punishment within the meaning of Article 3 of the 
Convention. That was because the 'nature and context of the punishment itself and [the] 
manner and method of its execution'57 did not meet the 'commonly accepted standards in 
the penal policy of the member States of the Council of Europe in this field.'58 In this case, 
the Court looked at the development of a different common standard, which lowered the 
threshold for considering a punishment as degrading and therefore agreed with the 
                                                 
54 Marckx v. Belgium, at para. 40-41. 
55 Ibid., para. 41. 
56 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, (1978) 2 EHRR 1 
57 Ibid, para. 31. 
58 Ibid, para. 32. 
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applicant that such a practice could no longer be tolerated. The Convention as a 'living 
instrument…cannot but be influenced by these developments'59 and must to depart from 
any interpretation that fixes the meaning of degrading punishment at the time of 
enactment.  
Perhaps the most remarkable example of an application of the effectiveness principle 
in light of the living instrument approach for the identification of a positive obligation has 
been the famous case of Airey v. Ireland.60 The Court decided that Ireland had violated 
Mrs Aireys’ right for effective access to the courts in order to obtain a decree of separation 
from her violent husband by failing to provide her with legal aid in civil proceedings, 
which was found to be essential under the particular circumstances. The government’s 
objections were based on the argument that no system of legal aid for civil proceedings 
was available in Ireland and that Article 6 para.3 of the Convention only granted a right 
to free legal representation in criminal proceedings. Therefore, according to the 
government, the applicant was supposedly free to represent herself – which was 
permissible in her case before the High Court – or to employ a lawyer by her own means. 
Judge Thor Vilhjalmsson put forward a famous objection in his dissenting opinion, where 
he complained that 'the war on poverty cannot be won through broad interpretations of the 
Convention.'61 In the same vein, the Commission’s and the government’s view was that 
the Convention should not be interpreted so as to promote social and economic 
developments. However, the Court decided that the state was liable because it had not 
taken into account the inability of the applicant to exercise effectively her right to access 
to courts due to her lack of sufficient means: 
 
'despite the absence of a similar clause [i.e. similar to paragraph 3(c) 
concerning legal aid in criminal proceedings] for civil litigation, Article 6 
para. 1 may sometimes compel the State to provide for the assistance of a 
lawyer when such assistance proves indispensable for an effective access to 
court'62 
 
Remarkably, for the first time the Court made also the following significant statement by 
saying that it was  
 
'aware that the further realisation of social and economic rights is largely 
dependent on the situation – notably financial – reigning in the State in 
question. On the other hand, the Convention must be interpreted in the light 
of the present-day conditions…and it is designed to safeguard the individual 
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in a real and practical way…Whilst the Convention sets forth what are 
essentially civil and political rights, many of them have implications of a 
social and economic nature. The Court therefore considers, like the 
Commission, that the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may 
extend into the sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive 
factor against such an interpretation; there is no water-tight division 
separating that sphere from the field covered by the Convention.'63 
 
This is a powerful restatement of the principle that a positive obligation may be found to 
be within the meaning of the text, when the Court can justify that it is essential or 
'indispensable' to what we think today is required by the Convention in the particular 
case.64 So, the Court seems to be saying, if a social or economic entitlement proves to be 
indispensable for the effective exercise of a right then this is not an extensive reading of 
the Convention but it is an interpretation that gives real meaning to the essence of the 
right, as it is actually found within the text of the Convention. In other words, the applicant 
in this case was not asking the Court to create a general right to legal aid in civil 
proceedings over and above what the text provides in Article 6 for criminal proceedings. 
To the contrary, she was claiming that in her particular circumstances but also for anyone 
who cannot have effective access to the courts due to the lack of financial means there is 
a right to be provided with the means that would guarantee effective access to the courts. 
This is to say that there is an obligation already there within the meaning of the right of 
access to court (Article 6 para.1) and is indispensable to an effective respect of the right 
not of those who can afford to access the courts but of the applicant and all of those who 
cannot. The concern of the Court was not to recognize the existence of an obligation of 
the state to provide free legal assistance for everyone in civil proceedings; the Convention 
provides legal aid in criminal proceedings for specific reasons, such as the fact that the 
personal liberty of the individual is at stake. The Court here was concerned with ensuring 
the effective protection of the right of access to court for those who would be unable to 
use this right in any meaningful way without legal aid. 
In the same spirit, the Court found that effective respect might entail positive 
obligations, which could as well 'involve the adoption of measures designed to secure 
respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
64 This decision has been reaffirmed in the more recent case P C & S v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 
EHRR 31, again concerning the effective protection of the right of access to court. This time, 
besides the principle of effectiveness the Court added that also the principle of fairness required 
that the applicant receive the assistance of a lawyer, ibid, para. 95. This could be seen as an attempt 
by the Court to stress that it wishes to reach the best possible understanding of the essence of the 
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Positive Obligations under the ECHR 43 
 
themselves.'65 By identifying  positive obligations in this area the Court does not aim to 
assume a paternalistic, overprotective role or create a 'right to security' but merely to 
provide effective protection for what a right already guaranteed in the Convention requires 
in the particular instance.  
In subsequent judgments, the ECtHR has developed the living instrument approach 
as a clear rejection of formalism and originalism as well as a turn towards a 'moral reading' 
of the Convention in light of the values that underlie it.66 Firstly, the Court has declared 
as irrelevant for the interpretation of the Convention the lack of clear intentions of the 
drafters about what falls within the scope of its provisions and has recognized the 
existence of rights and obligations that the drafters appear to have not envisaged.67 A step 
further and even contrary to the drafters clearly expressed concrete intentions was made 
in Young, James & Webster, where the Court had to decide whether the legal requirement 
that all employees of certain class become members of a particular trade union – the 
'closed shops' in Britain – was compatible with freedom of association under Article 11 
of the Convention. The applicants did not want to join the union and claimed that the 
relevant provision should be understood as embodying a negative freedom of association 
as well, that is a right not to join a union and not to suffer any negative consequences – 
such as dismissal – when deciding not to join. The argument of the Government was that 
this right ‘had been deliberately excluded from the Convention.’68 The Court found that 
their dismissal constituted a violation of the Convention, even though the government 
cited evidence from the preparatory works that it was undesirable to introduce into the 
Convention a rule under which no one could be compelled to belong to an association. 
However, remarkably, the Court did not consider this to be the decisive factor but gave 
greater weight to the argument that such a practice would strike at the very substance of 
the concept of freedom of association that the Convention is designed to guarantee: 
 
‘Assuming for the sake of argument that…[it] was deliberately omitted from 
and so cannot be regarded as itself enshrined in, the Convention, it does not 
                                                 
65 See among others, X and Y v. the Netherlands, Osman v. United Kingdom, (1998) 29 EHRR 245, 
Edwards v. United Kingdom, (2002) 35 EHRR 19. 
66 See Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, chs. 2 and 
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Constitution in Dworkin, Freedom's Law. The Moral Reading of the American Constitution. 
67 Matthews v. United Kingdom, (1999) 28 EHRR 361, the Court in this case was considering 
whether Article 3 Protocol 1 – right to free elections ‘in the choice of the legislature’ – applies to 
the European Parliament and declared that ‘the mere fact that a body was not envisaged by the 
drafters of the Convention cannot prevent that body from falling within the scope of the 
Convention’, at para. 39. 
68 Young, James & Webster v. United Kingdom, (1983) 5 EHRR 201. This is a much statement 
stronger than that made in the Johnston case where the Court said that there was no indication of a 
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follow that the negative aspect of a person’s freedom of association falls 
completely outside the ambit of Article 11 and that each and every 
compulsion to join a particular trade union is compatible with the intention 
of that provision. To construe Article 11 as permitting every kind of 
compulsion in the field of trade union membership would strike at the very 
substance of the freedom it is designed to guarantee.’69  
 
 
Secondly, following up from the reasoning in Tyrer and Marckx that first established the 
living instrument approach, a significant development towards a moral reading of the 
Convention takes place in Dudgeon.70 In this case, the Court noted that the change in the 
member States’ treatment of homosexual behaviour signifies a better conception of the 
right to family and private life that made the penalization of homosexuality in Northern 
Ireland an unacceptable treatment of homosexuals and violated their rights under Article 
8 para. 1 of the Convention: 
 
'As compared with the era when the legislation was enacted, there is now a 
better understanding, and in consequence an increased tolerance, of 
homosexual behaviour to the extent that the great majority of the member 
States of the Council of Europe it is no longer considered to be necessary or 
appropriate to treat homosexual practices of the kind now in question as in 
themselves a matter to which the sanctions of the criminal law should be 
applied'71 
 
Notice how the Court contrasts the restricted conception of homosexual behaviour of the 
past with the newer understanding of it: treating the Convention as a living instrument 
means identifying not just the most recent but also the best understanding of the value at 
stake. This is a very good example that illustrates the point that turning to the best possible 
interpretation here means turning to the one that comes closer to the moral truth about the 
interpretive questions that the Convention’s provisions pose.72  
This shift towards substantive moral reasoning and away from a conventional 
understanding of the states’ obligations based on the ECHR is gradual and with frequent 
retreats, especially when applicants argue for the existence of positive obligations in 
sensitive moral issues. In such cases, the Court usually finds that national authorities are 
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70 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, (2002) 34 EHRR 61.  
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Letsas, as above in note 66. 
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better placed to decide these issues and leaves the matter to a rather wide margin of 
appreciation. The Court also often retreats from a substantive examination of the moral 
requirements of effective respect in positive obligations cases with socio-economic 
implications on the basis that such cases involve resource allocation decisions that 
national authorities are also better placed to decide. I believe this is largely due to the 
difficulty in addressing the distributive justice questions that these cases pose rather than 
due to any appeal to the idea of consensus or common ground. To make this point clear I 
will examine these cases separately in chapter 2 and in the following section focus only 
in those that reveal a tension between a conventional (based on consensus) and a moral, 
evolutive interpretation of the Convention. Besides, it is part of my wider argument in this 
thesis, that we must first clear the way of all flawed limitations to the interpretive quest 
for effectiveness, including an appeal to consensus, and then welcome and address the 
distributive justice issues raised by claims to resources and positive obligations. 
 
B. Consensus, Common Ground and Substantive Moral Arguments 
 
Echoing concerns expressed in particular in the context of positive obligations cases, the 
Court has often retreated from a dynamic interpretation of the Convention in light of 
present day conditions and the values that underlie it. This has usually happened where 
the Court considered that there is no ‘common ground’ or ‘consensus’ between the 
Member States of the Council of Europe about the meaning of a provision and allowed 
for a wide margin of appreciation of the national authorities to determine the requirements 
of the text and thus each state’s positive obligations. Such were the cases concerning the 
legal status and rights of transsexuals.73 In these cases, the Court had repeatedly denied 
the existence of a positive obligation by pointing to the diversity of practices and the lack 
of common ground amongst member states rather than looking at whether there were 
substantive moral reasons to justify such an obligation as indispensable to an effective 
respect for private life.  
In Rees v. United Kingdom, the first of a series of judgments concerning the positive 
obligation of the state for the official recognition of post-operative transsexuals the 
applicant was claiming that the British authorities had a duty to amend his birth certificate 
to reflect his new, post-operative identity as a male and not inform third parties of that 
change. The Court relied on the remark it had first made in Abdulaziz, Cabales and 
Balkandali just a few months earlier.74 When there is no common ground on the 
                                                 
73 Rees v. United Kingdom, (1987) 9 EHRR 56, Cossey v. United Kingdom, (1991) 13 EHRR 622, 
and X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom, (1997) 24 EHRR 143.  
74 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 471. 
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requirements of 'respect', the positive obligations arising from Article 8 cannot extend into 
an area where diversity of practices pertains and consensus is meagre, which is an area 
where the states should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. In the Court’s words, the 
reason for this is that  
 
'the notion of ‘respect’ is not clear-cut, especially as far as those positive 
obligations are concerned: having regard to the diversity of practices 
followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the notion’s 
requirements will vary considerably from case to case.'75   
 
The Court admitted that several states had made steps towards recognizing the obligation 
that the United Kingdom had allegedly failed to fulfil, that is, they had given transsexuals 
the option of changing their personal status to fit with their newly gained identity. 
However, the Court found that, in the present case, the law appeared to be in a 'transitional 
stage', as these states had provided for such an option 'subject to conditions of varying 
strictness and retained a number of express reservations' whereas in some states the option 
did not even exist.76  
Four years later, in Cossey v. United Kingdom, the Court gave an identical judgement, 
as it found that the applicant’s claim and circumstances were not distinguishable from 
those of Rees noting also that there had been 'no significant scientific developments that 
had occurred in the meantime'.77 The crucial point of disagreement between the majority 
and the minority was, in both cases, whether there had been a clear scientific or societal 
development that was already reflected in the legislation and policy of the majority of 
states. It was only another eight years later, in Sheffield and Horsham v UK,78 that the 
minority opinion was significantly strengthened but also diverted its focus from the 
inquiry about common ground towards more substantive considerations. Yet again, the 
majority disregarded a thorough comparative study submitted by the non-governmental, 
human rights organisation, Liberty, as well as the fact that only four out of thirty-seven 
states did not provide for the option of amendment of birth certificates of post-operative 
transsexuals. Instead, the majority restated its hesitation to impose, what it considered to 
be, a controversial obligation to undertake a particular social policy. It said that the 
applicants had not shown that since Cossey there had been 
 
'any findings in the area of medical science which settle conclusively the 
doubts concerning the causes of the condition of transsexualism…' and  
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…'As to the legal developments in this area…the survey [submitted by 
Liberty] does not indicate that there is yet any common approach as to how 
to address the repercussions which the legal recognition of a change of sex 
may entail for other areas of law such as marriage, filiation, privacy or data 
protection, or the circumstances in which a transsexual may be compelled to 
reveal his or her pre-operative gender.'79   
 
Interestingly though, it appears that the minority did not focus its criticism merely on the 
issue of common ground but stressed that there is something wrong about the way the 
right to gender re-assignment is conceived by the majority: 
 
‘…It is no longer possible, from the standpoint of Article 8 of the Convention 
and in a Europe where considerable evolution in the direction of legal 
recognition is constantly taking place, to justify a system such as that 
pertaining in the respondent State, which treats gender dysphoria as a 
medical condition, subsidises gender re-assignment surgery but then 
withholds recognition of the consequences of that surgery thereby exposing 
post-operative transsexuals to the likelihood of recurring distress and 
humiliation. 
 
For the above reason we consider that respect for private life under Article 8 
imposes a positive obligation on the respondent State to amend their law in 
such a way that post-operative transsexuals no longer run the risk of public 
embarrassment and humiliation…’80 
 
Unfortunately, these substantive considerations about what effective respect for the new 
identity of post-operative transsexuals entails did not prevail in this case. Nevertheless, 
similar considerations were eventually adopted in a unanimous decision of the Grand 
Chamber in Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom. In this case, the Court stressed that 
practical and effective respect for the rights granted is of crucial importance, and that this 
kind of respect requires a certain degree of consistency in responding to any 'evolving 
convergence as to the standards to be achieved.'81 This is expressed in the following terms: 
 
‘…The Court is struck by the fact that nonetheless the gender re-assignment 
which is lawfully provided is not met with full recognition in law, which 
might be regarded as the final and culminating step in the long process of 
transformation which the transsexual has undergone…The coherence of the 
administrative and legal practices within the domestic system must be 
regarded as an important factor in the assessment carried out under Article 8 
of the Convention…Where a State has authorised the treatment and 
surgery…financed or assisted in financing the operations…it appears 
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illogical to refuse to recognise the legal implications of the result to which 
the treatment leads.’82 
 
The Court considered the government’s argument – and indeed its own previous ruling in 
Sheffield and Horsham – about the lack of a common approach among the Contracting 
States on the repercussions of the legal recognition of a change of sex for other areas of 
law. Notably, it explained that, according to the principle of subsidiarity, states do enjoy 
a certain degree of margin of appreciation in resolving the legal and practical problems 
posed in this case, because it is primarily for the Contracting States to secure rights and 
adopt the measures that would resolve these problems. The lack of a common approach 
and the existence of a diversity of practices were deemed 'hardly surprising'83 though, and 
of less importance84 in the particular case, where the Court went on to argue that the 
applicant's claim is such that cannot be left to the margin of appreciation of states: 
 
‘…In the twenty first century the right of transsexuals to personal 
development and to physical and moral security in the full sense enjoyed by 
others in society cannot be regarded as a matter of controversy requiring the 
lapse of time to cast clearer light on the issues involved. In short, the 
unsatisfactory situation in which post-operative transsexuals live in an 
intermediate zone as not quite one gender or the other is no longer 
sustainable. 
 
…Having regard to the above considerations, the Court finds that the 
respondent Government can no longer claim that the matter falls within their 
margin of appreciation, save as regards the appropriate means of achieving 
recognition of the right protected under the Convention…’85 
 
Note the contrast: when the Court refers to the official recognition of the post-operative 
transsexuals’ new identity it speaks of their right to personal development and to physical 
and moral security. Whereas, when it refers to the repercussions that might arise in other 
areas of law it talks of 'legal and practical problems' and 'measures that would resolve 
these problems' all of which could86 fall within the margin of appreciation of states and in 
which issues diversity could be sustainable. In this way, it clearly establishes that to have 
one’s actual identity – in the case of transsexuals, their post-operative identity – respected 
                                                 
82 Ibid, para. 78. 
83 Ibid, para. 85. 
84 For the argument that, following up from Marckx v. Belgium, this is a first of a series of 
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and now often interprets the Convention in light of evidence of even emerging consensus or 
common values found in international law materials and substantive moral reasoning, see Letsas, 
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in the same way that others’ is respected in society is a matter of right that needs to be 
decided on grounds other than the existence of consensus or a common practice. In the 
Court’s own words, the applicant’s claim to have her identity respected 'cannot be 
regarded as a matter of controversy requiring the lapse of time' to be resolved. For, we no 
longer accept this to be a matter that falls in the margin of appreciation of states, as we no 
longer accept that certain individuals should be denied their right to personal development 
and full enjoyment of their identity as an essential feature of their right to private life 
guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR. 
In Goodwin the Court appears to accept that although ‘the notion of respect is not 
clear-cut’ this should not necessarily lead to a wide margin of appreciation of the national 
authorities. More specifically, the lack of consensus or a common approach in a particular 
matter need not mean that there is no right at stake and the case should be understood as 
policy matter that should better be left to the discretion of the national authorities. Instead, 
it makes better sense to suggest that, when we say that respect is not clear-cut, we merely 
acknowledge that it will not be easy to ascertain what rights and positive duties effective 
respect entails. Besides, as I explained earlier in this chapter, the fact that the notion of 
respect or of a particular provision or concept is not clear-cut does not leave room for 
judicial discretion but leads to unavoidable choices in substantive reasoning and 
interpretation. The Court did not elaborate on this but it points to other reasons for finding 
a violation: e.g. when the denial to some individuals of the freedom to develop and fully 
enjoy their identity, a freedom enjoyed by others in society, is incoherent, illogical and 
unjustified.87 
After this significant judgment though, the Court did not follow the same path in 
equally controversial issues but, again, considered that the lack of a common approach or 
consensus meant that it ought to treat the matter at stake as a matter of policy rather than 
an ECHR rights issue.  
For example, in Frette v. France Mr Frette applied for an authorisation by the Social 
Services, which is a prerequisite in order to initiate the procedures for adoption of a child 
in France. During this process, he disclosed that he was homosexual and, as he claimed 
before the ECtHR, he was subsequently denied authorisation –and, effectively, the 
opportunity to be considered for adopting a child– on the impermissible grounds of his 
'choice of lifestyle.'88 In particular, he argued that the relevant national legislation –which 
otherwise provided substantive criteria for deciding on the eligibility– was applied in a 
discriminatory way by the Social Services in his case. Because the authorities provided 
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only unsubstantiated and insufficient reasons for the rejection of his authorisation, which 
he claimed was 'implicitly and exclusively based on his sexual orientation'89 and therefore 
violated his rights under Articles 8 and 14 ECHR. The Court accepted that the decision of 
the national authorities was based decisively on his avowed homosexuality90 and therefore 
interfered with his freedoms. Still, a very narrow majority vote of 4-3 found that this 
interference was justified. Firstly, because it was in pursuit of the legitimate aim of the 
protection of the health and rights of children. Secondly because it was proportional, in 
light of the fact that it was 'indisputable that there is no common ground on the question', 
'no uniform principles on these social issues'91 and that the 'scientific community…is 
divided over the possible consequences of a child’s being adopted by one or more 
homosexual parents.'92  
The dissenting opinion of three judges criticised the majority’s finding that the 
protection of the child’s rights and freedoms could be established as a legitimate aim in 
the particular case as the government had failed – even in the opinion of the Conseil d’ 
Etat – to refer 'to any specific circumstance that might pose a threat to the child’s 
interests.'93 Most significantly, the minority opinion concluded that the lack of reference 
and detailed substantive analysis of any evidence of the potential danger posed to children 
when adopted by homosexuals against a consideration of the situation of the particular 
individual concerned, effectively amounted to an absolute bar to adoption by homosexuals 
which was not proportionate and a violation of the rights protected under Articles 8 and 
14 ECHR. With this final remark, the three judges object to the unsubstantiated and 
superficial examination of the requirement of legitimate aim and of the test of 
proportionality, which, as they argue, necessarily involves a substantive assessment of the 
realities of the case and the reasons that support one or the other interpretation.  
For instance, the Court took into account the report submitted by the UK government 
in Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, which suggested that 'the presence of known or 
strongly suspected homosexuals in the armed forces would produce certain behavioural 
and emotional responses and problems, which would affect morale, and, in turn, 
significantly and negatively affect the fighting power of the armed forces.'94 Examining 
this study gave the Court the opportunity to rightly dismiss it on the basis that the views 
and attitudes expressed in it represented 'a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual 
majority against a homosexual minority’ and therefore that the existence of such views 
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93Ibid, dissenting opinion of Judges Sir Nicholas Bratza, Fuhrmann and Tulkens. 
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and attitudes could not ‘of themselves, be considered by the Court to amount to sufficient 
justification for the interferences with the applicants’ rights.’95 Even though this decision 
dismissed the use of this majoritarian preference as a reason that could justify interference 
with individual freedoms it left open the possibility that if it was supported by other 
reasons it could play a role in justifying interference.96 Apart from that, it is also concerned 
with a rather different situation than the one in Frette where the issue was not a policy 
argument – like in Smith and Grady, about the effectiveness of the armed forces – but one 
of principle, that is whether the rights of others would be endangered or compromised in 
any way. In this harder case, the Court had to assess whether the reasons for the differential 
treatment imposed a prejudicial majoritarian preference on the individual – here, the 
predisposition, suspicion or uncertainty of the majority about the parental suitability of 
homosexuals – but also that the measures taken are necessary in order to ensure the 
effective enjoyment of the rights of others. The dissenting judges rightly complained that 
by failing to address these issues, the majority did not substantively examine the 
proportionality of the interference with the applicant’s freedom but considered the 
national authorities better placed to do so. 
Equally restrained is the Court’s approach in finding the application of Parry & Anor 
v. United Kingdom as inadmissible: the applicants, a female and a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual were put in a quandary97 by the legislation adopted to regulate the 
granting of gender recognition certificates. They wished to remain married after the 
gender reassignment treatment but also to have the new identity of the applicant officially 
recognized by the national authorities – as required after the decision of the ECtHR in the 
Christine Goodwin case. In particular, the applicants claimed that the state had indeed 
taken positive steps following that previous ruling, but that the measures taken still fell 
short of complying fully with the requirements of Articles 8 and 12 ECHR. That is, 
whereas they did provide for official recognition of transsexuals who were single or 
wished to terminate their marriage98 they did not offer the same protection for the freedom 
of choice of other transsexuals who would wish to remain married. The Court 
acknowledged that it ought to examine whether the state had failed to comply with 'a 
positive obligation to ensure the rights of the applicants through the means chosen to give 
effective legal recognition to gender re-assignment.'99  
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Still, the Court reiterated that the notion of 'respect' in Article 8 ECHR is not clear cut 
and that therefore, especially as far as it concerns the positive obligations inherent in it, 
the margin of appreciation of states is wider than in other cases. Following this, it noted 
that English law does not permit same sex marriages but provides for civil partnerships, 
which would give the applicants an alternative viable option of giving to their relationship 
a legal status akin to that they enjoyed in marriage. For these reasons, the Court concluded 
that the effects of the system had not been shown to be disproportionate, and that a fair 
balance had been struck in the circumstances (taking into account that this is an area where 
the states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation) and consequently dismissed the application 
as manifestly ill-founded.  
The applicants' claim with respect to the right to marry was also dismissed on the basis 
that Article 12 ECHR and English law do not allow same sex marriages and no positive 
obligation of the state to provide such an option can be interpretively derived from the 
Convention. The Court relied on its precedent in Rees but also on the lack of a common 
approach among the states to argue, once more, that 'Article 12 of the 
Convention…enshrines the traditional concept of marriage as being between a man and a 
woman' and that the granting of such a right to same sex couples in some particular states 
was an extension of this right and not a right that 'flow[s] from an interpretation of the 
fundamental right as laid down by the Contracting States in the Convention in 1950.' The 
applicants claimed that part of the essence of the right enshrined in Article 8 was to be 
able to continue to remain married, since they chose to form their relationship through this 
institution for its particular historical and social value and remained faithful to this belief 
irrespective of the changes in their lives. With a touch of irony, the Court replied that 'the 
applicants have referred forcefully to the historical and social value of the institution of 
marriage which gives it such emotional importance to them; it is however that value as 
currently recognised in national law which excludes them.'100 With these statements, the 
Court assumed that the value of marriage is to be determined by the national legislation 
and the views of the majority. Individual views and choices that do not conform to the 
majority’s understanding can be excluded from the value of marriage. Finally, with this 
comment, the decision concluded that the matter fell within the state’s margin of 
appreciation, as it did not impair the very essence of the applicants’ right to marry. In fact, 
the Court found that the 'sensitive moral choices concerned and the importance to be 
attached in particular to the protection of children and the fostering of secure family 
environments' were relevant factors that even outweighed the applicants' claim that the 
only way they could effectively exercise their rights was impaired. 
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Looking closer at this exchange, we see that, in the Court’s view, the state had no 
obligation to provide the applicants with an option of retaining their marriage as this 
obligation was not found to be within the scope of Article 12 but only pointed to an 
alternative way of formulating their relationship. Note, however, that what the Court 
points to is an altogether different right that the applicants could exercise - namely the 
right to enter a civil partnership – and not an alternative way of exercising the right whose 
violation they were claiming. Aside from this distracting move, no justification is actually 
given to the argument that the very essence of the right to marry was not impaired. Despite 
an initial statement that the matter cannot be left entirely to the margin of appreciation of 
the Contracting States, the Court did not engage in any substantive discussion of the 
essence of the right and the value that underlies it. Instead, it allowed the national 
authorities and, effectively, the majority’s perception of the value and nature of the 
institution of marriage to determine the essence and content of the right to marry. Against 
this outlook, Dworkin powerfully argues that we offend the abstract right of individuals 
to be treated with equal concern and respect (and any more specific rights that flow from 
it) when we exclude them, without any weighty moral justification, from the continuous 
process of the evolution of the meaning and content of values (such as that of marriage) 
only to protect and impose a majoritarian conception of these values.101 In a truly free 
society, Dworkin explains, these values belong to everyone and to no one save only when 
particularly weighty moral reasons warrant an exception.102 
On the same question of same-sex marriage, the Court has followed this restrained 
approach in two more recent cases. In both Schalk and Kopf v Austria and Hamalainen v 
Sweden,103 the Court acknowledged the heavy personal burden and hard choices that the 
legal framework in their countries imposed on spouses whose marriage was no longer 
considered valid, when one of them proceeded to full legal recognition of their new gender 
identity after gender-reassignment operations. However, the Court restated its position 
that '… Article 8 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as imposing an obligation on 
Contracting States to grant same-sex couples access to marriage … the regulation of the 
effects of a change of gender in the context of marriage falls to a large extent, though not 
entirely, within the margin of appreciation of the Contracting State.'104 The Court relied 
decisively on the fact of the diversity of practices pertaining and the lack of a European 
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consensus on the matter either on allowing same-sex marriages or on how to deal with 
gender recognition in the case of a pre-existing marriage.105 Based on this, it concluded 
that national authorities should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation both with regards to 
the decision whether or not to enact legislation on legal recognition of the new gender of 
post-operative transsexuals and to the rules laid down to achieve a balance between the 
competing public and private interests involved.106 The options that the applicants were 
left with were either to proceed to full legal recognition of their new identity but divorce, 
or to remain married but tolerate the inconvenience caused by the male identity number 
or convert their marriage into a registered partnership.107  
The three dissenting judges objected that, given that 'a particularly important facet of 
an individual's existence or identity is at stake' the decision of the Court should not have 
been influenced decisively by the lack of consensus and common practice or the 
protection of morals.108 This is an argument away from consensus and towards the moral 
truth about the substance of the right at stake. But significantly, the minority opinion also 
highlighted another important issue: that it is 'highly problematic to put two human rights 
– in this case, the right to recognition of one’s gender identity and the right to maintain 
one’s civil status – against each other.'109 Notice also, that the applicants were Evangelical 
Lutherans and therefore divorce was not really a choice for them, as it would contradict 
their strongly held religious convictions. What the three dissenting judges are effectively 
saying is that this is also an unfair choice: no matter what they choose, one of their rights 
will be impaired. And this, to their mind, is an excessive burden for the applicants to bear 
given also that the couple’s continued marital relationship despite full new gender 
recognition would not influence or impair in any way others from exercising or enjoying 
their ECHR rights.110 The dissenting judges’ opinion that this interference is not 
'necessary in a democratic society' echoes Dworkin’s argument that I referred to earlier. 
No particularly weighty reasons, such as the moral rights of others, warrant this limitation 
of one of the applicants’ rights, by way of an exclusion of these individuals from the value 
of marriage, that should, in principle, be open to all in a democratic society.111  
Notice that the examples discussed above raise two especially sensitive moral issues, 
such as same-sex marriage and adoption by homosexuals. In the also controversial issues 
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broadly related to the value of life, such as those concerning the beginning and end of life, 
the Court has taken a similar stance. For instance, the Court still allows a wide margin of 
appreciation in other sensitive areas such as abortion and assisted suicide.112 In Pretty v 
the United Kingdom, the Court denied the existence of a positive obligation of the state 
to permit and facilitate the assisted suicide of a terminally ill woman due to the existence 
of consensus against this practice.113 In addition, in Tysiac v Poland, the Court avoided 
discussing whether any positive obligation of the state to make abortion legally possible 
is inherent in an effective respect for that right.114 Even so, it concluded that the state had 
violated the applicant’s right to respect for her private and family life because it failed in 
its positive obligation to establish an effective procedure, through which the applicant 
could have appealed against her doctors’ refusal to grant her request for abortion.  
Still, it is true that the Court generally seems to be moving from a conventional to a 
moral reading of the Convention.115 The Court’s reasoning in Goodwin signified a 
remarkable change. This, of course, was based on the Court’s long established approach 
to the interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument and its turn towards 
substantive moral reasoning. Many other judgments have followed in the same spirit. For 
instance, the Frette judgment, discussed above, was overturned by EB v France, with the 
justification that 'where sexual orientation is in issue, there is a need for particularly 
convincing and weighty reasons to justify a difference in treatment regarding rights falling 
within Article 8.'116 Similarly, in Dickson v United Kingdom,117 concerning a policy 
procedure for providing facilities for artificial insemination to prisoners and in Hirst v 
United Kingdom,118 concerning the prisoners’ right to vote, the Court found that reference 
to the lack of consensus was not decisive and, instead, assessed and rejected the reasons 
provided by the governments to justify these policies. In particular, the Court in both cases 
considered unacceptable the fact that one policy was a blanket ban (Hirst) and the other 
set the threshold so high against the applicants from the outset that it did not allow a 
proper proportionality assessment of the competing rights and interests (Dickson). In 
addition, on numerous occasions, judges have protested in their dissenting opinions 
against the majority's unjustified over-reliance on consensus and have argued that the 
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existence or lack of a common ground should not be the decisive factor for finding a 
violation or for leaving the matter to the national authorities' margin of appreciation.119 
 
In sum, the Court has largely resisted a conventional effectiveness approach. The 
development of the living instrument approach, as well as the theory of 'autonomous 
concepts', indicates that the Court considers that the Convention’s provisions are made up 
of concepts that require interpretation based on substantive moral reasoning about their 
essence and the principles that underpin them and not based on past or current 
conventional understanding.120 In this way, the Court acknowledges that rights cannot be 
protected effectively if States are allowed to ultimately determine the meaning and 
obligations that follow from the Conventions’ provisions. To the contrary, the Court has 
accepted that its aim is to ensure substantive effectiveness for the ECHR rights: it favours 
a 'substantive rather than a formal conception' of the Convention rights, it feels impelled 
'to look behind the appearances and examine the realities'121 of each case, reflect on the 
value that each right serves, discover and protect its very essence. Moreover, in order to 
guarantee rights that are 'not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective' may require 
that the states' sovereign will be set aside.122 Understood in this way, the principle of 
effectiveness turns the Court’s focus away from a formalistic reading of the Convention 
and into the realm of substantive reasoning that may potentially surpass the understanding 
that national authorities have of the what obligations are inherent in an effective respect 
for the ECHR rights.  
Even more so and inspired by the same principles, the Court’s practice with regards 
to the 'autonomous concepts' in the Convention reaffirms the idea that we cannot rely upon 
the sovereign will of the states to define the meaning and requirements of the rights that 
they are expected to guarantee. It should be upon the Court to determine the meaning of 
the rights that the Convention grants to individuals or the specific obligations that it 
imposes on states and then decide whether states have respected these rights and 
discharged these obligations. Crucially, it ought to do so independently of the states’ 
interpretation of these provisions in their domestic legal system because to allow the 
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contrary could 'lead to results incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, 
which is to protect rights that are not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective'.123  
Finally, I take it that this interpretive approach to the ECHR and the principle of 
effectiveness is not only justified but also essentially tied with the moral foundations of 
human rights as counter-majoritarian: their content should be determined with reference 
to substantive moral principles because these are independent of the will of the majority.124 
This is crucial, not only with respect to negative claims of non-interference, but also when 
seeking to determine the rightful claims of individuals to resources, i.e. those resources 
that they are entitled to as a matter of rights, rather than as a matter of policy that can be 
left to the majoritarian decision-making.  
But this interpretive approach is not followed consistently in the case law on positive 
obligations in particular. Recall, a wide margin of appreciation is often granted to the 
national authorities often with poor justification, due to the lack of consensus. The 
difficulties are even greater when the Court assumes that there are significant resource 
allocation implications. I believe, this is not so because the Court really wants to place 
significant weight on the idea of consensus or because it believes that the ECHR rights 
cannot entail positive obligations. This has to do more with the reluctance to tell the 
government how to act, what social policies to institute or legislative changes to make, or 
how to make resource allocation decisions. In turn, it has to do with the nature of 
obligations, i.e. the fact that claims to positive obligations are claims to resources that 
raise questions about how much and what kind of resources people are entitled to as a 
matter of what effective respect for the substance of the ECHR rights requires.125 This is 
why, I turn the focus of this thesis to the progress and problems in determining the content 
of claims to resources and positive obligations in the Court’s practice and then in theory. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CLAIMS TO RESOURCES AND POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS IN THE PRACTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS. 
 
 
So far, I have observed that the Court has resisted a 'conventional effectiveness' approach 
to the ECHR: it has long abandoned a formalistic and originalist approach to the question 
of what effective respect for the ECHR requires. Furthermore, I have shown that the Court 
is gradually turning to a 'substantive effectiveness' approach: it seeks to develop an 
account of what positive obligations are inherent in effective respect for the ECHR 
interpreted as a 'living instrument'. Following this observation, I have sought to reinforce 
the view that the question of what is essentially required in order to guarantee rights that 
are practical and effective is an interpretive one. This interpretive question must be 
answered with reference to substantive moral arguments, derived from principles of 
political morality and the values underlying the Convention. I demonstrated that, although 
the Court has generally moved towards such an interpretive approach in many areas of its 
case law, it is markedly more cautious in the context of positive obligations cases. This is 
understandable, I argued, since claims to resources and positive obligations call for 
interpretive judgments that are closely related to issues of distributive justice. For this 
reason and due to the absence of principles that could help to determine the content of 
such claims, the Court's practice in this area of the case law is still largely incoherent.  
In this Chapter, I use a schematic categorization to discuss typical examples of groups 
of cases that highlight the inconsistency in the Court’s treatment of claims to resources 
and positive obligations. The first group includes claims that are the least controversial 
because they relate to the traditional functions of the state. In these cases, the effectiveness 
principle mostly takes precedence over competing considerations or objections of 
legitimacy and institutional competence. Then I examine a second group of cases dealing 
with more sensitive issues: those that relate more closely to welfare state responsibilities 
and have potentially significant implications of social and economic nature. These claims 
appear to be competing for limited scarce resources against each other, as well as against 
the public interests of the community. The Court automatically treats some of these claims 
as matters of state policy, for which the state is better placed to decide and declares them 
inadmissible. In other cases, the Court attempts to resolve the supposed conflict of 
interests in a balancing exercise, which, in the absence of clear principles to guide the 
process, is often left to a wide margin of appreciation of the national authorities.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the problems in these trends in the Court's 
case law. My aim will be to suggest that the Court's reluctance to deal with those claims 
that appear to have socio-economic implications is due to the lack of a clear set of 
principles, by which to develop a coherent account of positive obligations inherent in 
effective respect.1  
 
1. Progress: The Traditional Claims and the Principle of Effectiveness: 
Traditional State Functions and Procedural Obligations 
 
The claims that raise little controversy about the scope and extent of the states’ positive 
obligations are those related to the most traditional state functions, such as the application 
of criminal law, the operation of the police and security forces and the administration of 
justice. In particular, these claims usually arise in the context of the right to life (Art. 2), 
the right to liberty and security (Art. 5), the right to access to court and to a fair trial (Art. 
6) and the right to an effective remedy before a national authority for alleged violations 
of the Convention rights (Art. 13).  
In this area of the case law, the Court has acknowledged the existence of procedural 
obligations of the state to protect the right to life, such as the duty to conduct effective 
investigations of killings and disappearances or the duty to provide effective remedies 
under Article 13.2 This duty was first established in McCann v. United Kingdom, where 
the Court stated that '…there should be some form of effective official investigation when 
individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the 
State.'3 During the emergency situation in South-East Turkey in the 1990s a succession of 
similar complaints were made about the failure of the Turkish authorities to effectively 
investigate allegations of wrongful killings or disappearances, to which security forces 
could have been involved. The Court soon went beyond McCann, by accepting that states 
have a duty to carry out an effective investigation irrespective of whether the alleged 
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approach to the positive duties and the normative content of ECHR rights. Among others, see E 
Palmer 'Protecting Socio-Economic Rights Through the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Trends and Developments in the European Court of Human Rights', Erasmus Law Review, Vol. 2, 
Issue 4 (2009), p. 397-425 and S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed. Positive Rights and 
Positive Duties, especially ch. 1. 
2 For a detailed account of the relevant case-law see A Mowbray, ‘Duties of Investigation Under 
the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 435. For more recent cases see: Van Dijk and others (eds.), Theory and Practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, (Intersentia, Antwerpen, Oxford, 2006), pp. 367-386. 
3 McCann v. United Kingdom, (1995) 21 EHRR 97, at para 161. 
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perpetrator was an agent of the state: the mere knowledge of a killing is enough to give 
rise to such positive obligations.4  
While dealing with a series of similar complaints, the Court further specified the 
content of procedural duties based on a generic obligation to conduct effective 
investigation and found violations whenever the authorities had failed to deal promptly 
and adequately with individuals’ complaints about the wrongful acts of the security forces. 
This was so, in particular, when the authorities had not put in place guarantees of 
impartiality and independence, had not responded promptly to allegations, had not 
allowed public scrutiny of investigations, had not interviewed those implicated, had 
accepting at face value the evidence submitted by the alleged perpetrators and had 
attributed the alleged actions to groups, such as the PKK, on the basis of inadequate 
evidence.5 The Court also broadened the scope of these obligations by accepting the 
responsibility of the state to conduct an effective investigation in cases involving missing 
persons, that is, even when it had not been conclusively established that they had been 
unlawfully killed.6  
The Court has also recognised the existence of procedural obligations of states for the 
protection of the right to liberty and security of person (Art. 5) and the right of access to 
court and to a fair trial (Art. 6).7 In this context, the Court has sought to identify and 
safeguard the fundamentals of the rule of law and protect the individual against 
arbitrariness.8 A common feature between these cases and the previously discussed cases 
on procedural obligations is that the Court’s decision about whether the procedures are 
effective is based on criteria about the necessity and suitability of the measures that are in 
                                                 
4 Ergi v Turkey, (2001) 32 EHRR 18, paras 82-85. 
5 See Van Dijk, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 372 and the 
cases cited there. See also C Buckley, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right 
to Life in Turkey’ (2001) 1 Human Rights Law Review 35. 
6 Cyprus v Turkey, (2002) 35 EHRR 30. For a commentary of the judgment see L G Loukaides, 
‘The Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Case of Cyprus v Turkey’ (2002) 15 
Leiden Journal of International Law 225. 
7 Such as the duties to inform detainees of the reasons for their arrest (Art. 5(2)), to bring detainees 
arrested on suspicion of having committed an offence promptly before a judge (Art. 5(3)), to 
provide access to a court for the speedy determination of the lawfulness of a person’s detention 
(Art. 5(4)), the obligation to determine civil and criminal cases within a reasonable time (Art. 6(1)), 
to inform charged persons of the detailed nature of the accusations made against them (Art. 6(3)(a)), 
to provide impecunious individuals with free legal assistance when the interests of justice so require 
in criminal proceedings (Art. 6(3)(c)), to provide charged persons with the assistance of an 
interpreter if they do not understand or speak the language used in court (Art. 6(3)(e)).  
8 So it has interpreted these provisions as entailing an obligation of authorities to account for those 
detained  (Kurt v Turkey), to take measures to safeguard them against death or disappearance whilst 
in custody (Cyprus v Turkey), to provide special procedural safeguards in order to protect the 
interests of persons with mental disabilities (Winterwerp v the Netherlands), to provide actual and 
not nominal legal assistance (Artico v Italy), etc.. For a detailed account of the relevant case-law 
see Mowbray The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights, (Hart Publishing, 2004), chapters 4 and 5. 
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place and not about the outcomes of those procedures. Recall that, in the cases discussed 
earlier, the Court inquired about the existence of guarantees for a prompt, adequate, 
independent and impartial examination of complaints of killings or disappearances. Here 
too, the Court considers certain fundamental institutional and procedural requirements as 
obligations of measures to be taken rather than results to be achieved.9 In particular, it 
seeks to establish whether the measures and procedures in place are of the kind that one 
could reasonably expect them to be as essential features of the rule of law.10  
Besides, notice that in the discussion about what constitutes adequate or appropriate 
guarantees of effective investigation, the potential financial cost of the institutional, 
procedural or operational measures and duties required has never been invoked by the 
respondent governments. No consideration of the potential cost involved has ever 
prevented the Court from scrutinizing the states’ conduct or from finding a violation. 
Nowhere in the relevant case law does a respondent government attempt to deny or limit 
responsibility by arguing that such extensive duties of investigation could have social and 
economic implications and that they are, for this reason alone, matters of policy that 
should better be left to the discretion or margin of appreciation of the national authorities. 
The Court always substantively examines whether the procedures and policies in place 
meet certain standards and only leaves the choice of specific measures to the discretion of 
national authorities. In this context, judges and governments rarely invoke the potential 
budgetary or social policy implications as a reason to limit, let alone to deny, the existence 
of obligations for effective investigation.  
The need to invoke budgetary or social policy considerations appears in cases where 
applicants claim state duties to undertake various preventative measures for the protection 
of individuals that are more open-ended in nature. The Court always substantively 
scrutinizes the applicants' claims, as it does in cases such as those discussed above but the 
extent of responsibility of the authorities regarding preventative measures is more difficult 
to determine. In this area of the case law, we notice that the Court has sought to develop 
certain criteria for delimiting these potentially extensive and costly positive duties. In 
particular, such are the cases concerning the extent of protective policing measures aimed 
at safeguarding the right to life against the risk posed by police officials or private parties. 
In several instances, both the majority and the large minority opinions thoroughly 
                                                 
9 This expression was used earlier in Plattform ‘Arzte fur das Leben’ v Austria (1991) at para 34, a 
case concerning the obligation of the state to protect a demonstration from anti-demonstrations in 
order to guarantee the effective protection of the right under Art. 11. For a more detailed analysis 
of the nature of those essentials of an effective investigation see Kelly and Others v The United 
Kingdom (2001) at paras 95-97.  
10 A special reference to the importance of certain guarantees for the rule of law was made in Kelly 
and Others v The United Kingdom, at para 97. 
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examined whether the authorities had failed to protect the life of individuals effectively 
due to the lack of appropriate rules and procedures.  
For example, the Court investigated whether the planning and operational choices of 
the authorities showed 'a lack of appropriate care in the control and organisation' of an 
arrest operation, which resulted in the death of three suspected terrorists and whether the 
bad planning of the operation rendered the use of lethal force unavoidable.11 They 
examined whether the authorities had taken appropriate care to minimise recourse to lethal 
force in the planning and control of a domestic hostage rescue operation12. They 
considered whether the authorities' overall operational structure included clear guidelines 
and training for the use of firearms by officers, in order to avert the risk of random use of 
force in police pursue operations.13 The principle that features throughout the applicants 
and judges’ reasoning in these cases is that the object and purpose of the Convention is to 
make safeguards of the right to life (Art. 2) practical and effective and that this requires 
scrutinizing the national police authorities’ choices of rules, guidelines, procedures, 
planning and operation.14  
Wider disagreement about what satisfies the standard of effectiveness is generated by 
claims for protective measures against threats to life posed by private parties, rather than 
state officials.  In these cases, the Court has had to refine its reasoning in order to decide 
which omissions could count as violations of ECHR rights. In the most significant 
example, the frequently cited Osman case,15 the Court had to decide whether police in 
London had failed to discharge their obligation to take preventative operational measures 
to protect Mr Osman and his son. Their lives were at risk from the criminal acts of a 
teacher, who was obsessed with the young boy. In this instance, the Court took a step 
beyond basic rule of law responsibilities, such as the basic obligation to enact and 
implement criminal law prohibitions of murder or conduct effective investigations.16 The 
question here was the extent of state responsibility to avert threats to life and bodily 
integrity. The Court acknowledged that this was a difficult question given the 'difficulties 
in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational 
choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources.'17 However, the Court 
did not consider the case to be a matter of state policy and did not leave it to the margin 
of appreciation of the national authorities. Instead, it sought to identify a criterion that 
                                                 
11 McCann, at para 212. 
12 Andronicou and Constantinou v Cyprus (1997) 
13 Makaratzis v Greece (2004) 
14 See McCann, Ergi, Andronicou and Constantinou and Makaratzis. 
15 Osman v The United Kingdom (1998). 
16 See A Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights, at p. 16. 
17 Osman, para 116. 
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would help it clarify what effective protection of the right to life requires in similar cases. 
This criterion came to be known as the Osman test: the obligation to take preventative 
measures 'must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or 
disproportionate burden on the authorities’ and a violation will be established if the 
applicants 'show that the authorities did not do all that could be reasonably expected of 
them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have 
knowledge.'18  
Subsequent case law has regularly evoked and applied this principle in relation to fatal 
accidents attributed to dangerous activities, which raise issues of state responsibility, such 
as the operation of a chemical plant very close to people’s homes19 or the testing of 
atmospheric nuclear weapons in the presence of ignorant servicemen in the area.20 In 
general, the Osman test has informed the interpretation of the regulations that must govern 
the licensing, setting up, operation and security of dangerous activities, as well as the 
minimum conditions of any investigation into the cause of the loss of life that is allegedly 
related to such activities.21 The Court has even used this principle in order to determine 
whether authorities had taken all measures expected of them to protect the life of 
vulnerable individuals in their care22 or to prevent harm from the abusive or neglectful 
behaviour of others.23 
Notice that in Osman, the Court has admitted that not every claimed risk to life or 
personal integrity can entail for the authorities a positive obligation to take measures to 
prevent that risk from materialising.24 Instead, the Court developed the criterion of 'real 
and immediate risk to life' that authorities 'knew or ought to have known' and incorporated 
in it the concern about the potential resource allocation implications of such measures. 
According to this criterion, the authorities are under an obligation to take only those 
measures that, on the one hand, could avert a known, real and immediate risk but, on the 
other hand, are reasonable and not impossible or disproportionate given the availability 
and proper allocation of resources. The crucial feature of this test then is that the decision 
                                                 
18 Ibid. My emphasis.  
19 Guerra and Others v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357. 
20 McGinley and Egan v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 1, L.C.B v United Kingdom (1999) 27 
EHRR 212. 
21 Oneryildiz v Turkey (2004) 39 EHRR 12, para 149. As well as the public’s right to information 
about the potential dangers of such activities, see also Guerra, at para 60. 
22 Such as prisoners from their dangerous cellmates in Edwards v United Kingdom, (2002) 35 
EHRR 19 at paras 54-56 or against the risk of committing suicide whilst in custody in Keenan v 
United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 913 at paras 90-93. 
23 E.g. by putting in place legislation that effectively deters against serious breaches of the personal 
integrity of vulnerable individuals in A v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 611 or by removing 
children from their neglectful or abusive domestic environment in Z v United Kingdom (2002) 34 
EHRR 97 and E v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 31. 
24 Osman, para 116. 
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about what measures or resources are inherent in effective respect is not pre-empted by an 
objection about the potential socio-economic implications. To the contrary, concern about 
these implications may be part of a broader argument about the reasonableness or the 
unfairness of the allocation of resources. This, I note, is not a decision about outcomes to 
be achieved, as the Court itself put it, but a decision about the kind of treatment afforded 
to individuals, i.e. the level of concern and respect shown for individuals through the 
measures and policies adopted.25  
Indeed, in a series of judgments concerning the conditions of detention the Court places 
great emphasis on the 'lack of respect for the applicant' that the particular conditions 
amount to,26 or the special respect, concern and further obligations owed to children27 or 
to individuals with mental or physical disabilities.28 In all these cases, the Court has found 
that the lack of certain minimal conditions of sanitation, nutrition,29 cell size and 
recreation, ventilation and medical care, or the lack of care to adapt living conditions to 
                                                 
25 In this sense, the positive obligations or measures that we can reasonably expect the authorities 
to undertake are 'conduct-based' rather than 'result-based'. For this point see also FC Ebert and RI 
Sijniensky, 'Preventing Violations of the Right to Life in the European and the Inter-American 
Human Rights Systems: From the Osman Test to a Coherent Doctrine on Risk Prevention?' (2015) 
Human Rights Law Review 15 (2), pp. 343-368, at p. 347. 
26 Peers v Greece (2001) 33 EHRR 51 at para 75. Similar are the cases of Kudla v Poland (2002) 
35 EHRR 11 and Dougoz v Greece (2002) 34 EHRR 61, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (2011) 53 
EHRR 2 Also, the ECtHR has found a violation of Article 3 ECHR for the conditions in police 
detention centres in Greece that are meant to be used temporarily but are actually used for long 
periods of time, despite the fact that they lack the appropriate conditions, see Kaja v. Greece, 
Application no. 32927/03 (27 October 2006), Siasios & Ors v. Greece, Application no. 30303/07 
(4 June 2009), Ibram v.Greece, Application no. 39606/09 (25 January 2011), Lica v. Greece, 
Application no. 74279/10 (7 July 2012).  
27 For instance the Court has found that states violated the applicants' rights under Article 3 because 
they failed to provide conditions of detention that respected the applicants' dignity and humanity 
and did not take into account their particular needs and vulnerability as minor asylum seekers in 
detention. See Mahmundi and Others v Greece, Application no. 14902/10 (31 July 2012), Popov v 
France, Application Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07 (19 January 2012), where the Court found that 
the conditions (in dangerous iron framed beds for adults, without play areas or activities, and in an 
insecure and hostile atmosphere) in which the applicants’ children had been obliged to live with 
their parents in a situation of particular vulnerability heightened by their detention were bound to 
cause them distress and have serious psychological repercussions. Significantly in Muskhadzhiyeva 
and others v. Belgium, Application no. 41442/07 (19 January 2010) the Court stressed that the 
extreme vulnerability of a child was paramount and took precedence over the status as an illegal 
alien. 
28 Grimailovs v Latvia, Application no. 6087/03 (25 June 2013), where the Court stressed that the 
State could not absolve itself from its obligation to ensure adequate conditions of detention adapted 
to the special needs of prisoners with physical disabilities by shifting the responsibility to cellmates, 
Asalya v Turkey, Application No. 43875/09 (15 April 2014), Helhal v. France, Application No. 
10401/12 (19 February 2015), Vincent v France, Application no. 6253/03, (24 October 2006), 
Price v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 53, Keenan v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 913. 
29 In Herman and Serazadishvili v. Greece Application nos. 26418/11 and 45884/11 (24 April 
2014), the Court noted that the amount of 5,87 euros per day for food and drink is not enough for 
the appropriate nutrition of a person living in temporary accommodation for months and, therefore, 
fails to provide the conditions showing respect for her dignity.  
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the particular needs of people with disabilities amounts to inhuman and degrading 
treatment.  
  Crucially, the Court has declared that objections about the 'lack of resources cannot 
in principle justify prison conditions which are so poor as to reach the threshold of 
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.'30 It seems to me that this statement 
relies on an assumption about the unfairness of leaving a human being in such conditions. 
In particular, it is the assumption that a fair allocation of even scarce resources would have 
ensured certain minimal conditions and that failure to provide them demonstrates lack of 
concern for the most basic humane treatment of individuals. I believe this assumption is 
justified in the context of the Council of Europe, as it seems implausible for states 
members of the Council of Europe to claim that they are unable to meet conditions such 
as those described above, while fulfilling at the same time other equally fundamental 
obligations. I will return to this argument in Chapter 5. Still, not all cases allow such a 
straightforward argument. In fact, when a claim appears to raise sensitive issues with 
potentially far-reaching social and economic implications it becomes more difficult for 
the Court to distinguish between justified rights-claims and matters of policy that should 
better be left to the national authorities. It is to these more controversial cases that I now 
turn. 
 
2. Problems: The Sensitive Claims and the Margin of Appreciation: 
Claims Closer to Welfare State Responsibilities 
 
The common feature of this broad category of claims is that they raise issues that appear 
to be closer to welfare state responsibilities and that, for this reason, the ECtHR treats 
them with a smaller or greater degree of cautiousness and restraint. To be sure, in recent 
years, the Court has taken significant steps towards securing the procedural conditions for 
a fair distribution of various socio-economic entitlements, such as social security benefits, 
based on the ECHR rights.31 This has been achieved through an interpretation of the right 
                                                 
30 Poltoratskiy v Ukraine (2004) 39 EHRR 43 at para 148. 
31 See Palmer, 'Protecting Socio-Economic Rights Through the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Trends and Developments in the European Court of Human Rights', pp. 419-425 and O M 
Arnardóttir, 'Discrimination as a Magnifying Lens: Scope and Ambit Under Article 14 and Protocol 
12', in Brems Eva, Gerards Janneke (eds.), Shaping Rights in the ECHR by the European Court of 
Human Rights, (Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 567-599, who, though, notes that this 
practice may open the floodgates of wide-ranging claims and obligations and suggests that we rely 
on the notion of the margin of appreciation as a 'gatekeeper' to achieve the appropriate balance in 
the relevant case law. Without denying that some issues do belong to the states' margin of 
appreciation in designing social and economic policies, Palmer is right to point out that the Court 
needs to follow up with these developments in a more principled manner and on the basis of a 
normative framework, rather than relying on a fluctuating margin of appreciation. 
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to access to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of 
civil rights and obligations or of criminal charges (Art. 6(1) ECHR) to also cover public 
law disputes about social security or welfare benefits.32 This development is important in 
that it offers vulnerable individuals a fair chance in challenging any decisions or 
procedures that deny them or deprive them of housing or other social security benefits. At 
the same time, Article 14 on the prohibition of discrimination has been used to ground 
obligations to give fair access to social benefits, i.e. access in a non-discriminatory way33 
but also to ensure that state policies did not have an indirect discriminatory and 
disadvantageous impact on certain individuals or groups.34 These developments are, of 
course, welcome but their significance is limited to procedural matters of fair access to 
socio-economic entitlements and a requirement that any limitation or differential 
treatment (or indirect effect) will be based on an 'objective and reasonable' justification.35 
Of course, whether a justification is objective and reasonable will be a matter of contention 
and the Court often grants a very wide margin of appreciation in cases that it deems to be 
closer to socio-economic policy.36 The question of where the line should be drawn is not 
at all clear as the Court often decides these cases in an ad hoc basis, in the absence of clear 
criteria of reasonableness or fairness.  
For instance, the criteria for what constitutes 'fair' decision-making in accommodating 
or respecting the particular housing needs of individuals are not entirely clear. Although 
it is a positive development that the Court placed great emphasis on procedural safeguards, 
which ensure that there will be no manifest error in appreciation of choice and 
implementation of planning and housing policies, this an area where states are generally 
granted a very wide margin of appreciation. In these cases, the Court does not usually 
provide a principled justification for this wide margin of appreciation and often leaves 
unanswered the substantive questions raised by the applicants in these cases.  
                                                 
32 See for instance Salesi v. Italy (1993) 26 EHRR 187 and Tsfayo v. the United Kingdom, 
Application no. 60860/00, (14 November 2006). 
33 In Gaygusuz v. Austria, (1997) 23 EHRR 364, Koua Poirrez v. France, (2005) 40 EHRR 2 and 
Stec v. the United Kingdom, Applications nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, (12 April 2006), the ECtHR 
decided that claims to contributory benefits are analogous to the pecuniary rights of contributors in 
private funds and therefore may be considered as 'possessions' to be protected under Article 1 of 
Protocol No.1 which guarantees that every person is entitled 'to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions'. Taken together with Article 14 ECHR the states had an obligation to secure those 
benefits to non-nationals as well. 
34 See D.H. & Others v. Czech Republic, (2008) 47 EHRR 3, where the Court placed great emphasis 
on the fact that a state policy had an indirect but disproportionately prejudicial impact on a 
particular group (Roma children were usually placed in special rather than ordinary schools). 
35 As established in the relevant case law and in Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the ECHR. 
36 See for instance Carson & Others v. the United Kingdom, (2010) 51 EHRR 13 about the UK 
policy to limit index-linked pensions to residents only.  
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For example, in Buckley and Chapman,37 the applicants claimed that the state's 
planning policy had an indirectly discriminatory and disproportionate effect on them in 
particular, as Gypsies. The authorities refused to grant them planning permission to live 
in a caravan on land that they owned. They based their refusal on a policy regulating the 
use of land, which aimed at preserving the environmental value of the particular sites. The 
applicants' claim was that the state had an obligation to mitigate the disadvantageous or 
unfair impact that this policy had on particular individuals out of respect and concern for 
their particular circumstances and needs as Gypsies. Settling in caravans was the only way 
in which these particular individuals could use the land that they owned for their housing 
needs, in a way that was consistent with their culture. The Court acknowledged that the 
authorities ought to provide alternative sites for them to relocate, however it failed to 
address what seems to be an important moral question: whether the options that the 
applicants were left with, after implementation of the policy, were fair or feasible. The 
Court dismissed their claim assuming it was based on a much wider claim to be provided 
with a home. Instead, it could have tried to identify criteria or principles about which 
alternative options for accommodation are acceptable and fair for Gypsies that have to 
relocate.  
In a similar way, the ECtHR allows a wide margin of appreciation and is reluctant to 
scrutinize those cases that either appear to be closer to the heart of state sovereignty, such 
as immigration cases, or those that seem to entail difficult resource allocation decisions. 
The Court usually finds that national authorities are better placed to deal with such claims. 
I identify two problems in the Court’s practice in these areas of the case law: circularity 
and arbitrariness. I will briefly explain these problems before I turn to examples from the 
case law to illustrate the point. 
Firstly, it is circular to attempt to distinguish which obligations are inherent in effective 
respect for the ECHR rights and which are matters of social or economic policy that should 
fall within the states' margin of appreciation, with reference to the notion of effectiveness 
or the margin of appreciation. These notions are parts of our question so they cannot be 
used to answer it. Recall that our question is precisely this: which positive obligations are 
a matter of effective respect for ECHR rights and which are matters of policy that should 
                                                 
37 See Buckley v. the United Kingdom, (1997) 23 EHRR 101, and Chapman v. the United Kingdom, 
(2001) 33 EHRR 399. Later, in Connors v. the United Kingdom, (2005) 40 EHRR 9 the Court 
found that forced eviction was imposed on the applicant from a local authority caravan site was not 
sufficiently justified, especially given the serious prospect of homelessness, and the summary 
procedure followed lacked the appropriate procedural safeguards. Similarly, in McCann v. the 
United Kingdom, (2008) 47 EHRR 40, the Court decided that eviction constituted an interference 
with the applicants' right under article 8 ECHR that was not proportionate and necessary in a 
democratic society because the proportionality of removing a person from home was not assessed, 
as it should, by an independent tribunal. 
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fall within the states margin of appreciation? Our response to this problem cannot be that 
a positive obligation is not inherent in an effective respect for an ECHR right because it 
falls within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities. By bringing her case to 
the ECtHR, the applicant challenges this position and argues that her claim raises a human 
rights issue that the Court is institutionally responsible to scrutinize. Therefore, the Court 
needs to provide a substantive and principled justification for dismissing the applicant's 
claim and accepting the governments' case for leaving the matter within their margin of 
appreciation.  
This Court's reasoning is circular, in the way described above, especially in cases that 
appear to have far-reaching resource allocation implications. In such cases, the Court often 
accepts the governments' argument that they are 'better placed' to assess the particular 
social and economic conditions and priorities and allows a wide margin of appreciation 
without further justification. In other words, the Court endorses the objection that the 
diversity of practices or conditions as a sufficient argument in the debate about the limits 
of judicial review and the proper institutional arrangement between the Court and the 
national authorities and declares these cases as inadmissible. On the other hand, if it does 
examine the complaint substantively, it usually grants a particularly wide margin of 
appreciation, again, without adequate justification. 
 However, a properly justified decision about what should or should not be left to the 
states' margin of appreciation would have to be based on substantive arguments about the 
content of the ECHR rights, on the one hand, and the scope of judicial review on the other. 
The Court could draw this argument from a principled account of what socio-economic 
entitlements are inherent features of the ECHR rights.38 Besides, it is institutionally 
responsible to supervise the implementation of the ECHR rights; therefore, it must also 
justify any decision to classify a matter as one of state policy rather than one of ECHR 
rights. A mere allusion to the potential social policy or budgetary implications is not 
sufficient to justify the Court's decision not to scrutinize a claim: these implications are a 
feature that other more traditional civil and political rights claims also share, as I argued 
in the Introduction to this thesis. Recall also that the Court itself has established that it 
considers the point and purpose of the Convention to be to guarantee rights that are 
                                                 
38 This in turn will have to rely on a coherent set of moral principles that underpin human rights in 
general and the nature of ECHR rights in particular. See Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, p. 83. This means that positive obligations and socio-
economic entitlements under the ECHR will have a different justification and content than those 
under other e.g. social or economic rights instruments and not necessarily that there can be no 
socio-economic entitlements in the ECHR altogether. Therefore, the challenge (that I take up in 
the following chapters in this thesis) is to provide a coherent account and justification of the nature 
and extent of these claims.  
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'practical and effective'39 and has identified several positive obligations or socio-economic 
entitlements as inherent features of an effective respect for ECHR rights. To serve this 
purpose, the Court cannot rely on the notion of effectiveness as it lacks any normative 
content and therefore cannot serve as a principle guiding the Court's decisions. Instead, it 
needs to seek those principles that will help it justify which claims to resources and 
positive obligations are inherent in the ECHR rights and, in this way, distinguish them 
from matters of socio-economic policy. As I tried to show in the previous section, the 
Court has sought to develop criteria for determining what positive duties effective respect 
entails in those cases that are closer to traditional state functions. Consistency requires 
that it should attempt to approach more sensitive and controversial claims in the same 
way. Nevertheless, a closer look in representative examples of claims with socio-
economic implications in particular reveals a second problem, namely that of arbitrariness. 
In particular, minority judges and scholars criticize the Court's use of the 
proportionality or fair balance test employed in the context of articles 8-11 ECHR as 
arbitrary and inconsistent, especially in positive obligations cases. In the second paragraph 
of articles 8-11, the ECHR acknowledges a tension between apparently conflicting rights 
or between rights and other legitimate public aims and sets forth certain criteria for 
resolving this tension and for justifying limitations and interferences with these freedoms. 
The freedoms enshrined in the first paragraph of these articles may be limited following 
a two stage inquiry: firstly, 'in accordance with the law' and, secondly, only when this 
‘interference’ is justified as 'necessary in a democratic society', or else, proportional to the 
specific legitimate reasons or aims, on which the state has based some action or omission. 
The relevant limitations here are those that are necessary 'for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others' and in the interests of 'the economic well-being of the country' 
(the latter only in art. 8). 
The proportionality test serves a reasonable idea. Namely, given the scarcity of 
resources, a government will have to consider the content and limits of claims to resources 
and positive obligations, e.g. in accommodating the needs of people with disabilities in 
light of its various other obligations. It will have to determine these duties keeping in mind 
its responsibility to meet the demands of other individuals or of the community as a whole 
in health care or in having a functioning and effective judicial system, adequate policing 
and crime prevention. In this process, the Court must produce well-justified judgments, 
as is expected of any court. All decisions about the extent and limits of claims to resources 
need to be justified by a coherent set of principles about the content of ECHR rights and 
                                                 
39 First mentioned in Airey v Ireland and reaffirmed regularly thereafter. 
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about what distributions of goods, benefits or opportunities show respect or disregard for 
them.40  
However, as it happens with other sensitive issues,41 claims with potential socio-
economic implications are more difficult for the Court to decide than the more traditional 
claims examined in the previous section. As a result, the Court is often very restrained 
when dealing with these cases. It dismisses claims to resources and positive obligations 
based on an ad hoc and often intuitive, rather than reasoned evaluation of the supposedly 
competing interests.42 In what follows, I will discuss characteristic examples of positive 
obligations cases, where the Court regularly conducts the proportionality test in the 
absence of clear principles that could resolve the tension between apparently competing 
claims to resources in a consistent manner.43 This will then open the way to explore the 
values underlying the ECHR in search of a more principled approach. 
 
The fluctuating margin of appreciation and the inadmissible cases 
 
The first set of cases where we the Court faces difficulties are those relating to the claims 
of aliens to remain in the territory of a Member State and avoid expulsion to countries 
where they may be at a real risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3 
ECHR). As mentioned in the previous section, the Court has accepted that Article 3 does 
not merely entail government responsibility to abstain from and prevent inhuman and 
degrading treatment intentionally inflicted by public authorities. It has established that 'the 
suffering which flows from naturally occurring illness, physical or mental, may be 
covered by Article 3, where it is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, whether flowing 
from conditions of detention, expulsion or other measures, for which the authorities can 
                                                 
40 This, as I will argue in Chapters 3 and 5, turns on the more fundamental question of what respect 
for human dignity requires and I will develop an account of positive obligations based on Ronald 
Dworkin's two principles of dignity. 
41 Such as same-sex marriage or adoption by homosexual couples, the rights of post-operative 
transgender individuals etc, that I discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
42 Here I borrow the terms used by Jeremy Waldron, who distinguishes between intuitive and 
reasoned balancing in his ‘Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor Schauer’, (1993-
1994) 45 Hastings Law Journal 813. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, I discuss and defend the view that 
the balancing metaphor is often misleading and that reasoned balancing is better understood as 
interpretation following substantive moral arguments. 
43 Criticism for arbitrariness in how the Court applies the idea of proportionality also comes from 
the point of view against ‘rights inflation’, that is, against an unjustified expansion of the normative 
content of ECHR rights to include various welfare interests of individuals that are supposedly better 
based in other social and economic rights instruments. See Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, ch. 6. As I will argue later in this thesis, I agree with 
this view to the extent that claims are misconstrued as claims to the protection of welfare interests. 
But in Chapters 3 and 5 I take up the interpretive challenge of justifying claims to resources (not 
welfare interests) on other principles that cohere better with the values underlying the ECHR. 
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be held responsible.'44 For instance, the Court has accepted that, in principle, aliens may 
claim that they are entitled to remain in the territory of a state, in order to continue to 
receive medical treatment, if they are at real risk of not receiving it at the destination of 
expulsion and the lack of it would cause them suffering that reaches the threshold of 
inhuman and degrading treatment of Article 3. However, the Court has not treated these 
claims in a consistent and principled way. 
On the one hand, in the seminal cases of Chahal and Saadi the Court confirmed the 
absolute prohibition of Article 3. It categorically denied the governments' suggestion 'that 
a distinction must be drawn under Article 3 between treatment inflicted directly by a 
signatory State and treatment that might be inflicted by the authorities of another State, 
and that protection against this latter form of ill-treatment should be weighed against the 
interests of the community as a whole.'45 To the contrary, it stressed that 'since protection 
against the treatment prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that provision imposes an 
obligation not to extradite or expel any person who, in the receiving country, would run 
the real risk of being subjected to such treatment.'46 It then went on to reaffirm the principle 
that it is 'not possible to weigh the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons put forward for 
the expulsion, in order to determine whether the responsibility of a State is engaged under 
Article 3, even where such treatment is inflicted by another State.'47 In these cases, the 
Court states a clear and firm principle, by which it justifies why it deems the balancing 
exercise and the test of proportionality to be wholly inappropriate in the context of the 
absolute prohibition of Article 3. In other words, the idea is that no reasons or emergency 
circumstances, no matter how urgent or potentially life threatening for others,48 warrant 
or excuse inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court acknowledges that the value of 
human dignity leaves no room for exceptions to the moral imperative never to treat human 
beings in a degrading way or allow them to suffer inhuman or degrading treatment, 
irrespective of the benefits or costs that such an absolute principle may entail for other 
individuals or the community as a whole. 
On the other hand, the Court has not applied this principle consistently and this is partly 
due to the potential socio-economic implications of certain types of claims of aliens to 
remain in the territory of a Member State and to continue to benefit from medical 
treatment and other health services. To begin with, the Court in D v the United Kingdom, 
                                                 
44 Saadi v Italy, (2009) 49 EHRR 30, Pretty v the United Kingdom, (2002) 35 EHRR 1, D v the 
United Kingdom, (1997) 24 EHRR 423. 
45 Saadi v Italy, para 138.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid, see also Chahal at para 81. 
48 The Court refers to the right of other individuals to have their life protected from the threat of 
terrorism or other criminal activity under art. 2 
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reiterated that aliens 'subject to expulsion cannot, in principle, claim any entitlement to 
remain in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, 
social or other forms of assistance provided by the expelling State.'49 However, it also 
reaffirmed the previously established principle that the Member States' right to control the 
entry, residence and expulsion of aliens must be exercised in light of their obligations 
under Article 3 ECHR, that is, ensuring that there is no real risk that the individual will 
suffer inhuman or degrading treatment at the destination country.50 The Court found that 
'in the very exceptional circumstances of this case and given the compelling humanitarian 
considerations at stake,'51 the removal of the applicant was in violation of Article 3. Notice 
that this statement contains conditions that distinguish this case and necessitate principled 
judgment: which cases are 'very exceptional' and when are the 'humanitarian grounds 
against the removal' 'compelling' so that the matter falls outside of the margin of 
appreciation of national authorities with regards to immigration policy and gives rise to a 
violation of Article 3? In D v. the United Kingdom the Court admitted that the 
circumstances were very exceptional for the following reasons. The applicant was an HIV 
AIDS sufferer who was currently 'critically ill' and appeared to be 'close to death', could 
not be guaranteed any nursing or medical care in his country of origin and had no family 
there willing or able to care for him or provide him with even a basic level of food, shelter 
or social support.52 For these reasons, the Court concluded that the applicant was entitled 
to remain in the United Kingdom and not be expelled to St Kitts, were he faced imminent 
death in the lack of medical, nursing treatment and other basic support. This foreseeable 
outcome, according to the decision of the Court, would amount to treatment contrary to 
the high threshold of Article 3: it would constitute inhuman and degrading treatment. 
Since the judgment in D, the Court has never found a proposed removal of an alien 
from a Contracting State to give rise to a violation of Article 3 on grounds of the 
applicant's ill-health.53 In Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, a case concerning a patient with 
schizophrenia, the Court relied on, what we may call, a criterion of certainty about the 
applicant's 'real risk' of facing treatment contrary to Article 3.54 In particular, the Court 
considered that the risk that the applicant's condition would deteriorate if deported and the 
risk that he would not receive adequate support or care in the destination country was 
                                                 
49 D v the United Kingdom, at para 54. 
50 Ibid, para 46. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 On the ECtHR's own admission in N v the United Kingdom, (2008) 24 BHRC 123, para 34. 
54 Bensaid v the United Kingdom, (2001) 33 EHRR 10, para 35. The requirement to establish a 'real 
risk' coheres with previous case law, e.g. in Ahmed v Austria, (1997) 24 EHRR 278, para 39,  D v 
the United Kingdom, para 50 and 53 but also the 'real and immediate risk' test applied in Osman 
and similar cases thereafter, as discussed in the previous section. 
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largely speculative.55 For this reason, it decided that the applicant's deportation was not 
contrary to the United Kingdom's obligations under Art. 3.  
In several subsequent cases,56 where medical or social care would not be available, or 
would be significantly inferior, in the country of deportation for the applicant in need of 
it, the Court has decided that removal would not violate Art. 3 using the following criteria, 
besides the criterion of certainty. Firstly, it has considered whether the applicant's 
condition has attained an advanced or final stage at the time of deportation – call this the 
finality criterion. Secondly, it has investigated the prospect of medical care or family 
support for the applicant in the country of deportation – call this the prospect criterion. 
However, the Court has failed to justify the relevance of these criteria. For instance, it is 
not at all clear in the Court's reasoning what principle justifies the significant difference 
in deporting an individual who is at an advanced or final stage of a serious terminal 
condition, as opposed to deporting her at an earlier stage. This could be a principle that 
could also help us distinguish and justify which applications could be accepted on the 
basis of 'compelling humanitarian grounds', such as D v the United Kingdom.  Besides, it 
is not clear how scarce the medical and family support and care would need to be before 
we could conclude that the applicant faces no realistic prospect of obtaining them. Finally, 
we would need a clear set of principles to determine whether and to what extent (and at 
what cost) we must hold an individual responsible for securing these valuable resources 
for herself before the responsibility of the state is implicated. Recall that many relevant 
cases have been found inadmissible by the Court on the basis that treatment was available 
at the country of expulsion, albeit at considerable financial or personal cost for the 
individual.57 These are normative questions and call for a principled approach, in order to 
establish a coherent jurisprudence in these matters, i.e. one that avoids the danger of an ad 
hoc or arbitrary dismissal or finding of a violation on the basis of inadequately justified 
criteria.  
                                                 
55 Bensaid v the United Kingdom, para 39. 
56 Karara v Finland, (dec.) Application no. 40900/98 (29 May 1998) where the applicant was not 
in advanced stage of illness, SCC v Sweden, Application no. 46553/99 (dec.) (15 February 2000), 
where treatment was available in the country of expulsion but at considerable cost, Henao v the 
Netherlands, (dec.) Application no. 13669/03 (24 June 2003), where the applicant was not in and 
advanced stage of illness, medical treatment was available in principle and support was available, 
Meho v the Netherlands, (dec.) Application no. 76749/01 (20 January 2004), Ndangoya v Sweden, 
(dec.) Application no 17868/03 (22 June 2004), where limited medical treatment was available at 
considerable cost and the applicant was not in advanced stage of illness, Salkic & Others v Sweden, 
(dec.) Application no. 7702/04 (29 June 2004), Amegnigan v the Netherlands (dec.) Application 
no 25629/04 (25 November 2004), where was treatment available at considerable cost and the 
applicant was not in an advanced stage of illness. 
57 See for instance SCC v Sweden, Application no. 46553/99 (dec.) (15 February 2000), Ndangoya 
v Sweden, (dec.) Application no 17868/03 (22 June 2004), Amegnigan v the Netherlands (dec.) 
Application no 25629/04 (25 November 2004). 
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The recent judgment in N v the United Kingdom, illustrates the incoherence in this area 
of the case law in two ways. Firstly, although the complaint was very similar to that put 
forward in D v the United Kingdom, the Court rejected it without adequate justification. 
Secondly, in its reasoning, the Court contradicted important principles that it had 
previously established throughout its case law in this area. The case concerned the claim 
of N who was terminally ill with HIV AIDS and wished to remain in the United Kingdom, 
in order to continue to receive medical treatment for her acute condition. The applicant 
claimed that if she were deported back to Uganda, where the medical treatment she needed 
was scarce and only available at considerable cost, she would not be able to access it and 
would therefore be subjected to acute suffering and a premature death, conditions that the 
ECtHR had previously considered as inhuman and degrading treatment. On this basis, she 
claimed that the decision to deport her was in violation of the obligation of the United 
Kingdom authorities not to deport an individual to a country where she may be face a real 
risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment. The government responded, and the 
Court by majority accepted, that the case fell into the category of medical cases that had 
been rejected numerous times before in the previous years,58 on the basis that this claim 
too was not based on 'very exceptional circumstances', such as those presented in the D 
case.  
In particular, the Court considered the crucial point to be that the applicant's illness 
was currently stable. The applicant was currently fit to travel and had not reached 'an 
advanced or terminal stage', although it was foreseeable and accepted that the treatment 
she currently received in the United Kingdom was only available to her in Uganda at a 
considerable cost.59 Furthermore, the Court accepted that discontinuing the treatment 
would mean that her condition 'would deteriorate rapidly and she would suffer illness, 
discomfort, pain and death within a year or two'.60 Still, the government argued that the 
applicant's claim to remain in the United Kingdom and receive this treatment was one 
about 'prolonging life' through access to the country's health and medical services and 
benefits and not a claim about 'ensuring a dignified death'.61 Therefore, the Court 
concluded, this kind of state obligation fell outside of the intentions and purpose of the 
ECHR and was possibly within the ambit of other international instruments, e.g. those 
related to the protection of social and economic rights.62 
The applicant rightly challenged these arguments by pointing out that she had 
established what the Court's case law on expulsion required, namely that it was reasonably 
                                                 
58 See cases in note 56. 
59 N v the United Kingdom, paras 22-23. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid, para. 24. 
62 Ibid. 
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foreseeable that her expulsion would result in harm and that the harm would reach the 
threshold of severity of Article 3 treatment.63 In fact, firstly, she reminded the Court that 
in domestic proceedings it had been established that the 'foreseeable consequence of the 
[her] expulsion' would be 'exposure to acute physical and mental suffering, followed by 
an early death'.64 Secondly, the applicant challenged the relevance of the finality criterion. 
She argued that there was 'no conceptual distinction between acute suffering, occasioned 
by the removal of someone at death's door, who was psychologically prepared for death, 
and someone who was not so psychologically prepared, having been brought back from 
the brink of death by treatment which it was proposed to discontinue.65 In this way, she 
suggested that what was crucial was whether rapid deterioration and acute suffering was 
reasonably foreseeable and not how quickly that foreseeable suffering was likely to follow 
the expulsion. This is a reasonable objection. Notice that this kind of distinction does not 
appear to be relevant in other expulsion cases. Besides, the applicant contended that any 
available treatment in the country of destination was mostly palliative, that it would be 
impossible for her to cover the cost of her medication and support herself and therefore 
would quickly relapse into very poor health and suffer from her condition. Finally, she 
stressed that she would also suffer due to the absence of social and psychological support 
of any family members or people or organizations, such as those that had helped her in 
the United Kingdom. 
The Court admitted that, if the applicant were deprived of the medical treatment that 
she was receiving, her condition 'would rapidly deteriorate and she would suffer ill-heath, 
discomfort, pain and death within a few years', and it acknowledged that only half of those 
in similar need in Uganda received the appropriate medication due to country's lack of 
resources. However, the Court concluded that although this meant that 'the quality of the 
applicant's life, and her life expectancy, would be affected if she were returned to Uganda' 
this would not give rise to a violation of her rights under Article 3 of the Convention, 
because the applicant was not 'critically ill' at the time of deportation.66 The Court applied 
the criteria of finality and certainty: what was crucial was the rapidity of the deterioration, 
which the applicant would suffer and, besides, the extent to which she would be able to 
obtain access to medical treatment, support and care, including help from relatives, would 
involve 'a certain degree of speculation'.67 The justification that the Court put forward for 
this decision reversed significant and well-established principles about the interpretation 
of the Convention as a whole and of Article 3 in particular.  
                                                 
63 Ibid, para. 25. 
64 Ibid, para. 26. 
65 Ibid, para. 27. 
66 Ibid, at para. 50. 
67 Ibid. 
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To begin with, the Court reversed the famous statement made in the Airey case that 
'whilst the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many of 
them have implications of a social or economic nature.'68 Notice that in N the Court cited 
the very same paragraph from Airey in a different order. It said that 'although many of the 
rights it contains have implications of a social or economic nature, the Convention is 
essentially directed at the protection of civil and political rights'.69 Reversing this 
statement, the Court did not just rephrase the principle underlying the original statement 
but, instead, it appears to challenge it. Recall that the Court in Airey had explained the 
underlying principle in this way: 'the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention 
may extend into the sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor 
against such an interpretation' and that 'there is no water-tight division separating that 
sphere from the field covered by the Convention.'70 My point is that, in the original 
sequence of arguments, the 1979 Court had sought to widen our conception of the content 
of ECHR rights by setting aside conceptually flawed distinctions between different types 
of rights and duties. To the contrary, by reversing the very same arguments, the 
contemporary Court effectively prioritized these long abandoned distinctions and 
classifications and applied them, in order to narrow the scope of Convention rights and of 
state obligations, with no adequate justification. The only argument that seems to explain 
and support this line of reasoning is the one identified by the strong dissenting opinion, 
i.e. that finding a violation in this case would set a precedent that could open the 
'floodgates' for 'medical immigration'.71 However, as the minority judges pointed out, this 
argument is misconceived. I will explain. 
Firstly, I will show how the Court's broad interpretation of the applicant's claim in N 
is misguided, as evidenced by comparison with the seminal Airey case that was cited and 
relied upon in N. In particular, the Court in Airey had clarified that the applicant's claim 
should not be construed as a general claim for legal aid in civil cases. Instead, the Court 
had argued, this was a claim for legal aid in civil cases only for an individual who finds 
herself in those particular circumstances, i.e. where legal aid is indispensable for a fair 
representation in court and an effective access to justice. In fact, the Court had dismissed 
the government's objection that this was tantamount to a claim for free legal aid in civil 
cases for all under Art. 6 of the ECHR72 and examined whether the particular 
                                                 
68 Airey v. Ireland, para. 26. 
69 N v. The United Kingdom, para. 44. 
70 Judges Tulkens, Bonello and Spielmann point out this omission in their joint dissenting opinion 
in N, at para 6. 
71 See para 7 of the dissenting opinion. 
72 Which could be the content of another right. 
Positive Obligations in the ECtHR: Progress and Problems      77 
 
circumstances of the applicant meant that she was effectively denied her right of access to 
justice.  
To the contrary, the Court in N stated, as a general principle, that 'Article 3 does not 
place an obligation on the Contracting State to alleviate such disparities [i.e. in the level 
of treatment available in different Member States] through the provision of free and 
unlimited health care to all aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction'. In this 
way, it did not examine the applicant’s particular claim, i.e. it did not examine whether 
the particular circumstances of this applicant entail an obligation under Article 3 not to 
return her to her home country, in order to avoid exposing her to the risk of suffering 
inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court construed the applicant’s claim to be broader 
than it actually was and treated it with cautiousness. This, in effect, reversed the principle 
established in Airey and the subsequent case law on positive obligations. Namely, it 
reversed the principle that claims with social and economic implications are not outside 
of the scope of the Convention but require an analysis of the scope of each particular right 
in light of its object, purpose and the essential preconditions for its effective respect in 
each particular circumstances. Indeed, the three judges' minority opinion drew attention 
to the fact that the applicant's claim was not one about a general right to free and unlimited 
healthcare but a much more specific claim based on the particular circumstances. 
Therefore, they argued, the concern that finding a violation in this particular case could 
open the floodgates for unlimited claims to health and other social services was misplaced: 
this precedent would only apply to cases with the same or comparable circumstances. 
Secondly, allowing its judgment to be influenced by the policy consideration of 
opening the floodgates to a great number of similar complaints, the Court also set aside 
another fundamental principle regarding the interpretation of Article 3. To begin with, as 
the three dissenting judges pointed out, the majority of the Court inappropriately referred 
to the proportionality principle as one of the principles drawn from the relevant case law 
and supposedly applicable in this case. Citing the 1989 Soering case,73 the majority 
reiterated that 'inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual's fundamental rights.'74 However, the minority judges were 
right to complain that the majority decision muted the fact that, despite that statement, 
Soering had actually established the principle that the prohibition of Article 3 is absolute,75 
- a principle that it reaffirmed in the significant subsequent Chahal and Saadi cases. In 
these cases, as I mentioned earlier in this section, the Court had established that there was 
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74 See para. 44 of the N v. UK judgment and para. 7 of the dissenting opinion. 
75 Soering v. the United Kingdom, para. 88. 
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no room for a proportionality assessment when a government decision and action to 
extradite or expel an individual will expose her to a foreseeable and real risk of suffering 
treatment contrary to Article 3 in the destination country. In these cases, the Court, had 
clearly rejected the governments' attempts to suggest a balancing exercise between the 
competing interests of the state for national security or the prevention of terrorism or crime 
and the right of the individuals concerned not to be treated in a way contrary to Article 
3.76 Let us examine these cases more closely. 
In particular, in Saadi77 the Court had challenged the government's suggestion that 'in 
the field of implied positive obligations the Court [i.e. in previous case law] had accepted 
that the applicant's rights must be weighed against the interests of the community as a 
whole.'78 To the contrary, the Court replied, also citing previous case law, that Article 3 
'enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic societies' and 'unlike most of the 
substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no 
provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15, even 
in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.'79 On this basis, the 
Court established the principle that 'since protection against the treatment prohibited by 
Article 3 is absolute, that provision imposes an obligation not to extradite or expel any 
person who, in the receiving country, would run the real risk of being subjected to such 
treatment.'80  
To the contrary, the Court in N seems to have been influenced by proportionality 
considerations. On the one hand, it accepted that 'it is necessary, given the fundamental 
importance of Article 3 in the Convention system, for the Court to retain a degree of 
flexibility to prevent expulsion in very exceptional cases.'81 On the other hand, though, it 
stressed that 'Article 3 does not place an obligation on a Contracting State to alleviate 
disparities in socio-economic conditions and the level of treatment between different 
countries, through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a 
right to stay within the jurisdiction of a Member State', as this 'would place too great a 
burden on the Contracting States.'82  
Firstly, as I said earlier, the above statements misconstrue the reach of the applicant's 
claim and misdirect the focus from the question of a violation of Article 3 to a claim to 
benefit from a country's health and social services. Also, as the dissenting judges point 
                                                 
76 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, (1996) 23 EHRR 413 and Saadi v. Italy, (2009) 49 EHRR 30. 
77 Reaffirming the earlier Chahal judgment. 
78 Saadi, para. 120. 
79 Ibid, para. 127. 
80 Ibid. 
81 N v. The United Kingdom, para. 44. 
82 Ibid. 
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out, these statements imply that the Court dismissed this case out of concern for the 
potential significant cost if waves of other similar applications reached the Court. 
However, if the minority were right and, indeed, the majority accepted that the applicant 
would face treatment contrary to Article 3 but dismissed her claim considering the 
potential socio-economic implications of a decision not to deport her, this contravenes the 
principle of absolute prohibition established in the case law discussed above. Therefore, 
quite apart from being hypothetical and unsubstantiated by evidence in the judgment of 
the Court, this reason for dismissing the case of N is primarily contrary to principles 
established in the jurisprudence of the Court.83 
Finally, the reasoning in this judgment offered no principled justification as to why it 
was not enough that the risk of suffering inhuman or degrading conditions was real and 
foreseeable,84 in order to class this as a case of 'very exceptional circumstances', following 
the example of D v. The United Kingdom. Instead, the Court did not explain why it 
dismissed the applicant’s claim that it was irrelevant whether deterioration (and suffering) 
was imminent or not quite so.85  
What is more important, though, the Court has not justified in N (neither in D, despite 
the positive outcome in that case) what differentiates these so-called 'medical treatment' 
cases, where a violation of Article 3 will only be established in 'very exceptional 
circumstances'86 and usually on 'humanitarian grounds' from those cases, where a violation 
is established solely on the basis that deporting or extraditing the applicant will expose 
her to the real and foreseeable risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment. One 
argument justifying such a disparity could be that inhuman or degrading treatment in the 
deportation cases is supposedly evidently attributable to failure of the receiving states' 
national authorities to provide, for example, humane conditions in detention centres and 
prisons, whereas this is not supposedly the case in the 'medical cases'. However, notice 
that in the 'medical cases' too, the individual will suffer inhuman and degrading treatment 
due to failures of the state, albeit not as easily and directly attributable to the receiving 
country's national authorities, e.g. the failure to provide a vital life-saving treatment at a 
reasonable cost. Now, of course the ECtHR is not expected to alleviate such disparities 
                                                 
83 On this point, see also the dissenting opinion at paras 6-9. 
84 Recall that this was the criterion established by the Court in so many other cases in the context 
of Articles 2 and 3, discussed earlier in this chapter. 
85 Even if this consideration was deemed relevant in order to distinguish this case from D, then the 
Court could have found that the other particular conditions of the case imposed a duty to allow the 
applicant to remain in the country and continue to benefit from the treatment and social support 
she was given there. For this argument see V Mantouvalou, ‘N v UK: No Duty to Rescue the Nearby 
Needy?’, (2009) 72 Modern Law Review, p. 815-828. 
86 Instead, as I will argue in Chapter 5, the Court ought to determine when applicants have a right 
to avoid deportation because it is the only fair treatment to allow them to remain under the 
circumstances. 
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and failures but it certainly is expected to respect and protect the dignity of those within 
its jurisdiction (irrespective of whether they have a right to remain or not on other grounds) 
by avoiding exposing them to the real and foreseeable risk attributable to such failures.  
The Court's decision in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece87 supports this argument. In this 
case, the Court found that, the Belgian authorities ought to have allowed the applicant to 
remain in Belgium, despite the fact that in application of the 'Dublin II Regulation' they 
ought to have deported her to the Greek authorities, as the first country of entry to examine 
her asylum application. In particular, they had an obligation not to deport her because 
sending her to Greece would expose her to a real risk of suffering inhuman and degrading 
treatment88 attributable to the failures of the Greek authorities in the application of their 
legislation on asylum. Notice that the Court found that this risk that the Belgian authorities 
ought to have protected her from was not only due to the conditions in detention centres 
but also due to the impact of the authorities' delays and failures in the application of their 
asylum legislation: i.e. the living conditions of a vulnerable individual left homeless and 
unable to cater for her basic needs. That is, in finding a violation in M.S.S. the Court placed 
great emphasis on the fact that the applicant's vulnerable condition as an asylum seeker. 
But this is also true of the applicants in 'medical cases', at least when they can establish 
that they are in a critical or terminally ill condition and discontinuing their treatment will 
result in suffering contrary to Article 3, not necessarily at the time of deportation but even 
shortly after it. 
To sum up, although the Court considers the prohibition of Article 3 absolute, in 
principle, the case of N v the United Kingdom and a series of similar inadmissible cases, 
demonstrate that the Court is influenced by considerations of the potential social and 
economic implications and for this reason avoids finding a violation or even discussing 
the case on the merits.  
Quite apart from Article 3 cases, the Court heavily relies on such considerations about 
resource allocation implications in the context of the right to private and family life 
(Article 8 ECHR), especially in positive obligations cases, where it also allows national 
authorities a wide and fluctuating margin of appreciation. To be sure, in recent years, the 
ECtHR has remarkably developed the notion of private and family life and has broadened 
the protection offered by Article 8 of the Convention.89 This now also protects a right to 
                                                 
87 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, (2011) 53 EHRR 2. 
88 Living in inhuman or degrading conditions in detention centres or living as homeless and unable 
to cater for her basic needs, while waiting for a prolonged period to have her asylum application 
considered. 
89 For an overview of the development of the relevant case law see L Clements and A Simmons, 
'European Court of Human Rights. Sympathetic Unease' in M Langford (ed.), Social Rights 
Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law, pp. 409-427 and 
generally Koch, Human Rights as Indivisible Rights. The Protection of Socio-Economic Demands 
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personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other 
human beings.90 Furthermore, the Court has noted that the right to private life goes beyond 
a right to the physical integrity of the person, to embrace various aspects of an individual’s 
physical, moral and psychological integrity as well as the social identity of the person.91 
Finally, it is established by now that the effective enjoyment of many of the Convention 
rights by disabled individuals may require the adoption of various positive measures and, 
in particular, that Article 8 is also relevant to complaints requiring public funding to 
facilitate the mobility and quality of life of disabled individuals.  
However, the Court has not yet developed a principled framework as to what kind of 
positive measures are essential or how much resources may be required in respect of all 
these obligations, e.g. to facilitate the mobility and quality of life  of disabled individuals 
–and to what extent. The proportionality test is often used as a tool to resolve the tension 
between these claims, which appear to have more pronounced resource allocation 
implications, and other considerations. Still, there are many instances where the Court, 
due to the absence of a principled approach, leaves the proportionality assessment to a 
wide margin of appreciation of the national authorities.  
In general, the lack of a principled approach is evident in claims for access to social 
or health services, treatments and benefits, other welfare measures, policies or payments. 
In the context of these cases, as in other sensitive cases discussed in Chapter 1, the Court’s 
standard approach is to recognise that there may be positive obligations inherent in an 
effective respect for the Convention rights. Nonetheless, it regularly attempts to delimit 
what it considers as 'far-reaching' or controversial implications of this approach by noting 
that 
 
'especially as far as those positive obligations are concerned, the notion of 
"respect" is not clear-cut: having regard to the diversity of the practices 
followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the notion’s 
requirements will vary considerably from case to case. Accordingly, this is 
an area in which the Contracting Parties enjoy a wide margin of appreciation 
in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the 
Convention with due regard to the needs and resources of the community and 
of individuals.'92 
                                                 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (2009), E Palmer, Judicial Review, Socio-
Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act, (Hart Publishing, 2007), D Barak-Erez and AM Gross 
(eds.), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice, (Oxford: Hart 2007). 
90 Niemitz v. Germany, (1993) 16 EHRR 97, at para. 29. 
91 See for instance Pretty v. the United Kingdom, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom. 
92 First articulated in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v the United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 
471, at para. 67. This statement is also found in Rees v the United Kingdom (1987) 9 EHRR 56, 
Cossey v the United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 622, discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, where 
applicants claimed that the right to respect for private and family life under article 8 imposed an 
obligation on the national authorities to legally recognize their new status after gender reassignment 
and  X, Y and Z v the United Kingdom, (1997) 24 EHRR 143, with regards to an obligation to grant 
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The statement that the notion and requirements of respect are not 'clear-cut' and that due 
regard must be had to the needs and available resources of other individuals and the 
community as a whole is not necessarily out of place, as I will argue in detail later in this 
thesis. However, the above statements carry the danger of relativism or arbitrary 
fluctuation of the standards of human rights protection, especially so if the search for what 
effective respect requires is not guided by clear principles but is left to a variably wide 
margin of appreciation of the national authorities.  
Indeed, on the one hand, the Court has accepted that 'the boundaries between the 
State’s positive and negative obligations do not always lend themselves to precise 
definition'; that 'the applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar' but that in both cases 
'regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests 
of the individual and the community as a whole and that in both contexts the State is 
recognised as enjoying a certain margin of appreciation'.93 On the other hand, though, the 
Court generally differentiates its treatment of negative and positive claims94 often grants 
national authorities a significantly wider margin of appreciation in positive obligations 
claims without adequate examination and justification.  
In particular, the Court's standard approach in negative obligations cases is to examine 
first whether a particular state action or omission interferes with or limits one of the 
freedoms prescribed by the ECHR provisions and then to assess whether this limitation is 
justified.95 However, in positive obligations cases, the Court often conflates the question 
of whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage that falls within the scope 
                                                 
parental rights to transsexuals. See also Pretty v. the United Kingdom, (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at para 
15 where the Court significantly held that ‘while states may be absolutely forbidden to inflict the 
proscribed [inhuman or degrading under Article 3] treatment on individuals within their 
jurisdictions, the steps appropriate to discharge a positive obligation may be more judgmental, 
more prone to variation from state to state, more dependent on the opinion and beliefs of the people 
and less susceptible to any universal injunction’. 
93 My emphasis. See for instance Gul v. Switzerland (1996) 22 EHRR 93, Keegan v. United 
Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 913, Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, (1995) 19 EHRR 263, 
Stjerna v. Finland, (1997) 24 EHRR 194 and many more thereafter. 
94 For this criticism see generally Palmer, 'Protecting Socio-Economic Rights through the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Trends and Developments in the European Court of Human Rights', 
Warbrick, ‘The Structure of Article 8', and De Schutter, 'The Protection of Social Rights by the 
European Court of Human Rights’. Striking examples of this practice are evident in the Court's 
reasoning in the inadmissible cases that I discuss below in the text.  
95 Note that I do not necessarily take 'interference' to mean infringement of a right and I do not 
assume that all complaints before the ECtHR are based on prima facie rights. I accept the term (and 
the two-stage examination of the complaints that the Court follows) for the purpose of the 
discussion here in a broader sense. That is, in the sense that the applicant seeks to substantiate her 
claim that a particular state action or omission causes her to suffer a disadvantage and, therefore, 
that it raises a substantive question about the content of a particular ECHR provision. At a second 
stage, the state is required to prove that any frustration or disadvantage caused is not unfair or 
unjustified but proportionate and, therefore, it does not violate the applicant's ECHR rights. 
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of one of the ECHR provisions with the inquiry about whether the disadvantage was unfair 
or disproportionate. At the same time though, the Court does not reverse the burden of 
proof that corresponds to each of these two stages. As a result, quite apart from evidence 
and arguments to the effect that a particular action or omission causes her disadvantage in 
the enjoyment of a specific ECHR provision, the applicant has the additional burden to 
prove that this disadvantage is disproportionate and unfair. As many commentators 
complain, this approach does not correspond to the two-stage structure of ECHR rights 
and Articles 8-11 in particular, whereby the state must prove that the actions or omissions 
that the applicant complains of are justified as necessary in a democratic society for the 
reasons found in the second paragraph of these articles. This places the applicant in an 
unfairly onerous procedural position and allows a less stringent review of the substance 
of the complaint.96  
Specifically, the decision about whether to examine a claim substantively should 
depend on whether the applicant has made a strong case that she has suffered a significant 
disadvantage, which falls within the ambit of one of the ECHR provisions. However, the 
Court often finds no violation or declares the case inadmissible on the basis that the 
applicant's claim falls within the state's margin of appreciation. Crucially, unlike the 
treatment of claims to negative obligations, here, the Court leaves the decision as to 
whether there has been an interference or disadvantage suffered by the applicant in the 
first place, to the margin of appreciation of the national authorities. Consequently, it does 
not scrutinize, as it should, the government's arguments in order to assess whether the 
action or omission that raises the issue of interference or disadvantage is justified –and for 
this reason, not a violation of ECHR rights and rightly left to the margin of appreciation 
of the national authorities. 
The differential treatment of negative and positive obligations is evidenced most 
clearly in a series of claims that the Court has unjustifiably left to the states' wide margin 
of appreciation or declared outright inadmissible. For example, in Botta v. Italy an 
applicant with impaired mobility complained 'of impairment of his private life and the 
development of his personality resulting from the Italian State’s failure to take appropriate 
                                                 
96 See Warbrick, ‘The Structure of Article 8', De Schutter ‘The Protection of Social Rights by the 
European Court of Human Rights’, p. 225-227, De Schutter ‘Reasonable Accommodations and 
Positive Obligations in the European Convention on Human Rights’, in A Lawson and C Gooding 
(eds.) Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice (Oxford, 2005), pp. 43-44, E Palmer, 
Judicial Review, Socio-Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act, p. 59-62; J Gerards and H 
Senden, 'The Structure of Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Human Rights', (2009) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 7, Number 4, pp. 619-653, eps. Section 3; L 
Lavrysen, 'The Scope of Rights and the Scope of Obligations. Positive Obligations', in E Brems, J 
Gerards (eds.), Shaping Rights in the ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), p. 162-182 who argues that elements of the second stage of legality or 
proportionality should not enter the first stage of examining the scope of positive obligations.  
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measures to remedy the omissions imputable to the private bathing establishments', in the 
resort where he spent his holidays, 'namely the lack of lavatories and ramps providing 
access to the sea for the use of disabled people.'97 In particular, the applicant complained 
that, although Italian legislation required private establishments to provide these facilities 
for the accommodation of the needs of disabled individuals, the authorities had not taken 
the steps necessary to enforce this legislation.  
The Court first had to determine whether the right asserted by Mr Botta fell within the 
concept of respect for private life set forth in Article 8 of the ECHR. It recalled that the 
concept of private life 'includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity' and is 
primarily intended as a guarantee against outside interference in the development of the 
'personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings.'98 Furthermore, 
the Court noted that, the applicant's claim concerned the existence of positive obligations 
that might also be inherent in effective respect. Following this, it reiterated that the concept 
of respect is 'not precisely defined' and that 'regard must be had to the fair balance that has 
to be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual, while the State 
has, in any event, a margin of appreciation.'99  
At this point, the Court for the first time sought to determine the existence and content 
of positive obligations based on a test or criterion that it also found to be decisive in its 
past practice. Specifically, it explained that 'the Court has held that a State has obligations 
of this type where it has found a direct and immediate link between the measures sought 
by an applicant and the latter's private and/or family life.'100 Notably, the Court explained 
that older seminal positive obligations cases, such as Airey v Ireland and X and Y v the 
Netherlands could be explained by this principle: in those instances, the Court had found 
a violation on the basis that the states' omission directly affected the applicants. Moreover, 
the Court also cited a more recent example, whereby the harmful effects of pollution 
caused by the activity of a waste-water treatment plant situated near the applicant’s home 
                                                 
97 Botta v. Italy, (1998) 26 EHRR 241 para. 27. 
98 Botta v. Italy, para. 32. 
99 Ibid, para. 33. 
100 Ibid, para. 34. My emphasis. For a critical discussion of the 'direct and immediate link' test see 
De Schutter, ‘Reasonable Accommodations and Positive Obligations in the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, pp.43-45. Also, given the way the Court introduces this criterion with 
references to its past case law, Colm O' Cinneide is right to point out that this test seems to be 
performing the same job as the references to 'state responsibility' do in the Art. 2 and 3 cases, i.e. 
establishing the need for some element of particular responsibility on the part of the state. See C 
O' Cinneide, 'A Modest Proposal: Destitution, State Responsibility and the European Convention 
on Human Rights', 5 European Human Rights Law Review (2008), at p. 592. Notice, that in Art. 2 
and 3 cases the analysis of state responsibility issues have some similarities with criminal law 
responsibility, in particular with regards to individuals or institutions who have a special 
relationship of care towards others. The cases examined here pose a different problem for 
responsibility, as I will discuss further in Chapter 5: responsibility to show concern for a fair 
distribution of resources. 
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was considered to have a direct and disproportionate impact upon the private and family 
life of the applicant.101 Similarly, the Court recalled another instance, when it has 
considered the direct effect of the toxic emissions from a factory on the applicants’ right 
to respect for their private and family life. In that case, it had found that the existence of 
such a direct effect meant that Article 8 was applicable and that the State had violated this 
right by not communicating essential information that would have enabled the applicants 
to assess the risks to their life and health for themselves and their families.102  
However, the Court decided that no such direct and immediate link could be 
established in this case and that, for this reason, Article 8 was not applicable. Contrary to 
previous examples, the Court explained, 'the right asserted by Mr Botta, namely the right 
to gain access to the beach and the sea at a place distant from his normal place of residence 
during his holidays, concerns interpersonal relations of such broad and indeterminate 
scope that there can be no conceivable direct link between the measures the State was 
urged to take in order to make good the omissions of the private bathing establishments 
and the applicant’s private life.'103 It may be true that, in the particular case, the applicant 
unfortunately failed to construe his claim in the most effective way and to provide 
convincing arguments to substantiate his claim. At the same time, though, the Court placed 
undue emphasis on the fact that the applicant claimed a right to access public facilities 
away from his normal place of residence and during his holidays. On this basis, it was 
reluctant to acknowledge a positive obligation to implement the legal requirement to make 
all private beaches accessible for people with disabilities. Notice that, the Court here 
seems to have misconstrued the applicant's claim as a claim to be facilitated in enjoying 
interpersonal relations of a broad and indeterminate scope and, therefore, it seems to have 
assumed that the right claimed was of a 'social nature' and more suitable for adjudication 
under the 'flexible' machinery of the European Social Charter.104 Besides, the Court 
appears to have been also influenced by the respondent government's submission that 
imposing positive obligations 'to ensure the satisfactory development of each individual’s 
recreational activities' would then entail that states must also 'take into consideration 
obstacles resulting from the insufficient means of those who wished to take part in such 
activities.'105Again, the Court seems to have accepted the government's comparison and 
failed to examine whether the applicant's claim could be distinguished from such a 
hypothetical far-reaching claim. It is one thing to argue that a state has a positive duty to 
                                                 
101 Lopez Ostra v. Italy (1995) 20 EHRR 277, para. 58. 
102 Guerra and Others v. Italy, (1998) 26 EHRR 357, para. 57 and 60. 
103 Botta v. Italy, para. 35. 
104 This was the majority’s view in the proceedings before the Commission that the Court seems to 
have accepted. See Botta, para. 28. 
105 Ibid, para. 29. 
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facilitate access to public facilities for people with impaired mobility and quite another to 
argue that the state ought to fund the social life of certain individuals.  
To be sure, I do not mean to imply that the Court should have necessarily found a 
violation in this case. I only want to point to the lack of any form of substantive 
examination of the applicant's claim that he suffered a significant disadvantage in the 
enjoyment of his private life. Of course, as I said earlier, the applicant himself failed to 
frame his claim in this way and support it with appropriate and compelling arguments. 
Still, it seems to me that to say that the applicant's claim had features of a 'broad and 
indeterminate scope' was merely descriptive and did not warrant a decision that Article 8 
was not applicable. Instead, in order to determine when a claim is too broad or 
indeterminate to be considered a human rights issue, the Court should have attempted a 
moral evaluation of the disadvantage, impairment or limitation complained of by the 
applicant, the possible ways to mitigate it and the extent of state responsibility to do so. 
This moral evaluation would have to rely on principles that determine what people are 
rightfully entitled to as a matter of effective respect for their ECHR rights, in light of the 
principles and values that underlie the ECHR, as I have explained earlier in Chapter 1 and 
will develop further in the following chapters. 
A stronger case for a direct and immediate link was presented to the Court in Zehnalova 
and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic106 by the physically disabled applicant and her husband, 
who complained about the lack of access for people with disabilities to public buildings 
and facilities open to the public in their home town, such as the post office, police station, 
most specialist doctors surgeries and various lawyers’ offices, cinemas and the town 
swimming pool. They argued that the lack of access to these facilities constituted a 
violation of their right to respect for their private life: the Czech State had failed to 
discharge its positive obligations to remove the architectural barriers preventing disabled 
access to public buildings and buildings open to the public, as the national legislation 
required. The Court decided that Article 8 was applicable but that a positive obligation to 
ensure access to the buildings in question may be found to exist 'only in exceptional cases', 
where the lack of access to these buildings affects the applicant’s life 'in such a way as to 
interfere with her right to personal development and her right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings and the outside world'.107 Still, in the instant case 
the Court found again that the applicants’ claim was 'too broad and indeterminate' as they 
'failed to give precise details of the alleged obstacles and have not adduced persuasive 
evidence of any interference with their private life'. More specifically, the Court noted 
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107 Ibid, section A. 
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that 'the first applicant failed to demonstrate the existence of a special link between the 
lack of access to the buildings in question and the particular needs of her private life.'108 
Finally, the Court held that the applicants failed to dispel the doubts concerning the need 
to use these buildings on a daily basis and, therefore, failed to establish a direct and 
immediate link between the measures sought and the applicants’ private life. The 
application was declared inadmissible. 
As in Botta, in this case too, the Court did not justify why it considered it relevant 
whether the applicants needed to access the buildings in question on a daily basis. In fact, 
it seems to contradict the very point of a right to private life and personal development, to 
inquire what activities people will be involved in on a daily basis, before granting them a 
right to do so. People with disabilities, in the same way as non-disabled people, need to 
have access to these public facilities whenever they choose to use them and not have to 
follow patterns of behaviour in order to become entitled to the right to choose. For, 
suppose that the Court was willing to accept that weekly or monthly use was regular 
enough to warrant a positive duty to facilitate access. That would still not cover the case 
of someone making a hobby of watching films one year and then deciding to become more 
active and take up swimming instead the following year. The Court seems to have gotten 
the matter the wrong way around. The individual must be in a position to determine if and 
when she needs to have access to these facilities and be able to do so if and when she 
chooses to. It should not be left to the authorities to decide who has a justified claim based 
on an inquiry about her pattern of behaviour and regulate access to public facilities within 
these limits. 
A further interesting point is that the Court in this case, as well as in Botta, was 
reluctant to find that an obligation of the national authorities to take positive steps to 
ensure compliance with national legislation, concerning access to public facilities, fell 
within the scope of Article 8. De Schutter is right to point out that this signifies a difference 
in the treatment of negative and positive obligations: the Court always examines whether 
the actions of national authorities are 'in accordance with the law.'109 The effect of this is 
that, although legislation may impose both negative and positive obligations on the state 
to ensure respect for the ECHR rights, it seems that the authorities will be granted a 
significantly wider margin of appreciation in whether and how they will comply with their 
positive obligations. We can possibly attribute this differential treatment of negative and 
positive obligations to the Court's concern about the potential socio-economic 
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109 See De Schutter, ‘Reasonable Accommodations and Positive Obligations in the European 
Convention on Human Rights’, p. 47. 
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implications of these particular types of cases. Because, notice that, in cases that raise no 
such concerns, the Court has been willing to establish that states violated ECHR rights 
when they failed to discharge their positive obligations to effectively enforce criminal or 
anti-discrimination law.110 Obviously, the positive obligation to ensure compliance with 
criminal or anti-discrimination law has seemingly limited resource allocation 
implications. Similarly, in Sari and Colac v. Turkey111 the Court found that a direct and 
immediate link was established and found a violation of Article 8, on the basis that the 
state had failed in its positive obligation to create the appropriate legislative framework in 
Turkey affording practical and effective protection against incommunicado detention. As 
I tried to show in the previous section, the Court rarely hesitates to find procedural positive 
obligations relating to the traditional functions of the state in policing, effective 
investigation and the administration of justice, as falling within the ambit of the ECHR. 
In these cases, as with the obligation to put in place a legislative framework in Sari and 
Colac, no concern or objection emerges that such positive obligations may be too 
burdensome or complicated and that, therefore, that the national authorities are in a better 
position to determine their content. Finally, it is quite significant that, in Sari and Colac, 
the Court did not place the burden of proof on the applicants to establish the link. Instead, 
it followed the standard approach for negative obligations and examined whether the state 
could justify the incommunicado detention for more than seven days.  
The Court’s reluctance to follow the same approach in cases relating to the 
accommodation of the needs of people with disabilities is understandable. In the absence 
of a set of principles that could help it deal with such claims, the Court will always be 
cautious about finding that obligations with potentially extensive socio-economic 
implications fall within the ambit of the Convention.   
It is noteworthy that the ECtHR has so far declared inadmissible all of the 'direct and 
immediate link' test cases with the exception of Sari and Colac v Turkey. Strikingly, in 
some cases the Court has even denied reviewing the applicant’s arguments in trying to 
establish a direct and immediate link. Instead it has deferred this assessment to the wide 
margin of appreciation of the national authorities, on the grounds that the issues raised 
involved decisions on the allocation of scarce resources that national authorities are better 
placed to make.  
                                                 
110 See, for instance, Dordevic v. Croatia, Application no. 41526/10 (24 July 2012), where the state 
was found to have violated the applicant’s Article 3 and 8 rights by not enforcing existing measures 
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For instance, in Sentges v. the Netherlands,112 it is unclear whether the application was 
declared inadmissible on the basis that no direct and immediate link was established or 
because the Court decided to leave this question to a wide margin of appreciation of the 
national authorities. In this case, Sentges, a young sufferer of a muscle degenerative 
disease was unable to stand, walk or lift his arms, his manual and digital functions were 
virtually absent and he was completely depended on others for every act he needed or 
wished to perform, including eating and drinking. The national health authorities denied 
his request to be provided with a robotic arm specifically designed to be mounted on 
electric wheelchairs, in order to give disabled people more autonomy in handling objects 
in their environment. Providing the applicant with the robotic arm would enable him to 
perform many acts unassisted and without the presence of others. The applicant argued 
that the right to respect for his private life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, 
entailed a positive obligation of the State to provide him with, or pay for, this valuable 
device. He relied on previous case law, which has established that the concept of private 
life, as interpreted by the Court, encompasses the notions of personal autonomy and self-
determination, as well as the right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
beings. He complained that his dependence on others for every single act meant that he 
was unable to pursue the establishment and development of relationships with other 
human beings and that his freedom of choice in who to develop relationships with was 
limited to an unacceptable degree. The robotic arm would increase his severely curtailed 
level of self-determination as it would make him significantly less dependent on his family 
and friends. In this way, he would be able to establish and develop relationships with 
persons for reasons other than dependence. Therefore, he argued that there was a direct 
and immediate link between the measure sought and his private life.  
However, instead of assessing whether the applicant had succeeded in establishing a 
direct and immediate link, the Court decided to leave this assessment to the wide margin 
of appreciation of the national authorities. Specifically, it held that, even assuming that in 
the present case such a special link indeed existed, regard must be had to the fair balance 
that had to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the 
community as a whole and to the particularly wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by 
States, especially in issues such as this that involve an assessment of priorities in the 
context of the allocation of limited State resources. In these matters, the Court stated, the 
national authorities are in a better position to carry out this assessment than an 
international court, which should also be mindful of establishing a precedent, at least to 
some extent. Thus, although the Court acknowledged the very real improvement, which a 
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robotic arm would entail for the applicant’s personal autonomy and his ability to establish 
and develop relationships with other human beings of his choice, it found that the state 
had not exceeded the wide margin of appreciation afforded to it. No substantive reasons 
whatsoever were given to justify why the applicant’s claim fell outside of the normative 
realm of Article 8 and within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities.113  
In fact, recall that the direct and immediate link test was devised to help the Court 
answer the question of whether a particular positive obligation fell within the ambit of the 
Convention or whether it belonged to the margin of appreciation of the national 
authorities. It is circular to suggest that it should be up to the national authorities to decide 
whether a direct and immediate link is established. Besides, as I explained earlier, when  
the case concerns compliance with a negative obligation the Court never leaves the 
question of whether the action complained of falls within the ambit of an ECHR provision, 
to the margin of appreciation of the national authorities. Rather, the Court settles this 
question first and then proceeds to examine, at a second stage, whether the situation 
complained of by the applicant constitutes an unfair, disproportionate and unjustified 
disadvantage. Still, in Sentges, the direct and immediate link test was used as 
complementary to the fair balance test but, eventually, both were deferred to the discretion 
of the national authorities. Therefore, effectively, the Court dismissed the applicant’s 
claim as inadmissible solely on the basis of its budgetary implications and clearly being 
mindful of the fact that it could establish a precedent for potentially extensive claims to 
resources. 
Similarly, the Court delivered another poorly justified decision in Molka v. Poland.114  
In this case, the physically disabled applicant complained that he could not exercise his 
ECHR right to vote because he lacked appropriate access to the polling station or an 
alternative way to cast his vote. The Court, once more, acknowledged that 'the effective 
enjoyment of many of the Convention rights by disabled persons may require the adoption 
                                                 
113 Notice that commentators disagree about whether the Court actually found article 8 to be 
applicable but not violated or not applicable. See L Waddington, 'Unravelling the knot: Article 8, 
private life, positive duties and disability: rewriting Sentges v. Netherlands', in E Brems (ed.) 
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see Fredman Sandra, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties, p. 207 and 
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of various positive measures' and referred to various texts adopted by the Council of 
Europe, which stress the importance of full participation of people with disabilities in 
society, in particular in political and public life. More specifically, the Court accepted that 
the applicant’s involvement in the life of his local community and the exercise of his civic 
duties was a matter that was relevant to 'the applicant’s possibility of developing social 
relations with other members of his community and the outside world, and is pertinent to 
his own personal development.'115 Citing the two previous cases where the direct and 
immediate link test had been used, the Court restated that, although 'in circumstances such 
as those in the present case, a sufficient link would exist to attract the protection of Article 
8', 'the Court does not find it necessary finally to determine its applicability.'116 At this 
point, it reiterated that regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between 
the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole and to the 
margin of appreciation enjoyed by States in this area. In this case, the Court stressed that 
the margin of appreciation is even wider, as the issue at stake concerns the provision of 
adequate access of people with disabilities to polling stations, which must necessarily be 
assessed in the context of the allocation of limited State resources. Finally, the Court 
decided that the national authorities are in a better position to carry out this assessment 
than an international court, because of their awareness of the funds available to provide 
such access for disabled persons.  
Again, no substantive reasons were given in Molka to support the decision to defer this 
matter to the national authorities and not scrutinize it as a potential human rights violation. 
A mere reference to the socio-economic implications of this claim is not sufficient to 
justify whether or not there is a direct and immediate link, declare the application 
inadmissible and not worthy of substantive examination. After all, most of the complaints 
brought before the ECtHR have budgetary implications. Recall that the Court has 
established that the ECHR imposes on Member States various costly positive obligations 
to put in place and run effective crime prevention and investigation mechanisms, as well 
as judicial systems and prison services. This is not to say that the potential cost of the 
measure sought by the applicant is irrelevant in determining the extent of state 
responsibility and the content of any positive obligations imposed. Rather, my point is 
that the Court must determine this at a second stage, whereas, at a first stage, it ought to 
assess the impact of the state's omissions on the actual enjoyment of the applicant's 
freedoms under the ECHR and consider what claims to resources or positive obligations 
may be inherent in an effective respect for the ECHR rights. 
                                                 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
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Besides, I do not aim to argue that any disadvantage or frustration caused is necessarily 
unfair and a violation of ECHR rights. Neither do I want to suggest that the ECHR 
provisions entail positive obligations to ensure a particular level of goods, benefits, 
resources or opportunities. For example, a state that only provides a 70% contribution 
towards the cost of a drug required to treat an applicant's chronic and life-threatening 
condition does not necessarily violate her right to life under Article 2 ECHR.117 Of course, 
it may be relevant that the applicant is unable to afford the remaining 30%, that his 
condition has deteriorated and he could face an untimely death. These circumstances 
should neither be conclusive nor be disregarded: they must be part of a wider argument 
about whether and to what extent it is fair for one to be supported by the state in such 
circumstances, given the scarcity of resources and the state's obligations towards other 
individuals. In Nitecki v Poland, the Court found that a positive obligation to fund this 
treatment could be engaged but considered that, in the special circumstances of the 
particular case, the respondent state could not be said to have failed to discharge its 
obligations under Article 2 by not paying the remaining 30% of the drug price. The 
complaint was found inadmissible without any justification as to why this was a 
reasonable and fair burden for the applicant to bear and one that did not violate his ECHR 
rights. 
Similarly, I do not mean to imply that comprehensive haemodialysis treatment must 
be available for applicants suffering from chronic renal failure in all Member States as a 
matter of ECHR rights. Of course, the Court must take into account the fact that any 
decision to provide such treatments 'amounts to a call on public funds which, in view of 
the scarce resources, would have to be diverted from other worthy needs funded by the 
taxpayer.'118 At the same time, though, it must be in a position to justify whether this is an 
expensive treatment that particular applicants, such as those in Valentina Pentiacova & 
Ors v Moldova, did not have a right to and that the state had struck a fair balance in 
denying it to them. However, in this case too, the Court decided that the national 
authorities are in a better position than an international court to carry out the fair balance 
assessment altogether, 'in view of their familiarity with the demands made on the health 
care system as well as the funds available to meet these demands' and found the complaint 
inadmissible. 
In sum, my point in discussing these inadmissible cases was to suggest that the Court 
is uneasy dealing with claims that appear to have potentially extensive socio-economic 
implications because it has no principles at hand, by which to determine their content and 
                                                 
117 See Nitecki v. Poland, (dec.) Application no. 65653/01, 21 March 2002. 
118 Valentina Pentiacova & Ors v. Moldova, (2005) 40 EHRR SE23. 
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limits and fears that it will open the floodgates for unlimited claims to resources and 
positive obligations. More specifically, even when the Court is willing to accept that one 
of the ECHR provisions may be applicable, it usually defers the crucial assessment of all 
relevant considerations to the wide margin of appreciation of the national authorities.  
Nevertheless, to decide cases such as those discussed above, the Court would need to 
rely on substantive arguments based on a clear set of principles about what resources states 
are under an obligation to provide to show effective respect for ECHR rights and what 
burden or cost it is fair and reasonable to impose upon others. As I explained in Chapter 
1, these are substantive moral arguments and principles of political morality that we must 
explore and develop in light of the values underlying the ECHR. For this reason, my 
analysis in the following chapters of this thesis will now turn on an examination of the 
values of freedom and equality.  
 
94 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THREE CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY  
AS THE CORE VALUE UNDERLYING THE ECHR RIGHTS  
 
So far, in Chapter 1, I have established that we should treat the ECtHR's 'effectiveness 
principle' as an interpretive question: the question of what positive obligations are inherent 
in an effective respect for the ECHR rights cannot be settled with reference to the plain 
meaning of the text or the original intentions of the drafters. Instead, it invites substantive 
moral reasoning with reference to the values underlying the Convention. To respond to 
this interpretive task we cannot simply refer to the notions of effectiveness or the margin 
of appreciation, as these are part of the question in the first place. In Chapter 2, I 
highlighted the progress but also the inconsistency in the Court's case law and I offered 
examples that point to the lack of a coherent set of principles by which to determine the 
content of positive obligations and claims to resources. I suggested that our interpretive 
judgments in determining this content must rest on substantive arguments and principles 
based on an interpretation of the core values underlying the ECHR rights.  
This chapter identifies three different conceptions of the value of liberty that have been 
or could be employed to explain and coherently justify the content and extent of positive 
rights and provide a principled account of positive duties within the ECHR.  
The first, based on Berlin’s moral and political outlook, is an understanding of the 
value of political freedom as an independent value, construed in isolation from the 
concerns and demands of other values, such as autonomy, equality or social justice. In the 
first section, I will argue that this approach is not only morally and politically unattractive 
and counter-intuitive but that it is also at odds with the practice of the ECtHR.1 In the 
following section, I explore an alternative conception that is often presented as the most 
                                                 
1 Many in political philosophy have challenged Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction between negative 
and positive freedom and have offered competing interpretations of the value of liberty. See I 
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ first delivered in 1958 as an inaugural lecture and then published 
in 1959 in a collection of essays under the title Four Essays on Liberty, now found in I Berlin, 
Liberty (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002). See the early response to Berlin’s distinction in 
G C MacCallum, 'Negative and positive freedom' Philosophical Review 1967 and a famous early 
criticism of his negative freedom in C Taylor, 'What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty' in A Ryan 
(ed.), The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin (Oxford University Press, 1979). 
Also see R Dworkin’s objection to the idea of a 'right to liberty' in 'What rights do we have?' in his 
Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1977). A partial reformulation of some of Berlin’s ideas with 
a compelling analysis on the value of liberty comes from B Williams, 'From Freedom to Liberty: 
The Construction of a Political Value', (2001) 30 (1) Philosophy and Public Affairs 3. For the 
republican conception of the value of liberty as a third alternative of 'freedom as non-domination' 
see Q Skinner, 'The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives' in Rorty, 
Schneewind & Skinner eds. Philosophy in History (Cambridge University Press, 1984) and his 
'The Paradoxes of Political Liberty', Tanner Lectures on Human Values (1984). Also in the same 
strand see P Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford University Press, 1997), For an autonomy-based 
conception of positive liberty see J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986). 
                                    Three Concepts of Liberty 95 
 
comprehensive theory of positive liberty, which is a conception of liberty in light of the 
values of autonomy or well-being. According to this, rights are claims to choices and 
resources that enhance the individuals' interests in autonomy, as much as possible. This 
approach, mainly inspired by the influential work of Joseph Raz in political philosophy, 
is often taken by legal scholars to be the most suitable moral basis for positive rights and 
duties. In particular, a growing number of human rights scholars suggest that the current 
practice of the ECtHR is best understood as a concern for the conditions of an agent’s 
autonomy and that the shift towards the recognition of positive rights and duties and socio-
economic rights signifies a shift towards an autonomy-based understanding of freedom, 
human rights and constitutional rights.2 In section 2, I will highlight the flaws of such an 
approach and explain why it misses important aspects of the nature, point and purpose of 
the ECHR rights. In the third section, I develop an alternative conception of positive 
freedom based on Ronald Dworkin’s influential work on the interrelation between the 
values of liberty and equality. Although Dworkin’s famous theory of rights rests on a 
distinctive interpretation of these values it has mostly been developed or employed in its 
negative form of 'rights as trumps' against impermissible reasons for state action or 
inaction. In the final section of this chapter, I suggest that an integrated interpretation3 of 
these two values also entails a 'distributive function' of rights, i.e. an account of positive 
rights and duties as fair shares to measures, goods, benefits or opportunities according to 
just scheme of distribution of resources.4  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See in particular K Moller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford University Press, 
2012) and his 'Two Conceptions of Positive Liberty: Towards an Autonomy-based Theory of 
Constitutional Rights', (2009) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 757-786, S 
Fredman, Human Rights Transformed, Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2008) and L Lavrysen, 'Protection by the Law: The Positive Obligation to Develop 
a Legal Framework to Adequately Protect ECHR Rights' in Y Haeck and E Brems (eds.) Human 
Rights and Civil Liberties in the 21st Century, (Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and 
Justice, Volume 30, Springer, 2014), pp. 69-129. 
3 Here I borrow R Dworkin’s terms first used in his Justice for Hedgehogs, (Harvard University 
Press, 2011) at p. 368. 
4 An interpretation of the value of liberty in light of the value of equality is also at the heart of the 
theory of rights of other political philosophers, such as in Amartya Sen’s capabilities theory. Of 
course, providing a coherent account of positive rights and duties depends on the particular 
conceptions of freedom and equality that one adopts. However, all egalitarian theories share the 
fundamental premise that the value of political freedom is defined and shaped in light of the value 
of equality. For the purposes of this Chapter this is enough common ground to start with. At a later 
stage, I will engage with the alternative conceptions of the value of equality that could also offer 
different understandings of freedom and different accounts of positive rights and duties. Note that 
Joseph Raz's theory that I examine here does not share this common ground as it is not an 
egalitarian theory but a perfectionist theory of freedom in light of the value of autonomy. 
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1. Liberty as an Independent Value 
A. Berlin’s value pluralism 
 
Suppose that we follow a theory of rights that flows from an understanding of the value 
of freedom usually associated with the work of Isaiah Berlin. Scholars very commonly 
refer to and subscribe to elements of Berlin’s writings on the value of liberty but they 
rarely anticipate or overcome its various problems as a basis for an account of human 
rights. Crucially, they often overlook the implications of the deeper foundation of Berlin’s 
account of liberty, which is his particular version of value pluralism. According to this, in 
the world that we encounter in ordinary experience, we see that genuine, objective values 
are many and that conflicts among them are inescapable and tragic: there is no right choice 
or solution but always loss of something valuable at any attempt to resolve the conflict.5 I 
will explain this before I move on to explore its implications for a theory of freedom and 
rights based on it. 
To begin with, Berlin insists that the only strictly philosophical method we can use to 
identify the true nature of values is an analysis that is essentially free of moral evaluations.  
His concern that we construe mostly descriptive and minimally normative definitions6 of 
each value has its roots in a particular philosophical framework: i.e. that the only reliable 
method of approaching these matters is through the ordinary resources of empirical 
observation and ordinary human knowledge.7 These, he argues, give us no a priori 
guarantee that there is such a thing as harmonious truth or state of convergence of values 
in a single pattern8 but instead that there is apparent conflict within the truth about matters 
of value; or else, true statements of value can conflict.9 In other words, he argues that the 
values, goals, and ends that individuals set for themselves and pursue in their lives all 
reflect a plurality of ultimate and objective values that inescapably come into conflict with 
each other in the private lives of individuals as well as in the social and political realm. 
Most importantly, a further implication of this outlook is that any attempt we make to 
                                                 
5 For an overview of Berlin’s philosophy and his value pluralism see J Cherniss and H Hardy, 
'Isaiah Berlin', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Zalta Edward N. 
(ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/berlin/  
6 Bernard Williams argues that Berlin's understanding of values is descriptive but also in some 
sense 'minimally normative' but I do not see how a value free statement can be normative in any 
way. See B Williams, Isaiah Berlin entry in the online Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
7 Berlin, Liberty, p. 213-214. 
8 Ibid.  
9 This image he posits as contrary to the ancient belief that has dominated western philosophy from 
Plato through to the romantics, who in his view seriously challenged it. Berlin makes this point in 
greater detail in his essay 'The Lasting Effects', ch. 6 in his The Roots of Romanticism, (Pimlico, 
2000) 
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accommodate these conflicting values requires inevitable choices of sacrifice and loss of 
something genuinely valuable.10  
Now, this conception of value pluralism does not necessarily exclude the possibility 
that reason may play a role when we assess the relative weight that these values have in 
different circumstances at the stage where we seek to determine their limitations and set 
priorities.11 However, Berlin argues that we should not allow evaluative judgments at the 
prior stage, where we identify something as a value. He views any attempt to rationalize 
the description of values as masking the true will of our empirical self, i.e. our 
understanding of the world around us through ordinary experience. Appealing to reason 
rather than ordinary experience, he warns, could potentially subordinate us to an ideal, 
higher, rational understanding of values that our empirical self does not identify with. 
This, he argues, underestimates our ordinary experience, our understanding of the world 
and of what is valuable in life.  
Most crucially, Berlin contends that when we are asked to detach ourselves from our 
ordinary experiences we are also forced to identify ourselves with a hypothetical, 
metaphysical self, i.e. to choose as valuable only what we would if we were rational 
agents. And, since it will be difficult for many to determine what their ideal, rational self 
would choose, we may be forced to identify with the authoritative will of a collective self, 
such as the political community, which purports to guide our action to the rational and 
mutually beneficial choices.12 This metaphysical fission of the self, he warns, is a 
philosophically flawed and politically dishonest approach. Because it is not truthful to the 
empirical fact of the plurality, incommensurability and conflict of values and potentially 
opens the way to coercion in the name of a rational amalgamation of values in a 
harmonious scheme accepted by all, qua rational. So, Berlin fears, in cases where 
individuals actually experience their values to be in conflict, they will not just have to 
accept a rational compromise and a loss of what they value. Even worse, they will be 
                                                 
10 Berlin, Liberty, p. 213-214. At this point Berlin makes no distinction between, on the one hand, 
what individuals find of value to themselves and the goals and ends they set for their private lives 
and, on the other hand, political values. This is problematic if one attempts to identify political 
values in a wholly subjective way that lacks a certain degree of impartiality, which is essential for 
any plausible and morally attractive theory about political values. For this point see B Williams, 
'From Freedom to Liberty: The Construction of a Political Value', (2001) 30 (1) Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, p. 13 and my discussion later in section 3 (B) of this chapter. 
11 See I Berlin and B Williams’s reply to G Crowder’s claim in 'Pluralism and Liberalism' that 
according to Berlin’s pluralism choices among incommensurable values are 'underdetermined by 
reason' in 'Pluralism and Liberalism: A Reply', in the exchange published in Political Studies 
(1994), XLI, pp. 293-309, at pp. 306-307. Even in his original essay 'Two Concepts of Liberty' 
Berlin makes it clear that the choices and compromises that will eventually have to be made among 
ultimate values will be based on a pragmatic and a rational assessment of which value should take 
priority in the circumstances. 
12 See K Flikschuh, Freedom, (Polity, 2007), p. 28-36, who explains Berlin's refusal to accept a 
close connection between freedom and reason. 
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asked to admit that a rational interpretive analysis of the issues at stake proves that they 
had misunderstood the true nature and content of certain values in the first place.13 Berlin 
foresees a danger in this: specifically, the danger that some kind of authority will claim to 
be better placed to identify the true content of values and will strive to patronize 
individuals or even force on them values that they do not identify as their own. To avoid 
this, he claims, we must see and define values for what they are in empirical reality and 
not for what we, or (even worse) others, can rationally construe them to be in order to fit 
together in a largely hypothetical and metaphysical scheme. This is a central point in 
Berlin's theory of value and his version of liberalism. It is beyond the scope of my thesis 
to discuss this in depth but I will present and discuss the illustrative example of the values 
of liberty and equality that Berlin mostly refers to and is also crucial for my thesis.  
 
B. Liberty and Equality as Independent Values 
 
Let us now come to liberty and equality. According to Berlin's outlook, philosophical 
clarity and political honesty require that we describe and understand the concept and value 
of liberty, like all other concepts and values, in isolation, i.e. independently of other values 
such as equality, fairness, social justice, utility, security or happiness. Take Berlin’s 
example of the independent realms of the values of liberty and equality. Following his 
view, the fundamental sense of freedom is that of negative freedom or freedom from 
interference or obstacles in whatever one may wish to be or do. The content of these claims 
to freedom are shaped irrespective of any theory of equality, about what people ought to 
be free to do or be or what they are rightfully entitled to under a theory of social equality 
and justice or a reasonably just theory about the distribution of resources. So, equality 
claims to resources, which he places under the concept of positive freedom to the 
conditions for the exercise of negative freedom (including conditions of rationality and 
socio-economic conditions),14 would then similarly be construed independently of any 
other considerations. That is, independently of the cost that these claims may entail for 
others or any personal responsibility or cost that it would be fair for individuals to bear 
for their choices and the outcome of their lives (that it would be unfair to transfer to 
others). In a nutshell: a non-moralized conception of values construed along Berlinian 
lines means that claims to liberty or equality may encompass a wide range of claims and 
not only reasonable or rightful claims to liberty or equality, i.e. only those resulting from 
an interpretation of these values in light of each other. 
                                                 
13 Berlin, Liberty, p. 212. 
14 Ibid, p. 45-47. 
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Berlin’s argument to support this outlook is that it is essential to avert the danger that 
some authoritarian regime –like those of the past- will strive to determine as supposedly 
rational, true and ultimate certain conceptions of values and force them upon individuals 
that do not identify as their own. And the first inconspicuous step towards such gross 
misuse of power is, in his view, the identification of the independent value and demands 
of freedom with the demands of other values, such as those of social justice or equality 
that provide the conditions for its exercise or make it worthwhile. However, notice that, 
despite Berlin's insistence on a morally neutral account of values, his argument is a moral 
one to begin with. He suggests that there is something morally wrong or disrespectful 
about not allowing individuals to choose and follow their own ideals and, therefore, a kind 
of moral right or requirement to prevent some from forcing her ideals on others –even if 
this were to her benefit. I will further explain this inconsistency. 
Berlin’s argument is mainly derived from his interpretation of the words of Kant, 
Hegel and Rousseau15 and the historical experience of their misuse by authoritarian 
regimes that lead to the sacrifice of individual (negative) freedom for the sake of the 
supposedly 'true' or 'full' freedom, which is blended with a conception of equality or social 
justice. Nevertheless, such an argument is far from decisive in a philosophical quest to 
discover whether this version of value pluralism and its implications for the relation 
between the values of liberty and equality are true. Of course, we can and must look to the 
past to try to make best sense of the use of interpretive concepts, such as liberty and 
equality. But history alone cannot fix the interpretation of these concepts.16 That is, the 
nature, content and conflict (or not) of political values is primarily a matter of substantive 
moral and political philosophy: it begs the question to assume that values are independent 
or interdependent without any substantive moral and political reasoning.17 Besides, we 
could carefully construe positive liberty in a way that avoids the mistakes of the past and 
the dangers of authoritarianism.18  
So, leaving the historical argument aside, I will reveal some of the substantive 
shortcomings of Berlin's theory of freedom and equality. To begin with, if we understand 
these values in isolation from each other, conflicts are inevitable and choices are not 
merely hard but also tragic, as Berlin put it. Any choice we make in determining their 
content, limits and relative weight will wrong one of the parties involved. That will be the 
                                                 
15 For a criticism of Berlin's interpretation of these philosophers and their ideas, see Flikschuh, 
Freedom, pp. 22-36. 
16 R Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), p. 350. 
17 See R Dworkin, 'Moral Pluralism' in his Justice in Robes, especially p. 112-113. 
18 See A Swift, An Introduction to Political Philosophy: A Beginners’ Guide for Students and 
Politicians (Polity Press, 2003), pp. 77-87 and Taylor, 'What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty'.  
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case even if we frustrate far-reaching claims, e.g. to enjoy absolute security, or the most 
extensive freedom or absolute equality. Indeed, to be consistent with his moral and 
political outlook Berlin admits that there is tragic loss of something valuable or 'an 
infraction of liberty' in every single law that regulates human behaviour, be that the 
'freedom of parents to educate their children' or the 'freedom of the torturer to inflict 
pain.'19 So, the frustration of any kind of claim that individuals consider as instances of 
their freedom will be deemed as a prima facie interference with something valuable. Only 
at a second stage, he adds, we may find some of these claims as morally abhorrent and 
decide to restrict them for the sake of other values but this, he insists, 'does not render 
them genuine freedoms any the less' and does not justify us in so reformulating the 
definition of freedom.20 
It is not hard to illustrate how unconvincing and counterintuitive such an interpretation 
of these values can be. On the one hand, on this account, freedom is restricted when we 
prevent some from harming others or from stealing or when we tax them in order to fund 
redistributive schemes required by a theory of equality or social justice. On the other hand, 
individuals are not able to claim that their freedom is restricted when they lack the 
conditions enabling them to exercise their rights in any meaningful way, due to poverty, 
disability or other disadvantage. In this way, the continuum of the value of freedom seems 
to encompass and extend between two extremes. It extends from some entirely descriptive 
account of primitive freedom, such as that found in nature, and all the way to a worthless 
freedom of choice in a society, where there is a complete vacuum of other conditions that 
could make it useful and valuable.21 To be consistent with this, would mean that we have 
to accept that freedom is diminished and individuals are prima facie wronged even if they 
are denied what could, in fact, be even more than a fair share of resources or opportunities. 
That is, if we classify the act of torture or murder as genuine instances of freedom, then 
we accept that, no matter how well justified, any interference with the plans of the torturer 
or murderer denies her something valuable, an opportunity or right that she was prima 
                                                 
19 See Berlin, Liberty, p. 48.  
20 Ibid, p. 48-49. Surprisingly, the same point is made by Moller, ‘Two Conceptions of Positive 
Liberty: Towards an Autonomy-based Theory of Constitutional Rights', at p. 775, who claims to 
subscribe to a largely moral account of personal autonomy, following Raz, albeit one that also rests 
on certain elements of Berlin’s moral and political outlook. I will return to this contradiction in 
section 3 of this chapter and later in Chapter 4. 
21 Such a 'primitive' account of freedom derives from Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, chs. 14 and 21, 
and is at the basis of purely descriptive accounts of (negative) freedom, i.e. those aiming to keep it 
free from moral evaluations about the value of options, choices, opportunities or limitations and 
frustrations. For a strictly descriptive or 'physicalist' account of freedom whereby all physically 
possible actions are relevant for freedom see H Steiner, An Essay on Rights, (Wiley-Blackwell, 
1994) and his 'Individual Liberty' in D Miller (ed.) The Liberty Reader, (Edinburgh University 
Press, 2006), pp. 123-140. Also, for an account of 'pure' negative freedom MH Kramer, The Quality 
of Freedom, (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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facie entitled to. The objection that torturing or murdering others does not fall within the 
scope of their freedoms is impermissible, according to Berlin's theory. On the other hand, 
following Berlin's outlook, individuals would not be able to argue that it is unfair for them 
to be left alone, within a formal framework of potentially wide-ranging freedom of choice, 
but where they suffer from natural, social or economic conditions that deprive them from 
any realistic opportunity to exercise this choice. If they argue that the distribution of 
resources and opportunities in society leaves them with less than a fair share, then we 
would have to consider this as an equality or social justice-claim and not as a genuine 
freedom-claim. Following Berlin's distinction between freedom and the conditions of its 
exercise, that separates the demands of freedom from the demands of other values any 
claims to the conditions that make freedom meaningful and worthwhile would be 
dismissed as freedom or rights claims and classified as social policy claims to equality or 
social justice. 
It is deeply misguided to argue that both of these extremes of the continuum can be 
thought of as genuine instances of freedom as a political value. Both Bernard Williams 
and Ronald Dworkin –who have divergent views on the rest of the debate, as I will explain 
below- at least agree to a certain crucial point. They agree that we need to be able to justify 
with a certain degree of impartiality what is worthwhile or right, in order to classify it as 
an instance of a political value, of freedom or equality, or indeed as a value of any kind.22 
The fact that something may feel desirable or good from the point of view of the individual 
concerned is not sufficient for anyone else or the society as a whole to consider it as a 
value. Only an objective evaluation can determine the weight of a choice, preference, 
attitude or goal and help us decide on the priority or urgency that we should assign to it in 
the allocation of other rights and entitlements.23 That is why we do not normally 
understand the mere wish and ability to kill or steal as instances of political freedom, 
whose restriction is necessary because it conflicts with other values. In other words, we 
consider that the frustration or loss felt by the individual is not morally significant, because 
nothing bad is being done and no one is wronged if these so-called freedoms are denied.24 
In fact, in these cases we would say that this ability or wish is not even a value at all, let 
alone a political value. To the contrary, adopting an 'internal perspective about what adds 
value to one’s life' leads us to a wholly subjective and unattractive account of the political 
value of freedom. Because this conception of freedom implies that even immoral activities 
such as murdering or torturing would be considered as prima facie within the rightful 
                                                 
22 See Williams, 'From Freedom to Liberty, The Construction of a Political Value', p. 12, Dworkin, 
Justice in Robes, p. 115. 
23 TM Scanlon, ‘Preference and Urgency’ (1975) 72 Journal of Philosophy 655. 
24 However, see discussion later in the text about the debate between Williams and Dworkin. 
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sphere that one is entitled to control.25 It seems to me that, to put all these claims in a 
balancing exercise at a second stage of limitations debases and misguides the hard 
interpretive work of exploring the true meaning and the requirements of political values 
such as freedom and equality. This interpretive task should focus on what it is that we 
value, what we think is worth allowing, respecting, ensuring or providing. I will return to 
this in the following section. 
Similarly, to take this objection one step further, we may argue that merely 
designating certain spheres of freedom (in private life, in family life, in access to justice) 
is not worthwhile and valuable in any way, if no concern is shown for the conditions or 
ability of the individual to actually exercise any choice within these spheres. Contrary to 
what Berlin tried to argue, it is not plausible to draw a sharp distinction between freedom 
and the conditions for its exercise. Berlin's apparently watertight distinction is 
conceptually flawed and morally unattractive, because we cannot construe a plausible or 
meaningful conception of freedom without any reference to arguments about what 
individuals are rightfully entitled to. I will explain.  
Jeremy Waldron26 and G.A. Cohen27 eloquently exposed the paradox of construing 
liberty in a purely negative way, insulated from the concerns of other values, especially 
the values of equality, fairness or social justice. In particular, Cohen highlighted the 
essential connection between freedom and money: law enforcement officials will have to 
physically prevent a poor person from getting hold of goods or using services without 
paying for them. So, although Berlin invites us to consider such cases as a lack of means 
or conditions of freedom, this physical restriction actually constitutes an interference with 
negative freedom, as Berlin defines it, i.e. freedom from interference. Therefore, 
impecunious individuals are not actually free, in the way Berlin assumes they are, to 
acquire what they cannot pay for, without suffering an interference with their freedom. Of 
course, one would object that this is a justified interference. Nevertheless, recall that 
following Berlin's morally neutral definition, the argument that we may be justified in 
                                                 
25 See Moller ‘Two Conceptions of Positive Liberty: Towards an Autonomy-based Theory of 
Constitutional Rights', p. 775 Moller directly cites Berlin to adopt this problematic conception of 
control and ties with it the idea of 'prima facie' rights to everything, free from moral evaluations, 
which need to be evaluated, balanced against each other and limited at a second stage. He further 
defends this account of freedom and argues it is an advantage of the proportionality analysis that it 
invites this 'rights inflation' as the only check to arbitrary or unjustified state action in his most 
recent 'Proportionality and Rights Inflation' in G Huscroft, BW Miller and G Webber (eds.) 
Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning, (Oxford University Press, 
2014), pp. 155-172. I discuss this again in Chapter 4.  
26 J Waldron, 'Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom' in his Liberal Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 1993).  
27 GA Cohen, 'Freedom and Money', in GA Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and 
Other Essays in Political Philosophy, (Otsuka Michael ed.) (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2011), pp. 166-199. 
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imposing restrictions should not influence whether we call something as an instance of 
genuine freedom.  
In a similar way, Waldron eloquently proves as 'simply false' the 'familiar claim', 
which he attributes to Berlin and Hobbes, namely that, 'in the negative sense of "freedom," 
the poor are as free as the rest of us – and that you have to move to a positive definition 
in order to dispute that.28 In particular he reveals that homeless individuals who lack the 
conditions or resources necessary (i.e. a home) to make choices or perform actions that 
they are legally permitted to perform, such as wash, sleep, cook are not free in the sense 
Berlin assumes that they are, i.e. free from interference. In fact, although they actually are 
legally permitted to and physically able to make these choices or perform these actions 
they can only do so by breaking other laws, such as those of private property. Therefore, 
in any attempt to exercise their freedom, they, too, will be subject to physical restriction 
by law enforcement officials, i.e. to interference with their negative or formal freedom. 
Again, under a morally neutral definition of freedom the objection that our private 
property laws render this interference justified does not refute the point that this is 
interference with freedom as Berlin defines it and not just lack of conditions of equality 
or social justice. To say that this is not really interference would take us beyond a 
descriptive definition of freedom and would entail a moral interpretation of this value in 
light of other values.  
In this sense, both theorists argued that those who lack certain resources that are 
essential conditions for choice, also lack freedom, in the way described by Berlin: freedom 
from deliberate interference by other individuals. And to the extent that freedom, as Berlin 
wanted it, is construed as a value independently of any consideration about whether such 
interference is justified, then it would follow that the homeless or poor also lack negative 
and not just positive freedom or the conditions for the exercise of negative freedom. To 
avoid or overcome this conclusion we need to resort to what Berlin wanted to exclude 
from the first stage of constructing our understanding of values: we need moral evaluative 
judgments about what is worth allowing, protecting or providing.  
My point in the previous paragraphs was that following Berlin's approach consistently 
is unattractive and untenable: freedom means nothing of value without certain conditions 
for its exercise, which are an essential part of it. Although the law grants certain freedoms 
to all, the law or other social and economic arrangements, which society puts in place, 
have a different impact on different people and a devastating impact on certain individuals 
in particular. This often means that some effectively have no choices available to them, 
so their freedom is worthless, or they can only exercise their formal freedom by breaking 
                                                 
28 Waldron, 'Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom', pp. 318-322. 
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the law. In other words, social, economic or institutional arrangements, as well as power 
structures, unavoidably influence the distribution of freedom, not only in the positive but 
also in the negative sense favoured by Berlin and a political community must bear some 
responsibility for the structural disadvantage that these cause to certain individuals or 
groups.29 Therefore, a modest conclusion is that certain complaints about the lack of 
resources are essentially connected with claims to liberty, because, without certain 
conditions, freedom of choice becomes morally unattractive and worthless as a moral and 
political value. Of course, this conclusion does not settle but merely opens the normative 
debate as to which claims to resources are essential features of claims to specific rights 
and freedoms.  
 
A value-neutral conception of liberty as the basis of rights and claims to resources 
 
This understanding of the value of liberty is not only morally problematic. It also offers 
an unconvincing answer to our initial normative problem: to explain and justify which 
claims to resources belong, as rights-claims, to the institutional context of the Convention 
and should be decided by the Court. If we understand claims to resources as separate 
claims to the social and economic conditions for the exercise of freedom, and not as 
freedom-claims themselves, they would be, according to this theory, demands of the 
values of equality or social justice. This means that they would not be considered as claims 
to protect freedom as such but as claims to judicially extend the scope of the Convention 
freedoms to achieve other desirable goals.30 The idea of 'effectiveness' that the Court often 
refers to would be seen, according to this theory, as a matter of social and economic policy 
and not as a matter of legal rights and freedoms. Then it would appear that the only 
institutionally appropriate solution for the Court would be to allow a wide margin of 
appreciation to the national authorities to decide whether and to what extent they will 
ensure an 'extension' of the scope of the Convention, especially in controversial claims 
with potentially far-reaching socio-economic implications. The practice of the ECtHR in 
the inadmissible cases that I examined in Chapter 2 would then be justified. 
                                                 
29 See Williams, 'From Freedom to Liberty: The Construction of a Political Value', p. 8-9 and p. 
21. 
30 This is the fear expressed by Judge Vilhjalmsson in the famous 1978 Airey case discussed in 
chaptes 1 and 2, that we cannot fight poverty through broad interpretations of the ECHR but also 
more recently by those who warn that reading certain positive obligations in the ECHR should not 
'extend' the scope of the Convention in such a way that its provisions are 'rewritten', see Mowbray, 
'The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights', p. 57-79. This also seems to be the idea 
behind the Court's decision to allow a particularly wide margin of appreciation on the basis that 
certain cases involve resource allocation decisions. 
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However, notice that this conception of liberty as the basis of ECHR rights would 
miss an important feature of the applicants' claims.31 Specifically, on closer inspection, 
their complaint is that they are suffering a serious and unfair disadvantage in the 
distribution of resources or opportunities: they complain that the current legal, social and 
economic arrangements unfairly hamper their freedoms under the ECHR. They are not 
merely frustrated or inconvenienced by a lack of ability to exercise their freedom but also 
claim that this is a significant moral harm:32 that, in lacking certain conditions or abilities, 
they are not treated as they are entitled to be treated, as a matter of the freedoms and rights 
granted by the ECHR. When referring to positive obligations as inherent in effective 
respect, the Court itself appears to reject a value-neutral conception of freedom. Notice 
that it attempts to justify these positive obligations on arguments about what is the essence 
of a particular freedom or what is worth protecting about it and would be lost or 
diminished, if the state did not secure certain enabling conditions that it considers 
indispensable for that freedom to be worth anything at all. In this way, the Court 
acknowledges that these conditions are essential features of the freedoms guaranteed by 
the ECHR and not the separate concerns of public policy, which should better be left to 
the margin of appreciation of the national authorities. Of course, this does not resolve the 
question of which conditions are essential or inherent features of the ECHR freedoms but 
merely opens the way to explore it through alternative theories.   
 
2. Liberty in Light of the Value of Autonomy  
 
An increasing number of human rights scholars seek for a more promising basis for 
positive rights and duties in a conception of the value of liberty that is richer than that 
offered by Berlin and construed not in isolation but in light of other values, such as that 
developed by Joseph Raz, in light of the value of personal autonomy.33 Indeed, on a quick 
perusal, this approach appears to have much to offer to human rights discourse. Unlike 
that of Berlin, Raz’s theory of rights is not based upon a value-neutral understanding of 
liberty: to the contrary, he acknowledges that a linguistic, value-neutral definition of 
liberty does not have any normative force and therefore cannot settle moral questions, 
such as what rights people have and what obligations these impose on others. As Raz puts 
                                                 
31 In some cases, applicants themselves frame their own claims in a way that misses or 
misrepresents this point. 
32 Here I borrow the term used by Dworkin in his A Matter of Principle, 'Principle, Policy, 
Procedure', p. 80. 
33 See Fredman, Human Rights Transformed, Positive Rights and Positive Duties, p. 23-25 and 
Moller, ‘Two Conceptions of Positive Liberty: Towards an Autonomy-based Theory of 
Constitutional Rights'. 
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it, conceptual analysis 'cannot answer the questions of which liberties are valuable, what 
counts as a restriction or interference with a person’s freedom and how to judge when 
considerations of freedom conflict with other considerations.'34 If we are to follow a 
consistent moral and political outlook, he argues, we can only solve these problems with 
reference to moral principles and arguments.35 
For this reason, Raz develops a conception of the value of freedom in light of the 
values of autonomy and well-being. Rights and duties are grounded on the intrinsic 
desirability of the well-being of individuals36 and they go hand in hand with a conception 
of law and government as a source of liberty, rather than as a potential threat to it. That is, 
government is supposed to promote freedom and not merely sit back and avoid interfering 
with it.37 In particular, it must strive to enable its subjects to enjoy greater freedom by 
enhancing the conditions for their autonomy, which further allows them to advance their 
well-being. Raz regards the concern for creating and expanding the conditions of 
autonomy as the 'core of the liberal concern for liberty'38 and considers liberty and rights 
valuable insofar as they serve positive freedom and autonomy.39 In this context, I 
understand the difference between freedom and autonomy as one between the ideal and 
the conditions to achieve it: autonomy as a particular interpretation of well-being is a 
moral and political ideal and freedom (both negative and positive) is instrumental in 
achieving this aim. Such an approach appears to some commentators40 to be promising as 
a basis for grounding positive duties. However, on closer inspection, it raises various 
points of concern that those endorsing it often underestimate.  
 
The value of autonomy 
 
To begin with, I will draw attention to Raz’s understanding of the value of autonomy that 
plays a key role in his version of liberalism and his conception of freedom and rights. 
Raz’s value of autonomy appears to be linked with the same fundamental ideal as all other 
accounts of this value within the liberal tradition: that individuals should be the authors of 
their lives by making choices that control or shape their life at least to some degree.41 So, 
in line with other liberal thinkers, such as Kant, Mill, Berlin, Rawls and Dworkin, Raz 
appears to place considerable weight on the importance of individual choice and the idea 
                                                 
34 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 16. 
35 Ibid, p. 15. 
36 Ibid, p. 190. 
37 Ibid, p. 18-19. 
38 Ibid, p. 203-207. 
39 Ibid, p. 410. 
40 See Fredman and Moller as above note 33. 
41 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 369. 
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of control over one’s life. However, right from the outset in his major work in political 
philosophy, The Morality of Freedom, he is eager to detach himself from this core liberal 
strand and offer an alternative version of liberal values, such as personal autonomy and 
political freedom. In particular, Raz’s analysis of the value of autonomy has two 
distinctive features that mark it apart from all other liberal interpretations of it: it is 
understood as a social and perfectionist value. I will first describe key points of these two 
features and then explain how they give rise to various points of concern for using a Razian 
account of autonomy as a basis for human rights claims. 
 
A. Raz's Conception of Autonomy as a Perfectionist and Social Value 
 
Autonomy as a Perfectionist Value 
 
To begin with, Raz’s first point of criticism targets liberal neutrality, namely, the central 
idea shared by most liberals, that the state should remain neutral between rival conceptions 
of the good life.42 The idea of state neutrality is central to the liberal tradition because it 
embodies the fundamental liberal concern for toleration. Liberal neutrality advocates 
argue that individuals must be free to shape and follow their own conception of the good 
life, according to their own political, religious, cultural and ethical views. The point of 
neutrality, they say, is for individuals to be able to live a life that they can endorse and not 
one that is forced upon them in a way that shows lack of respect for their choices or 
concern for their circumstances.43 To that end, the state should avoid making political 
decisions and adopting policies that favour any particular conception of what is good or 
valuable in life and must not use its coercive powers to promote or enforce it upon 
individuals.  
Ronald Dworkin, for instance, considers the idea of neutrality as a constituent principle 
of the political morality of liberalism. He argues that this principle ensures that all 
individuals are treated as equals,44 which means that it shows respect for the special 
responsibility that each individual has for discovering and following her particular 
conception of the good life and does not allow her to be subordinated to other peoples’ 
coercive choices.45  
                                                 
42 For an overview of liberal neutrality see G F Gaus, 'The Moral Foundations of Liberal Neutrality', 
in T Christiano and J Christman (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, (Wiley-
Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 2009) 
43 I will return to discuss this in length in the last section of this chapter and in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis. 
44 Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, p. 191. 
45 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 154-155 and Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 368-369. 
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Similarly, in Rawls's theory of justice as fairness, citizens' basic claims to social 
resources and the constitutional essentials do not depend on 'their complete conception of 
the good': people's entitlement to these basic goods must not be determined in relation to 
their divergent views, goals, loyalties and their incommensurable conceptions of what is 
good or valuable in life.46 Instead, Rawls suggests, these claims must be founded on a 
'public conception of justice' that judges these claims 'in terms of a partial conception of 
the good, rooted in the objective needs of citizens as free and equal.'47  
To the contrary, Raz criticizes the principle of neutrality as an incoherent and 
unattractive political ideal. His conception of freedom and autonomy is rooted in a theory 
of political perfectionism, which entails that the state may endorse and promote a 
particular conception of the good. Following a perfectionist moral and political position, 
it is within the state's legitimate role to use paternalistic measures and policies, in order to 
create the conditions of autonomy. In particular, Raz argues that the state has the right and 
duty 'to create morally valuable opportunities, and eliminate repugnant ones.'48 A 
perfectionist outlook entails that the evaluation of which are the conditions of autonomy 
or what constitutes morally valuable or repugnant opportunities is primarily entrusted to 
the state. Crucially, the problem with perfectionism is that it allows the state to use various 
coercive means, in order to implement the policies and decisions that the community, and 
not each individual for herself, finds to be conducive to autonomy. Raz denies that 
coercion can legitimately be used to promote autonomy and well-being. But Waldron is 
right to point out that, although Raz may denounce the use of criminal punishment as a 
direct form of coercion, he endorses the use of other means, which often amount to 
coercion in many respects, such as taxation, subsidies and the removal of options.49 
Indeed, the indirect impact of taxation may be much more crucial for the distribution of 
resources and opportunities in society. 
Besides, although Raz acknowledges that coercion is normally an insult to the 
person’s autonomy, he considers it as a matter of degree rather than an all-or-nothing 
concept: a person can still lead an autonomous life despite 'a single act of coercion of a 
not too serious nature.'50 This seems to be in contrast with the idea of moral independence, 
or even more so, with the idea of integrity that requires an attitude of unfailing respect for 
                                                 
46 J Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Belknap, Harvard, 2001), p. 151. On neutrality see 
also p. 153 note 27. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 417. 
49 J Waldron, 'Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz's Morality of Freedom', (1988-89), 62 South 
California Law Review, p. 1142-1152. 
50 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 156. 
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the inviolability of the person.51 Of course, Raz acknowledges the importance of moral 
independence as a distinct condition of autonomy.52 Specifically, he accepts that coercion 
and manipulation subject the will of one person to that of another and, in this way, violate 
autonomy because they treat others as objects, rather than as autonomous persons.53 Still, 
notice that for Raz, the fact that coercion and manipulation reduce options is just a 'natural 
fact' that 'has become the basis of a social convention' and that such conventions allow for 
exceptions.54 Namely, he does not attribute any moral dimension to coercion and 
manipulation: he observes it as a social event and a social convention that neither serves 
nor disrespects any stringent moral requirement.  Let us develop these ideas further.  
In particular, Raz explains that coercion by an ideal perfectionist state does not 
express an insult to autonomy on two conditions: firstly, if individuals are granted 
adequate rights of political participation and secondly, if it is guided by a public morality 
expressing concern for individual autonomy.55 This implies that there is nothing wrong 
with perfectionist and paternalistic policies, as long as they are decided collectively, they 
are compatible with respect for autonomy56 and enhance the individual’s ability to lead an 
autonomous life.57 There is a troubling hidden tension in this widely shared intuition. It is 
the long-standing tension between respect for autonomy as moral independence or 
freedom of choice and the ideal of an autonomous life as a particular conception of well-
being. The tension arises when some prioritize the ideal of an autonomous life and wish 
to serve and promote it through means, which others find offensive to a conception of 
autonomy as moral independence. How do liberal theorists account for this tension?  
Whereas a perfectionist would consider freedom of choice as merely instrumental to 
well-being, most liberals, such as libertarians and liberal egalitarians, consider freedom of 
choice as valuable in itself. They believe that the state compromises this valuable freedom 
of choice when it uses its coercive force to divert it towards choices that reflect a 
conception of the good that is other than the chooser’s. In fact, advocates of liberal 
neutrality see any such interference by the state as an actual denial or violation of 
                                                 
51 By 'unfailing respect' here I mean that failure to respect will necessarily entail a special moral 
harm to the person and not merely a compromise of her autonomy. I explain this in the following 
paragraphs. For the idea of integrity, of moral independence, moral equality and the inviolability 
of the person see B Williams, 'A Critique of Utilitarianism' in Utilitarianism, For and Against, and 
J Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 3 and 24-30, T Nagel, 'Personal Rights and Public Space', (1995) 
24 (2) Philosophy and Public Affairs, p. 83. 
52 That is distinct from and not reducible to the other two conditions of autonomy: appropriate 
mental abilities and an adequate range of available options. See Raz, The Morality of Freedom p. 
372. 
53 Ibid, p. 378. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid, p. 157. 
56 Ibid, p. 423. 
57 Fredman endorses this view in Human Rights Transformed, p. 16-18.  
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autonomy that inflicts some kind of moral harm or injury to the person, which cannot be 
justified by any supposed benefit to her or to others. Of course, even the most consistent 
advocates of neutrality allow for certain 'soft' paternalistic measures or policies but it is 
crucial that their justification is based on significantly different reasons.  
For instance, many liberals such as Dworkin, would accept laws and policies of 
'surface paternalism', e.g. compulsory education and mandatory seat belts, because these 
policies do not deny people the power to make their own decisions about maters of ethical 
foundation, neither do they depend on an ethical justification and choice about the 
personal virtues that a good life reflects.58 This kind of justification is accepted by liberals 
because it allows only those paternalistic measures and policies that protect the conditions 
for the ethical independence of the person. On the other hand, a perfectionist theory also 
justifies or even requires the adoption of all further measures and policies that are seen as 
protecting or promoting a specific conception of personal autonomy or some communal 
good.59 The notable difference is on the kind of treatment or attitude towards individuals. 
The liberal neutralist allows paternalistic political decisions that may influence how 
people can and should live, as redistributive taxation and civil rights acts do, but do not 
violate authenticity because they are not justified on the assumption that they will make 
the lives of individuals ethically better or serve some collective good.60 As Dworkin puts 
it, we cannot escape influence by the ethical culture around us but we must resist 
domination in the form of government picking out worthy from unworthy options for us 
to make available or promote.61 Notice here the underlying crucial distinction between 
ethics and morality. Ethics involves all the decisions about how to live one's life and here 
we ought to respect people's special responsibility for these decisions and allow our ethical 
environment to be created organically, through the free choices of all people and not 
through political majorities imposing their decisions on everyone.62 Morality is prior to 
ethics in politics as it defines what opportunities and resources people are rightfully 
entitled to and determines what rights they have to liberty.63 
On the contrary, a perfectionist account of autonomy allows the state to promote a 
particular conception of the good life and, in this way, usurps the responsibility of 
                                                 
58 See Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 336-337 and 368-371. 
59 For a clear statement of the view that an action that infringes people’s autonomy is justified by 
the need to protect or promote the autonomy of those people or of others’ [my emphasis] see Raz, 
The Morality of Freedom, p. 425. Note that this theory allows the infringement of one person’s 
autonomy for the sake not just of that person only but also for the protection or even more generally 
the promotion of other people’s autonomy. 
60 See Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, (Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 76-77. 
61 See Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 211-212. 
62 Ibid, p. 371. 
63 Ibid, p. 371. 
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individuals to choose what makes their life valuable and successful. Furthermore, a 
perfectionist state justifies decisions about the exclusion or permission of options and the 
allocation of all kinds of resources and opportunities based on arguments about their 
ethical benefit to the lives of individuals or the common culture.64 Now, as much as this 
sounds counter-intuitive for a mainstream liberal it is a reasonable viewpoint under a 
perfectionist theory such as Raz’s. In order to understand Raz’s defence of this position 
we need to relate it to his deeper commitments to the non-individualistic nature and source 
of values that reveal further points of concern about his perfectionist account of freedom 
and autonomy. 
 
Autonomy as a Social Value  
 
Most major liberal thinkers consider the value of personal autonomy as essentially related 
to the significance or value of freedom of choice. In other words, they think that personal 
autonomy is compromised whenever individual choice is interfered with. As mentioned 
earlier, Raz breaks with this long tradition as, in his moral and political outlook, the value 
of freedom of choice is merely instrumental to that of personal autonomy and not 
intrinsically valuable. More broadly, he considers that the value of freedom is nothing 
more than the value of personal autonomy, which in turn is 'a particular conception of 
individual well-being that has acquired considerable popularity in western industrial 
societies'65. In the previous section, I explained how this introduces a form of 
perfectionism in Raz’s theory of personal autonomy and freedom: the state is required to 
provide and enhance the conditions of autonomy and well-being. In this process, it may 
favour a particular conception of what is good or valuable in life, even at the expense of 
the divergent ethical views that individuals may hold. But quite apart from the liberal 
neutralists' objection that I discussed earlier, there is a further crucial point that I wish to 
raise here. It is Raz's understanding of the value of personal autonomy as a social value.66  
                                                 
64 If this distinction is right then one is not really offering a perfectionist account of personal 
autonomy and freedom if she limits the justified/legitimate interference with the person merely to 
a list of goods that are considered as essential for the existence and the physical integrity of the 
person. This could well be accepted by a traditional liberal neutralist, only with a different 
justification. Either a theory endorses all measures that both ensure and enhance personal autonomy 
and suffers the liberal critique to perfectionism or it offers nothing different from a mainstream 
liberal theory. 
65 Ibid. p. 369. 
66 For Raz’s critique of liberal individualism see Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 165-263, for his 
thesis of the dependence of personal goals and values on social forms and social practices in 
particular see pp. 307-313, also J Raz, The Practice of Value, (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 
15-36, and Flikschuh, Freedom, p. 141-166. 
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To be more specific, in Raz's perfectionist account of liberalism, personal autonomy 
derives its value from the normative aspects of a particular social context, i.e. that of 
western industrial societies.67 This means that, for Raz, these normative aspects, which 
constitute reasons for action, are found in the world and, more specifically, in a particular 
social context, i.e. they are not created by the will and choices of reasoning individuals.68 
So, although he takes the value of personal autonomy to be an intrinsic value, namely a 
reason for action for its own sake, he nonetheless suggests that it is merely 'reason-infused' 
and not created by individual human reason and choice.69 That is, individuals reason about 
values and justify them based on how they influence their lives but they are not the creators 
of value. Moreover, in the recent development of his 'social dependence thesis' the value 
of autonomy appears to be dependent upon the social context: the value of personal 
autonomy, as all other values, comes into existence through 'sustaining social practices' 
rather than individual reason and choice.70 According to this thesis, goals and options 
emerge in practices pertaining in the social context and are endowed with meaning in the 
social realm. Forms of marriage, political participation or the exercise and regulation of a 
profession are made available as options in a society that has already developed the 
relevant forms and individuals come to appreciate and value them through habituation, 
rather than rational deliberation.71 Following this outlook, the value of individual choice 
is reduced to picking among autonomy options that have emerged and are largely pre-
determined as good or valuable through social practices.  
 Libertarians or liberal egalitarians would rightly object that the moral significance of 
individual choice is seriously depreciated if, as Raz suggests, governments 'endorse 
measures which encourage the adoption of valuable ends and discourage the pursuit of 
bad ones,'72 especially so, if what is a valuable goal or not depends so fundamentally on 
social forms and practices. Because, accepting social practices, rather than human reason, 
to be the source of value, undermines the universal appeal of morality and seems to open 
the way for social relativism.  
Raz denies the charge of conventionalism and social relativism by arguing that not all 
social forms and practices that emerge are valuable just because they have emerged.73 His 
defence is futile. In particular, he is bound to invoke the ideal of well-being as a criterion 
for which social practices are valuable and worthy of promotion by the perfectionist state. 
                                                 
67 See Flikschuh, Freedom, at p. 144-148. 
68 J Raz, 'Explaining Normativity: Reason and the Will', in Engaging Reason, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 90, cited in Flikschuh, Freedom, at p. 146. 
69 Flikschuh, Freedom, at p. 147. 
70 Raz, The Practice of Value, p. 19-25. 
71 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 310-313. 
72 Ibid, p. 423. 
73 Raz, The Practice of Value, p. 25-27. 
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But then, it would be circular to suggest that the social forms and practices that emerge 
are valuable insofar as they contribute to human flourishing if no independent substantive 
moral criterion –other than the social forms and practices themselves- is offered for 
judging human flourishing and well-being. For this reason, this thesis seems self-defeating 
in the context of a perfectionist theory but also contrary to the central liberal tenet that 
individuals are the source of value and not the common culture of a given community or 
social context.74 Still, despite being unconvincing, the social dependence thesis explains 
and serves the 'richer account' of non-individualistic freedom and personal autonomy that 
Raz advocates. Of course, as Flikschuh points out, this ends up being hardly recognizable 
as a liberal account of personal autonomy.75 And it certainly carries with it significant 
implications when it underlies a theory of rights based on interests in personal autonomy. 
 
B. An Autonomy-Based Conception of Freedom and Rights  
 
The conception of the value of autonomy that Raz develops has significant implications 
in his understanding of the value of freedom and a theory of rights and duties based on it. 
Clearly, his theory aims to defend a perfectionist concept of political freedom,76 whereby 
positive freedom, the 'real' or 'richer' account of freedom, is identified as the 'capacity for 
autonomy' and negative 'freedom from coercive interferences' is seen as merely 
instrumental to the latter and valuable only so far as it serves positive freedom and 
autonomy.77 But what is the place of rights in such a theory of freedom and autonomy? 
Under Raz’s theory of rights, a certain aspect of the well-being (an interest) of 
individuals gives reasons or grounds for holding others to be under a duty but the existence 
or extent of these duties depends on the absence of conflicting considerations of greater 
weight. In particular, Raz defines rights in the following way: 
 
'X has a right if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an 
aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other 
person(s) to be under a duty.'78 
 
Soon after, he explains that the existence and content of rights and corresponding duties 
depends on the force and weight of the reasons that justify the interests of individuals. 
Whether these reasons are 'sufficient', as the definition requires, to ground rights and 
duties will depend, in turn, on the force and weight of conflicting considerations: 
                                                 
74 C Korsgaard, in 'The Dependence of Value on Humanity', in The Practice of Value, pp. 63-85. 
75 Flikschuh, Freedom, p. 155. 
76 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 16. 
77 Ibid, p. 409-410. 
78 Ibid. p. 166. 
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'Which duties a right gives rise to depends partly on the basis of that right, on the 
considerations justifying its existence. It also depends on the absence of 
conflicting considerations. If conflicting considerations show that the basis of the 
would-be right is not enough to justify subjecting anyone to any duty, then the 
right does not exist.'79 
 
Following this theory, rights and duties are both conditional and a matter of degree:80 the 
decision about whether a given interest requires others to do something and exactly what 
or how much (thereby justifying a right to certain resources or opportunities) largely 
depends on the absence or the lesser weight of conflicting considerations of any kind.  
Now, following this theory, duties generated by rights are conceived of as open-ended 
requirements for the most extensive protection possible of various interests in autonomy, 
as long as no competing considerations limit their scope. So, trade-offs and balancing 
become an essential feature of rights reasoning and adjudication. This is so because the 
arguments about the content of rights perceived in this way are potentially very broad 
claims that need to be demarcated and have no special moral force: they can be limited or 
even overridden by other weighty claims, based on other interests of individuals or the 
community as a whole.81 There is a tension then, in this theory of rights, between the 
considerations that justify the existence of would-be rights with all other weighty interests 
and considerations. Both kinds of claims appear to have a potentially ever-expansive 
nature and this entails that those who arbitrate between them will have to balance the 
competing interests and seek to adjust each claim’s tendency to maximize the promotion 
of the interest on which it is based. This happens because this theory of rights grants no 
special moral force, urgency or priority to certain claims but, instead, treats them on a par 
with all other considerations. 
Following this outlook, a question such as that arising under the ECHR, of what 
obligations are inherent in effective respect, or else, what effective respect requires, 
becomes inversely related to the various conflicting considerations of other individual or 
communal interests. That is, the protection and resources that individuals are entitled to 
are ever expanding but only to the extent that no restrictions happen to be raised by 
competing interests and considerations. I will explain what is problematic in this approach.  
At first glance, this approach seems to offer a dynamic account of claims to resources. 
In fact, the idea that liberal governments ought to introduce laws and social policies that 
                                                 
79 Ibid, p. 183. 
80 Ibid, p. 156 and 183-186. 
81 Such as those found in the 'limitation clauses' of articles 8-11 ECHR: interference with the 
Convention rights is justified when necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
and crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the rights and interests of others. 
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protect and enhance people’s interests in autonomy and well-being naturally attracts those 
who advocate a more proactive role of the state with more extensive welfare 
responsibilities towards its citizens. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that, under a social 
and perfectionist conception of personal autonomy as that defended by Raz, the state 
would only be under a duty to promote those interests that it deems conducive to autonomy 
and well-being given the prevailing social forms and structures. True, Raz's theory allows 
the possibility that a state could adopt a ‘non-indigenous’ value, i.e. a value derived from 
another social context, and then it would be under a duty to adopt all relevant value-
sustaining practices, create the conditions for all the relevant interests and rights, therefore 
prompting broad-scale social change.82 However, notice that in a perfectionist and non-
individualistic account of freedom and rights this process could only be initiated by the 
state and then influence the options and rights available to individuals and not the other 
way around. An individual could not claim a government duty to make available an option, 
benefit or opportunity that has not yet emerged as good or valuable in social practices and 
is not adopted or endorsed by the perfectionist state as contributing to human flourishing 
and autonomy. Raz notes that individuals may transcend the forms available in social 
practices (possibly in the private sphere) but he does not seem to acknowledge the 
existence of any corresponding strong rights-claims to resources, options or opportunities 
against the state. For this reason, many liberals would again object that such a theory of 
rights would be paternalistic or relativistic, creating only those options that the state or 
prevailing social structures find morally valuable, eliminate those they consider 
repugnant,83 limit or override those they deem less significant, all such evaluations based 
on a sociological rather than thoroughly moral assessment. 
Instead of an open-ended account of autonomy interests, some theorists suggest a list 
of specific but universally shared key or fundamental interests for the well-being of 
individuals as grounds for rights claims and correlative duties to a minimum degree that 
enables agency or ensures a minimum worthwhile or decent life.84 This approach 
supposedly avoids most problems associated with perfectionism, since it focuses on, what 
are assumed to be, essential interests of all humans. At the same time, it aspires to offer 
an account of what the core content of claims to resources and socio-economic 
entitlements could be.  
                                                 
82 Flikschuh, Freedom, p. 147-148. 
83 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 417. 
84 All these purposes are presented as the minimum conditions of the same ideal of autonomy or 
well-being. See S Meckled-Garcia, 'Giving Up the Goods: Rethinking the Human Right to 
Subsistence, Institutional Justice and Imperfect Duties', (2013) Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 
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Still, these theories too are grounded on some idea of the essential preconditions of 
well-being, therefore pre-empting the individual choice of what the core of well-being 
consists in. Notice the contrast between these theories and Rawls’s justification of his 
'constitutional essentials', as 'the political and social conditions that are essential for the 
adequate development and full exercise of the two moral powers of free and equal 
persons', i.e. the capacity of individuals for a sense of justice and a conception of the 
good.85 Here, the constitutional essentials are preconditions for the individual to choose 
her own conception of the good and not for a particular conception of well-being: claims 
to these preconditions (resources, goods, opportunities) in each respective theory are 
bound to have not only a different justification but also a different content.  
Moreover, these theories advocate that states have duties to ensure a list of 
fundamental interests to a minimum degree necessary for a worthwhile life or decent life 
solely on the basis of the importance of these interests for the well-being of individuals. 
Crucially, they propose that we determine this minimum content independently of any 
consideration or criterion or principle about the reasonable cost or burden that fulfilling 
these duties may impose on others.86 However, such a principle is not only necessary to 
resolve the practical problems that arise in adjudication before a human rights court, such 
as the ECtHR. A principle that determines what is a reasonable burden is also a condition 
of justice of the decisions of social institutions that have the power and responsibility to 
allocate resources and burdens. Because, as much as certain minimum goods appear to be 
important for the fundamental needs and interests of all human beings, it would be 
unreasonable and unjust if the cost of fulfilling them required others to dedicate their lives 
entirely to this cause. So, although these theories aspire to offer a plausible and widely 
acceptable account of claims to resources (and the minimum core content of socio-
economic rights and duties) they beg our initial, crucial normative question of how much 
resources (goods, benefits, opportunities) one is entitled to or justified to demand from 
others and why.87  
The ECtHR frequently seeks to base its decisions on such a principle of reasonable 
burdens and benefits. For instance, the Court often requires that any positive obligations 
of the state to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR must be interpreted in 
                                                 
85 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 45. 
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a way which does not impose 'an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities' 
and that a violation will be established if the applicants 'show that the authorities did not 
do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life 
of which they have or ought to have knowledge.'88 However, in more controversial cases, 
the Court has not employed a similar principle. I will briefly discuss the implications that 
a theory that does not depend on such a principle or criterion would have for the practice 
of the ECtHR. 
 
The ECHR practice  
 
Following a conception of the ECHR rights, such as that discussed in the previous section, 
it appears reasonable that the Court in controversial cases, with potentially far-reaching 
socio-economic or policy implications, would consider the national authorities 
institutionally better placed and more competent to assess and prioritize the competing 
interests and ultimately decide the level or degree of protection. Because it would be 
difficult for the Court to assess the appropriate balance if the interests of individuals are 
on a par with a wide range of competing considerations, without any clear principles as to 
how to set their relative weight and priority. As it often happens in the Court’s case law, 
those cases that invoke more complicated disagreement about what resources or 
opportunities individuals are entitled to are deemed to require a political rather than 
judicial resolution. This argument from the point of view of proper institutional 
arrangement mainly rests on the assumption that the protection of rights-interests of 
individuals is always potentially at the – greater or lesser – expense of the interests of the 
                                                 
88 My emphasis. This principle that came to be know as the 'Osman test' was first formulated in 
Osman v. the United Kingdom (1998), a case concerning the obligation to take preventative 
operational measures to protect individuals, whose lives were at risk from the criminal acts of 
another individual. Subsequently, it has regularly been evoked in similar cases, e.g. in relation to 
fatal accidents arising out of dangerous activities that fall within the responsibility of the state, such 
as the operation of a chemical plant very close to people’s homes (Guerra and Others v Italy 
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the area (McGinley and Egan v United Kingdom (1998), L.C.B v United Kingdom (1998)), as well 
as the minimum conditions of any investigation into the cause of the loss of life that is allegedly 
related to such activities (Oneryildiz v Turkey (2004), para 149. Similarly, in cases relating to the 
right to be informed about the potential dangers of state activities, see also Guerra, at para 60), and 
finally in order to determine whether authorities had taken all measures expected of them to protect 
the life of vulnerable individuals in their care (such as prisoners from their dangerous cellmates in 
Edwards v United Kingdom (2002) at paras 54-56 or against the risk of committing suicide whilst 
in custody in Keenan v United Kingdom (2001) at paras 90-93) or to prevent harm from the abusive 
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or by removing children from their neglectful or abusive domestic environment in Z v United 
Kingdom (2001) and E v United Kingdom (2002)). See Chapter 2 for an analysis of the relevant 
cases. 
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majority.89 For this reason, it is supposedly politically sensitive and needs to be assessed 
by those who know and represent the needs and concerns of the national majority better. 
Following such an outlook, it would seem natural for the Court to allow a narrow or wide 
margin of appreciation depending on the anticipated implications of the recognition of a 
positive obligation. Let me explain this further. 
If claims to resources in the ECHR are claims to whatever provides the most extensive 
protection and promotion of interests that constitute conditions of autonomy, then these 
claims will conflict with the similar claims of other individuals and those of the 
community as a whole -a consequence similar to that of a value-neutral conception of 
freedom. Furthermore, freedom as autonomy, in Raz's own words, will be a matter of 
degree: claims to the protection of interests, to be provided with more options and 
conditions of autonomy, will have to be balanced against each other and against communal 
goals. They will only ground rights, if they outweigh competing considerations - which 
is, again, an effect similar to that of the Berlinian conception of freedom and rights. To 
conduct the balancing exercise in this way, may prove to be a very complex and 
inappropriate task for the Court to undertake since, under Raz’s theory of freedom, the 
perfectionist ideal of autonomy is a social rather than an individual matter. This would 
mean that the Court would have to allow public attitudes and culture to determine what 
options and forms of life are valuable, and, therefore, which ones ground rights and 
duties.90 Recall also that, according to Raz, some important options and conditions of 
autonomy are 'social' in nature, or else, they are 'collective goods.'91 This would lead the 
Court either to allow collective goods to outweigh and counterbalance individual interests 
or to defer most controversial or difficult cases to the margin of appreciation of the 
national authorities.  
Now, one could claim, following Raz, that an ideal perfectionist state would have 
considered as valuable and worthy of protection those autonomy options that a liberal state 
would consider fundamental too and that the only difference between the two theories lies 
in that a perfectionist one would seek to further advance autonomy by promoting 
additional options or conditions of autonomy. However, we have a good reason to be 
sceptical about this, otherwise, appealing and proactive outlook. In particular, the problem 
with perfectionism is that there is no guarantee that the state will value and protect those 
                                                 
89 On the point that the methods of balancing used by the ECtHR wrongly assume that human rights 
provisions benefit only the claim-holder at the expense of a majority and that all important concerns 
that are put to the balancing test have a common currency see Basak Cali, 'Balancing Human 
Rights? Methodological Problems with Weights, Scales and Proportions', (2007) Human Rights 
Quarterly 29, pp. 251-270, at p. 269. 
90 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 162. 
91 Ibid, p. 206. 
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options that other liberal theories value and protect. That is, the perfectionist state is not 
constrained by any moral considerations with the special force that liberalism attributes to 
rights and there is no guarantee that it will get these policy decisions and choices right. 
Rather, this will be merely contingent upon social attitudes and practices, on which Razian 
analysis of autonomy and the rights and duties corresponding to it rely. This means, of 
course, that it could decide that, although such options are worthy of some respect, they 
do not have the moral force or urgency to take priority in the allocation of resources.  
 
A common problem with both theories that I examined in this Chapter is that they use the 
term 'right' to mean something so weak that it needs further qualification before it can be 
fixed as a justified claim that imposes obligations. This happens because neither Berlin's 
nor Raz's theory distinguishes some of these claims as rights in a strong sense –claims 
with a special distributional character (that outweigh competing considerations), such that 
it is wrong as a matter of principle to interfere with them or deny them to someone without 
some special grounds.92 What we need in order to give rights –and obligations- this special 
strong character is a compelling justification and explanation of what people are entitled 
to and why: a justification that would make them immune to most ordinary competing 
considerations. We need arguments that explain why something morally bad or wrong is 
done if these rights are not recognized, why certain fundamental principles are violated if 
people are treated in this way. 
However, as I explained earlier, a descriptive conception of liberty, such as that 
advocated by Berlin, is hostile to this kind of argument. Because it assumes that the only 
philosophically valid and politically honest account of freedom is one that is independent 
of (rather than deriving from) any evaluative judgments about what people are entitled to, 
or else, independent of what is right for them to have, to claim and enjoy under a theory 
of distributive justice. 
On the other hand, an interest-based theory of rights such as Raz’s does not place any 
special weight on any claims or on any of the infinite ways in which individuals’ interests 
may be served and their autonomy promoted. Notice that, in such a theory, the state may 
have a wide range of positive duties to promote the interests of individuals in, what it 
considers to be, the conditions of autonomy, to the extent that it considers appropriate. 
However, this theory does not necessarily grant individuals any strong claims, such as 
specific rights correlative to any of these duties in particular. Furthermore, recall that for 
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interest-based claims are put on a par and in a balancing exercise with all sorts of other 
conflicting considerations before they can qualify as strong rights.93  
So far, I have tried to illustrate certain crucial weaknesses of these theories of rights 
and the morally unattractive features of the theories of freedom and autonomy on which 
they rest. In the following section, I will present Ronald Dworkin’s theory of liberty in 
light of equality, as an alternative basis for claims to resources. 
 
3. Liberty in Light of Equality:  
Dworkin's Integrated Conception of Liberty and Equality 
 
A. Political Values as Moral Values  
 
Dworkin’s moral and political philosophy is a useful contrast to both Berlin’s value 
pluralism and his conception of freedom, as well as to Raz’s social and perfectionist theory 
of freedom as autonomy.94 Unlike Berlin, Dworkin believes that the definitions and 
analyses of key political concepts and values that we construct are all moral: i.e. they 
consist of evaluative judgments and interpretive arguments. The outlook that Dworkin 
attacks is the general 'Archimedean' view, shared by Berlin and many other legal and 
political philosophers, that arguments about what values, such as liberty or equality, are 
second-order descriptions of a practice observed from an independent level of pure 
philosophical, conceptual inquiry.95 This 'meta-ethical' level is supposedly elevated above 
the first-order level of the social practice itself' in which political concepts and values 
feature and function, i.e. that of political or legal discourse. In the practice of moral, 
political and legal discourse, so the argument goes, substantive moral arguments must be 
employed to decide whether redistributive taxation or the prohibition of torture is either 
wicked or justified by the value of liberty; that is to say, we do not understand these 
concepts unless we understand them in a morally evaluative way. But the argument that 
liberty means being free from interferences in choosing one's own ends is a matter of 
value-neutral, conceptual analysis.  
However, Dworkin argues,96 it is mistaken to think there is a distinction between these 
two levels of discourse. Moral arguments about the meaning and content of values, such 
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as liberty, equality or autonomy, are often central in ordinary political and legal 
disagreements. When we disagree about the level of taxation necessary to fund policies 
for disadvantaged individuals, we invoke evaluative arguments about whether such 
redistributive taxation is justified based on the values of equality, liberty or social justice, 
properly understood. Also, no such arguments can ever be neutral to the legal or political 
disagreements because 'description' is bound to be an expression of a moral evaluative 
judgment. For, take the argument that respect for freedom to choose one’s own ends 
requires government to be neutral between different conceptions of the good life. This is 
not a neutral, conceptual argument based on a description of empirical reality, i.e. of a 
supposed 'fact' that people pursue different values, ideals and goals. Rather, it is itself a 
moral argument: namely, the argument that the values of liberty and equality require that 
we not force upon individuals any ideals of the community or other authority. Besides, 
not even the argument that people have different ideals is in any important sense 
descriptive. Because, unlike describing natural, empirical facts and phenomena, to identify 
something as a value is a moral argument in itself: moral arguments rule out some ideals 
or goals as non-valid or depraved in the first place. The contemporary moral and political 
philosophers' debt for this argument is to Kant and Hume, for establishing that values are 
not empirical but moral entities that we discover through rational deliberation and 
argument and cannot derive them from empirical facts.97  
Berlin does not directly challenge this powerful and widely acknowledged thesis. It is 
puzzling how he circumvents it and argues that it is possible and preferable to keep 
evaluative judgments about moral truth and value outside of the philosophical analysis of 
values. One way to understand this position is to attribute it to Berlin's conception of truth 
and reason and his 'fear of the totalitarian menace':98 he is eager to exclude from politics 
the use of reason to appeal to an ultimate, overarching, monist truth about matters of value 
by fear that this opens the way to oppression. Specifically, as I explained earlier in this 
chapter, Berlin fears that an appeal to reason carries the danger that an authority may seek 
to force individuals to abandon their empirical understanding of their goals and values to 
conform to what reason supposedly identifies as a valuable goal or way of life. To be sure, 
he is right that individual choice is oppressed when government justifies its actions and 
policies in the name of a particular ideal or conception of the good but that is only a danger 
in a perfectionist type of liberalism, such as that advocated by Raz. To the contrary, 
though, people are not oppressed when their government makes political decisions based 
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on the best moral understanding of the values at play and without denying individuals the 
freedom to make ethical choices for themselves. This kind of justification for political 
decision making, i.e. one based on the best moral understanding of the values at play, 
includes an appeal to the true meaning and content of these values but this appeal to reason 
and truth differs significantly from the one Berlin accused as potentially oppressive. I will 
explain this point further in the following paragraphs. 
In fact, Dworkin's moral and political philosophy rests on such a unified account of 
values, moral truth and interpretation. He argues that questions such as whether justice 
requires universal health care are moral, as he says, 'all the way down': there is no neutral, 
metaphysical, non-evaluative plane on which we can stand to decide what is right or true 
in such matters. Any stance we take is moral. As Stephen Guest insightfully observes, all 
of Dworkin's philosophy (moral, political and legal) relies on and is unified by an 
acceptance of Hume's principle that we cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.99 Questions 
of rightness or wrongness and of how things ought to be cannot be answered only with 
reference to descriptive facts. Ultimately, they depend on an interpretation of these facts 
through evaluative arguments. We can only rely upon substantive moral arguments and 
our value judgments about liberty or equality or justice are true in virtue of the substantive 
case that we can make for them.100 Notice that, for Dworkin, we do not establish truth by 
matching our conceptions of values with any special moral entities found in a second-
order philosophical plane. Neither do we rely on social conventions and forms to establish 
whether there is enough consensus: our evaluative judgments can be true no matter how 
many supporters they have. Instead, Dworkin argues, truth is a matter of the best moral 
argument or interpretation that can be made for the values at stake and, for this reason, we 
do not have to admit to conflicts of values, such as those assumed by Berlin, unless we 
have exhausted our interpretive attempt to construct an integrated account of these 
values.101 And why do we need to construe an integrated account of our moral values? 
Because to defend our particular conception of a value in a non-circular way we must 
draw on other values beyond itself and provide an account of how they all fit together: we 
seek the true meaning of values within morality itself rather than rely on another 
philosophical realm, where knowledge about values supposedly comes from.102 This is so, 
Dworkin explains, because we aim for coherence and integrity in the interpretation of 
values, not for its own sake but because it makes best moral sense to attempt to construe 
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values in light of each other rather than independently of one another. A closer look at 
such an integrated account of the values of liberty and equality will clarify these points 
and open the way for a different basis for human rights claims to resources. 
 
B. Liberty and Equality Integrated 
 
Dworkin denies the popular view in political philosophy that values conflict and that there 
is damage or loss in any decision that favours one value at the expense of others. Of course, 
he does not deny the actual frustration that individuals might feel in cases of apparent 
compromise. Nevertheless, he resists the conclusion that such compromises signify a 
tragic loss of the kind that Berlin describes in his defence of moral pluralism, i.e. the 
theory that there are as many ultimate and objective values as individual goals and ideals. 
For Dworkin this is mistaken and, to prove the point, he attacks the widely assumed 
position made famous by Berlin, namely, that every constraint or regulation of freedom is 
a sacrifice of liberty; possibly a justified one for the sake of other values but still a prima 
facie loss of something valuable.  
At this point, Dworkin rightfully challenges Berlin's claim that something of value is 
lost and sacrificed whenever we interfere with people's plans and actions by pointing to a 
distinction between a mere frustration and a wrongful interference with one's plans and 
pursuits.103 No doubt, taxation, criminal legislation or traffic regulations all frustrate many 
individuals but it is counter-intuitive to identify these as restrictions to liberty, if it is 
implausible to argue that they impose something that wrongs those affected in some way. 
In this sense, he denies that there is a general right to liberty.104 Now when can we say that 
a particular decision or policy does not just frustrate an individual but also wrongs her?  
Some cases raise little disagreement: hardly anyone would argue that we wrong 
someone, if we deny her option to drive at maximum speed in any direction or to injure, 
kill or abuse others. Allowing these options would seriously endanger or directly harm the 
moral rights of others and would eventually have the opposite effect of making us all 
equally unfree. An account of the value of liberty that does not take this into account 
clearly lacks the degree of impartiality necessary to be called a value in the first place. As 
Bernard Williams has forcefully argued, an account of freedom as primitive freedom, 
identified with a mere ability to do whatever one wishes, lacks the necessary degree of 
impartiality to be identified as a political value: it can only serve as a reason for action for 
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the particular agent and not for anyone else.105 As Williams explains, 'the notion of a 
political value implies an impartial standpoint to determine the priority of different agents' 
desires, a standpoint which is not given simply by the idea of each person's desires.'106 So, 
no plausible or morally attractive theory of rights can rest on this account of liberty: it is 
counter-intuitive to argue that one has even a prima facie right to harm the moral rights of 
others.  
In other cases, it may be less clear whether the moral rights of others are harmed or 
even involved: restrictions on the use of property or income are among the most 
controversial ones. For instance, if we consider redistributive taxation as an impairment 
of the freedom to use our income according to our life plans and goals then we have to 
accept that a government will constantly have to make trade-offs between this freedom, 
so defined, and the demands of equality or social justice, e.g. for a universal health care 
system or for various other benefits for disadvantaged individuals or groups. Moreover, 
we have to accept that, while making those trade-offs, any decision will inevitably harm 
or wrong some of those involved, either the taxed or the beneficiaries. This outlook 
assumes that, at the bottom of such disagreements, there is no right answer and no right 
decision and that for this reason people will have to accept the wrong or loss that trade-
offs and choices as an inherent feature of politics and adjudication.107 
However, as Dworkin reveals,108 this outlook assumes, rather than argues, that these 
are the correct definitions of liberty and equality. It further begs the question of whether 
these values are actually independent of one another, and thus prone to conflicts, or 
interdependent. It offers no substantive argument as to why we should accept such 
counter-intuitive conceptions of these values, other than the empirical claim that this is 
how we see and experience these values in the world around us. Still, the only non-circular 
way to argue for one or the other conception is through substantive moral reasoning and 
there is no such thing as a neutral observation of political concepts and values from a non-
evaluative plane, as I explained earlier. In other words, in order to decide whether 
frustration also amounts to some special moral wrong or harm, we need to rely on an 
interpretive argument that shows what is good or worthwhile about liberty or equality. 
Otherwise, there seems to be no point and value in thinking that values present themselves 
                                                 
105 See Williams, 'From Freedom to Liberty: The Construction of a Political Value', (2001) 30 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, p. 13. 
106 Ibid, p. 24. 
107 Dworkin, 'Moral Pluralism' in his Justice in Robes. Lorenzo Zucca adopts this approach in his 
Constitutional Dilemmas, Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights in Europe and the USA (OUP, 
2007) and for this reason accepts a corresponding image of balancing among constitutional rights, 
whereby choices and trade-offs between competing rights and other legitimate goals are made in 
an ad-hoc basis. I argue against this idea of balancing in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
108 Dworkin, in 'Moral Pluralism' in his Justice in Robes, pp. 105-116. 
                                    Three Concepts of Liberty 125 
 
to us in this way. Rather than accept definitions that concede to interpretive failure in 
advance, we should aim for integrity and coherence: since we do not find our conceptions 
of values in nature but in the realm of morality, we should seek conviction and as much 
coherence as we can command through the most morally compelling conceptions of 
liberty and equality.109 So, if we adopt Dworkin's suggestion to view the value of liberty 
as the freedom to do whatever you like as long as you respect the moral rights of others,110 
then we need a theory about what moral rights people have. This, in turn, will help us 
determine whether something significant has been lost or whether a significant wrong or 
an infringement of liberty has taken place. Before I move on to discuss Dworkin's 
integrated conception of liberty and equality and his theory of rights that flows from it 
there is one last hurdle to overcome. 
As I explained this far, Dworkin's theory relies on an assumption that the only morally 
significant way in which individuals are harmed is when they are wronged. However, 
Bernard Williams forcefully argues that there may be other ways in which individuals are 
harmed or feel great loss and sacrifice of their values.111 For instance, when the state 
allows critical or satirical expression some individuals or groups feel that their interests in 
their religious or ethical beliefs are harmed significantly. Similarly, any given political or 
judicial decision that involves the allocation of scarce resources, such as medical care or 
disability benefits, will grant relief to some but cause frustration to the interests of others 
in legal aid or policing. Such issues regularly appear before the ECtHR and raise ongoing 
debates among judges and scholars, mainly about the lack of a principled approach to 
these issues. These debates demonstrate that it is important how the Court justifies its 
decisions based on clear principles and not only which party's interests it upholds. Still, in 
issues that arise in the wider political context, Williams argues, some are bound to feel 
that they suffer a significant loss and that they are making a sacrifice of something 
valuable no matter how well we interpret the values in question, trying to make them all 
morally attractive and mutually supporting.112 In the realm of political opposition and 
argument in particular, Williams insists, it is not respectful to our political opponents to 
tell them that their conception of their values is confused and that another should prevail 
because it is the right one. Instead, he argues, the only way to respect them is to take their 
perceived loss seriously irrespective of our moral approval or not. We can better do this 
by telling them that a compromise was made by the competent political authority because 
                                                 
109 Ibid. My emphasis. 
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111 B Williams, 'Liberalism and Loss' in M Lilla, R Dworkin and R Silvers (eds.), The Legacy of 
Isaiah Berlin, (New York Review of Books, 2001) and in particular the discussion at pp. 125-127. 
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it was a necessary decision justified on various reasons –rather than because their claim 
was not deemed rightful according to a particular conception of the values in question.113  
Of course, with respect to the value of liberty, Williams disagrees with Bentham and 
Berlin who consider every law as an infraction of liberty: he views this is as restriction of 
primitive freedom –freedom as an ability or capacity- and not as a restriction of freedom 
as a political value.114 As I explained earlier, he acknowledges that primitive freedom does 
not contain the necessary degree of impartiality to be considered a value at all. No 
intelligible claim can be made that primitive freedom be respected, protected or extended 
by others and it is not good in itself, but merely possibly good for the individual concerned 
not to have her primitive freedom frustrated by others.115  
However, Williams argues that the notion of rightful liberty, such as that suggested 
by Dworkin, implies a juridical conception of an agreed authority entrusted to decide on 
the correct interpretation of the values at play and the rightfulness or wrongness of given 
claims -but this is not common ground among all participants in the political realm.116 
'Governments, parties, political actors, and complainants,' Williams insists, 'are not 
justices or advocates contributing their various inputs to the unfolding interpretation of 
what they all agree to be a unitary text' or an 'on-going framework for decisions,' such as 
'the institutional protocols of the Supreme Court.'117 Instead, he suggests, we constantly 
have to reinvent the on-going political framework that contains conflicts of liberty and 
equality and we contribute to this process by acknowledging that, when individuals are 
coerced in the name of a right that they do not identify with, they perceive this as a loss 
of some valuable liberty.118 Dworkin is right to resist this criticism: in any context, when 
people defend their conception of their values, they do so because they believe that it is 
the right one. If this is true, then a political decision could offend them more by 
disregarding this part of their argument, rather than by announcing what it considers to be 
rightful claims in liberty. In particular, if we undermine their ability to recognize that their 
convictions could be false then, in this way, we also disrespect their ability to form any 
true convictions in the first place. Besides, a decision that is based on the best moral 
justification that can be employed to support and prioritize a particular interpretation of 
the values at play would always be open to re-evaluation, in light of more convincing 
arguments. Recall that, in Dworkin's theory, an appeal to truth and integrity in our 
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framework of values is an appeal to 'conviction and as much coherence as we can 
command.'119 This means that truth lies in the best moral arguments that we can find as 
the foundation of our convictions but, also, that our convictions may change and we may 
find coherence in alternative interpretations of concepts and values in light of fresh 
arguments and ideas. 
Besides, this point is consistent with and reinforced by Dworkin's understanding of 
political values, such as liberty and equality, as interpretive concepts that are best 
understood in light of each other and not in isolation –a process of substantive moral 
reasoning all the way down, as explained in the previous section. For example, in the 
absence of shared criteria about whether taxation limits our liberty or whether it is required 
by equality, we make sense of our disagreement only by assuming that liberty and equality 
are essentially contested,120 interpretive concepts, whose meaning we understand best 
when we tie them to deeper and more abstract values and ideals.121  
To sum up, in this section, I defended a moral and political outlook whereby political 
values such as liberty and equality are best understood in light of each other and not in 
isolation. In particular, I defended a dynamic conception of liberty in light of the value of 
equality and argued against an understanding of it as an independent value or as 
instrumental to autonomy or well-being. I explained that an integrated account of the 
values of liberty and equality encompasses the ways in which we believe people ought to 
be free, having taken into account the demands of equality, fairness and social justice. 
This entails that judgments about what counts as a restriction, loss or lack of freedom 
depend on a prior theory about what people are entitled to according to a fair and equitable 
distribution of resources. If they derive from such a theory, rights have the potential of 
being fair but also much stronger claims: they can be absolute without being rigid, because 
they are determined through a process that has already taken into account the fair demands 
of others and those of the community as a whole. I will develop this idea in the following 
section and explain why I believe this is the most morally attractive and fitting 
interpretation of the values of liberty and equality as the core values underlying the ECHR 
rights and justifying claims to resources and positive obligations based on them. 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 Dworkin, Justice in Robes, p. 162. 
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C. Rights as Trumps and Rights to Fair Shares: 
The Fundamental Requirements of Equal Concern and Respect 
 
Following an integrated account of liberty and equality, rights and duties derive from the 
fundamental and abstract obligation of government to treat all individuals under its 
jurisdiction with equal concern and respect. This general moral obligation brings together 
our fundamental intuitions and concerns about liberty and equality. Dworkin further 
analyses it in two principles of dignity, the first more closely related to equality and the 
second to liberty. Firstly, the principle of the equal objective moral worth and importance 
of each individual's life and, secondly, the principle of special, personal responsibility of 
each individual for making the ethical choices that bring success and value in her own life 
(the principle of ethical independence).122  
It is difficult to argue that any plausible political theory could deny these abstract 
principles that delineate the broader moral outlook that Dworkin calls 'ethical 
individualism.'123 Given the fact that government enjoys a monopoly in the exercise of 
extensive coercive power, it must satisfy certain moral conditions for the legitimate use 
of this power: to exercise this power in a justified way and demand obedience it must treat 
all those under its jurisdiction with equal concern and respect. No theory could provide a 
plausible justification for the use of the state's coercive power in a way that treats some 
individuals or groups with contempt or with less than equal respect and concern, based, 
for example, on their race, sex, religious or political beliefs. Such a theory would have to 
rely on arguments about the inferiority of certain individuals or groups or about the 
supposed stronger rights or interests or benefit of others in treating them with contempt. 
But, as I argued earlier, such arguments would be indefensible as principles of political 
morality, as they are bound to express a merely subjective standpoint: no one could argue 
that it is an objective moral imperative to treat others with contempt. For these reasons, 
the abstract principle of equal concern and respect is common ground among all plausible 
political theories. Of course, different theories suggest different interpretations of how 
best to understand and apply these abstract principles.  
Now, Dworkin’s theory of rights was initially premised upon this connection between 
legitimacy and the abstract principle of equal concern and respect. According to his 
interpretation this abstract moral requirement grounds rights that 'trump' or block 
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impermissible reasons and considerations as the basis for government action.124 The 
theory of rights as trumps, as the best interpretation of the abstract right to be treated with 
equal concern and respect, also developed as a response to utilitarianism. The idea is that 
the purpose of rights is to block those considerations that contain hostile external 
preferences: preferences that one should suffer disadvantage in the distribution of goods 
or opportunities if others think he should have less because of who he is or is not or if 
others care less for him than they do for other people.125 In Dworkin’s later work, rights 
are not only connected with an interpretation of the requirement for equal concern and 
respect as a rejection of utilitarianism and the blocking of external preferences from the 
justification of political decisions. In his seminal work in political philosophy, Sovereign 
Virtue, Dworkin developed a more positive aspect of the requirement that government 
treat all will equal concern and respect: namely, the principle of equal respect for the 
special responsibility of each individual for how her life turns out requires that individuals 
are free to choose and pursue their own ethical values. Indeed, there is a normative 
connection here: civil and political rights are essential for ensuring that people will be free 
to make these choices for themselves and this determines the fairness of Dworkin's overall 
theory about the fair distribution of resources and opportunities in society.126  
At this point though, it seems to me that Dworkin’s theory also warrants a shift in the 
idea of rights from a merely defensive, reason-blocking to a positive, distributive outlook, 
better described as rights to fair shares in a just distribution of resources, be they goods, 
benefits, choices or opportunities. I will discuss the implications of this view, in light of 
Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources, in length in Chapter 5. For now, I only want to 
draw attention to the general point that, apart from that mentioned in the previous 
paragraphs, there is a further normative connection between rights and the fairness of 
Dworkin's theory of an equitable distribution of resources. I will explain.  
Dworkin's theory claims to be a fair theory for the distribution of resources on the 
basis that it allows those differences in the distribution of resources that reflect the free 
choices of individuals and seeks to mitigate the effect of morally arbitrary circumstances 
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that we have no control over, such as natural disasters, disability or the lack of talent.127 I 
believe that this distinction reveals a further normative connection between rights and the 
fairness of this scheme of distributive justice. Specifically, if fairness requires granting 
rights to ensure that individuals can make some choices for themselves it also requires 
rights to those essential conditions that make the rights to such choices realistic and not 
illusory –as the ECtHR’s effectiveness principle requires- due to factors outside of the 
individual’s control. My point is then that an integrated account of liberty and equality, 
expressed in Dworkin's two principles of dignity, entails the state's obligation to show 
both respect for the freedom of individuals to exercise choice and concern for the 
circumstances that may unfairly annihilate, diminish or impede the effective exercise of 
choices. In Dworkin’s words this is  
 
'…an undeniable tenet of fairness: that a society comes closer to treating 
people as equals when it adds, to the choices they have, choices they would 
have had were circumstances more nearly equal'128 
 
In sum, I believe that Dworkin’s further development of the two principles that flow from 
the abstract ideal of equal concern and respect, suggests that the idea of rights as trumps 
that block impermissible considerations captures the anti-utilitarian and reason-blocking 
character or rights but it is only part of the wider picture of what equal concern and respect 
requires. In particular, treating people with equal concern and respect is not fully ensured 
through the blocking of external and hostile moralistic preferences –which are the most 
commonly cited types of impermissible consideration, especially in the case law and 
literature on civil and political rights.  
Following this analysis, claims to resources and positive obligations need to be 
construed and justified as claims to (no more but also no less than)129 a fair share of 
resources, rather than as claims to whatever would promote or serve the effective 
enjoyment of certain interests or further freedom in a descriptive sense, as described 
earlier in this chapter. The debate about the content of positive obligations needs to turn 
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on the question of what constitutes a fair distribution of resources and what claims have 
this special distributional character: that they reasonably challenge the fairness in the 
distribution of resources within a state.  
To begin with, it is not enough to say that a decision about the distribution of resources 
can only be challenged when external and hostile moralistic preferences have been used 
as a justification for the disadvantage that some individuals are suffering. This is not to 
say that the fact that some individuals are disadvantaged or suffer is inherently unfair but 
only that there might be other reasons that make the distribution –and their disadvantaged 
position- unfair. For instance, a distribution could be unfair if no concern is shown for the 
actual choices that individuals are left with within certain spheres of formal freedom or if 
their actual freedom is diminished to the extent that their capacity to make choices and 
assume responsibility for their own lives is virtually denied. This is the case when no 
concern is shown for the circumstances that some individuals find themselves in. Still this 
is not to say that a particular range or quality of choices should be available in order to 
guarantee a minimum level of satisfaction of basic needs or basic conditions of agency or 
well-being or autonomy.130 But only those that can reasonably be argued to be a fair share 
considering the community’s available resources. Or else, those choices that we can 
reasonably assume that individuals would have had under a fair scheme for the distribution 
of resources.  
Notice, however, that Dworkin views human rights as grounded on the abstract right 
to be treated as a human being whose dignity fundamentally matters. This abstract basic 
human right, Dworkin explains, is 'a right to an attitude', i.e. to be treated by government 
in a way that shows a good-faith attempt to implement an intelligible interpretation of the 
responsibilities associated with respecting the dignity of those in its power.131 Now, this 
may be taken to suggest that government is not really required to remedy all injustices but 
merely to make a good-faith attempt in trying to identify or deal with them. Indeed, 
Dworkin clearly notes that a failure to strike the correct or fully just interpretation and 
application of these responsibilities does not constitute a violation of human rights.132 Still, 
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Dworkin also notes that the question whether a government makes a mistake in good-faith 
and not in bad-faith, i.e. in disregard or contempt for the dignity of individuals, is an 
interpretive test and not a matter of subjective intentions and motivations.133  
Following this, it seems to me that there may be quite a few instances of injustice that 
may be indicative of not just a failure to achieve full social justice but of indifference or 
contempt for some people's dignity –especially when morally arbitrary circumstances are 
such that they lack the essential conditions for choice and responsibility, as explained 
above. Besides, equality of resources includes the essential mechanism for mitigating the 
effect of these circumstances, through a hypothetical insurance device, which as Dworkin 
admits, is aimed at securing those essential conditions without which a state cannot 
proclaim that it shows respect for people's dignity or that it governs according to a good-
faith, intelligible interpretation of equal concern and respect.134 In other words, my point 
is that the hypothetical insurance device is meant to integrate the principle of 
responsibility with the principle of equal moral importance. That is, respect for personal 
responsibility requires not just respect for the ethical independence of individuals but also 
concern to ensure the conditions for the exercise of choice and responsibility, for which a 
prudent insurer would have insured herself. I will develop this argument further in Chapter 
5 of this thesis. 
For now, I will conclude this chapter with a note on how this theory of rights fits with 
the practice and the object and purpose of the ECHR. To begin with, I agree with the view 
that it captures the deontological, anti-utilitarian135 and anti-perfectionist136 character of 
ECHR rights. In particular, the purpose of the ECHR is best understood as aiming to 
establish certain moral standards regarding what governments may not do to those under 
their authority and protect the moral integrity, personality and independence of 
individuals. If this is true, then it should not be interpreted in a way that would allow states 
to reduce individuals into mere figures of a utilitarian calculus that would put their rights 
on a par with impermissible reasons and considerations in government action, such as the 
hostile external preferences of others. This would deny them the personal responsibility 
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and freedom to make choices that determine the value and success in their own lives. To 
ask individuals to sacrifice that freedom and adopt an 'impartial' point of view for the sake 
of a greater benefit is a straightforward attack on the individual’s integrity: she is alienated 
from the convictions that she mostly identifies herself with and no form of utilitarian 
arrangement includes, in principle, any guarantees that this will be avoided.137  
Besides, in a significant number of cases the ECtHR has established that individuals 
belonging to usually targeted groups, due to their race, sex, sexual orientation, religious 
or political beliefs, should not suffer disadvantage in the distribution of goods, benefits or 
opportunities on the basis of the moralistic preferences of the majority.138 Similarly, the 
Court’s reference to the need to balance claims to resources and positive obligations with 
other legitimate aims such as the 'rights and interests of others' or the 'economic well-
being of the country'139 must not be interpreted as a call for utilitarian calculation.  
Instead, under an integrated account of liberty and equality references to balancing 
must be interpreted as a call to determine the content claims to resources and positive 
obligations in light of the moral rights of others in resources and opportunities. Although 
in both cases rights are determined in light of other considerations, the crucial difference 
is that, following an integrated account of liberty and equality, rights may only be 
determined in light of permissible considerations. Following this, rights will be strong, 
unconditional and absolute claims but that does not mean that the content and 
requirements of positive obligations and claims to resources will be determined in 
disregard of other individual or communal goals. It only means that any such other 
considerations must be filtered through principles of fairness - and not utilitarian 
calculation - before they can influence what one can claim as a fair share of the 
community’s resources.140 
Finally, notice that, although the abstract moral standard is universal, as we want 
human rights standards to be, it still leaves room for variation given that its specification 
requires an interpretive judgment. In other words, we must rely on moral evaluative 
arguments to assess particular political decisions and policies in light of the principles of 
dignity that require equal concern for the fate of all and full respect for personal 
responsibility. And this interpretive judgment will be more accurate if it is sensitive to 
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different economic conditions and political and cultural profiles and histories.141 In this 
way, we could accommodate concerns of institutional arrangement between the ECtHR 
as an international court and a certain margin of appreciation of the national authorities as 
those primarily entrusted with the protection of the ECHR rights. However, this 
interpretive judgment and any margin of appreciation cannot be fixed by the above 
empirical considerations alone: as I stressed earlier, moral evaluative arguments will be 
necessary to justify whether a health or education policy shows a good-faith effort in one 
country and maybe contempt in another one.142 
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, I will defend an account of claims to resources and positive 
obligations based on a particular interpretation of Dworkin’s two principles of dignity. 
But first, in Chapter 4, I will examine, against the backdrop of these two principles of 
dignity, three different approaches that attempt to provide a principled framework for the 
ECtHR to adjudicate on claims to resources and positive obligations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THREE APPROACHES TO THE CONTENT OF CLAIMS TO RESOURCES  
AND POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ECHR 
 
Introduction 
 
So far, I have defended the view that the question of what positive obligations are inherent 
in the ECHR rights invites an interpretation of the core values that underlie the ECHR and 
the practice of the ECtHR. In the previous chapter, I examined three conceptions of the 
value of liberty, a central value underlying the ECHR rights. I argued that Ronald 
Dworkin’s integrated conception of the values of liberty and equality is the most morally 
attractive and also one that best fits with the practice of the ECtHR. In particular, the 
analysis of Dworkin’s work that I offered revealed how his two principles of dignity and 
the abstract right to equal concern and respect give rise to, both, rights as trumps that block 
impermissible considerations, as well as rights as fair shares in a just distribution of the 
available resources. I further suggested that claims to positive obligations are best 
understood as claims to a fair share of the community’s available resources.  
The question that follows from this is what constitutes a fair share of the available 
resources and what are the principles of a just distribution of resources. To proceed with 
this question, we need to look at theories of distributive justice, that is, theories that 
stipulate the resources and opportunities a government should make available to people it 
governs.1 However, when looking at these theories, we must bear in mind that the realm 
of social justice and moral rights is not necessarily identical to that of legal rights and 
human rights in particular. For instance, a government that departs from the political 
agenda presented in its electoral campaign or a government that fails to bring about full 
social justice does not necessarily violate human rights. To identify human rights claims 
with claims to full social justice would do a disservice to the protection of human rights. 
It would make it very difficult for courts to adjudicate on these claims and for governments 
to realize them. In turn, this approach would significantly weaken these claims and deprive 
them of the urgency and moral force that we want rights claims to have.  
On the other hand, we do need to think of the realm of social justice as completely 
distinct from that of human rights. After all, many human rights documents, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), have been drafted to address certain 
aspects of social justice. In the previous chapter, I argued that the realm of the ECHR 
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rights too can be understood as protecting those minimum conditions that are essential for 
any defensible scheme of distributive justice and that these conditions can be demarcated 
by Dworkin’s two principles of dignity –with a twist.  
Many would raise the objection that tying ECHR rights adjudication to theories of 
distributive justice will raise complex questions about the proper allocation of resources 
that an international court is not institutionally competent to decide.2 My suggestion that 
claims to resources under the ECHR should be understood as claims to a fair share of the 
available resources aims to narrow down what initially might appear as extensive social 
justice claims. Still, the ECtHR must be able to answer the question of what constitutes a 
fair share in a principled manner –in order to overcome any objections of institutional 
competence or charge of arbitrariness and incoherence. 
In this chapter I explore how three different approaches could provide such a 
principled framework for the ECtHR to adjudicate on claims to resources. I begin by 
discussing the different uses of the doctrine of proportionality, which is increasingly used 
in the context of human rights and the ECHR in particular, and explaining why some uses 
are inappropriate and others inadequate to provide a principled framework for determining 
the content of claims to resources. I then move on to discuss how the two theories that are 
endorsed widely in the field of human rights, i.e. the minimum core approach and the 
capabilities theory, both carry significant flaws and fail to respect fully Dworkin's two 
principles of dignity. Still, I identify certain elements of both of these theories that express 
a valid and important concern to be taken into account in human rights adjudication. In 
the following Chapter 5, I suggest a way to incorporate some of these elements into an 
interpretation of Dworkin's theory of equality of resources. 
 
1. Proportionality and the Question of Distributive Justice 
 
The pertinent question that runs through this thesis is how much and what kind of 
resources is an individual entitled to claim in the form of positive obligations of the state 
for the protection of ECHR rights. Following up the discussion from chapter 3, I explained 
in the introduction to this chapter that I treat this as a question of distributive justice and, 
in particular, as a question about what one can claim as a fair share of resources given a 
                                                 
2 Indeed, as highlighted in Chapter 2, this is the objection that governments most often raise before 
the ECtHR, an objection that very often leads the Court to leave the case to the margin of 
appreciation of the national authorities as better placed to decide. Others would further object to 
the infusion of moral or political theorising into what they believe could be a strictly legal method 
of adjudication. I have already dealt with this objection in Chapter 1 and argued that there can be 
no such thing as a purely legal approach to such matters: the endeavour is interpretive and all 
arguments raised are substantive moral, evaluative judgments. 
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theory about the just distribution of a society's available resources.3 Quite apart from the 
relevant heated debates about the principles of distributive justice in political philosophy, 
judges and scholars around the world have increasingly relied on the doctrine of 
proportionality as a structured test to review which limitations to the applicants' claims 
are justified or which violate a human right.4 In the context of the ECHR, when reviewing 
whether state action or omission violates a particular human right, the Court first examines 
whether that action or omission constitutes an interference with a Convention right and 
then whether it is justified: it will be justified if it is proportional to a legitimate aim that 
the state wants to serve with a decision or policy realised through action or omission. 
The doctrine of proportionality is most often discussed in literature in relation to so-
called 'negative rights' or claims against state interference and the most widespread 
conception of it is linked to the idea that such claims cannot be absolute but have to be 
balanced against individual or communal interests and considerations, with which they 
are often in tension. Similarly, the prevalent image of claims to positive obligations too is 
one of tension and often conflict that can only be resolved through some sort of balancing. 
Although the principle of proportionality and the idea of a fair balance has appeared in the 
ECtHR's case law on positive obligations as early as 1968,5 only recently have some 
scholars begun to argue for its usefulness as a tool for delineating the content of social and 
economic rights and positive duties in particular.6 No doubt, the idea and practice of 
                                                 
3 Some scholars attribute the theoretical difficulty in determining which positive duties correspond 
to the ECHR rights to the difficulty in establishing 'conceptual proximity' between rights and duties 
in these kind of cases. See Lavrysen, 'Protection by the Law: The Positive Obligation to Develop 
a Legal Framework to Adequately Protect ECHR Rights', p. 71. And others dismiss the Court's use 
of tests such as the 'direct and immediate link' test discussed in Chapter 2 on the basis that they fail 
to establish conditions of proximity, see D Xenos, 'The human rights of the vulnerable', (2009) 13 
International Journal of Human Rights, p. 598 and more generally his The Positive Obligations of 
the State under the European Convention of Human Rights (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). As I 
have highlighted in Chapter 2 and argued in detail in Chapters 2 and 3 this connection or proximity 
is a moral one, so the question of proximity or link between rights and duties cannot be settled with 
any factual or conceptual analysis but rather it requires substantive moral reasoning about a matter 
of distributive justice: i.e. about what rights and resources people are morally entitled to in light of 
the values underlying the ECHR. Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis take on the challenge of 
approaching this question as one that raises issues of political morality and distributive justice.  
4 See generally Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) ch. 2, A Barak, Proportionality. Constitutional Rights and 
their Limitations, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), M Klatt and M Meister, The Constitutional 
Structure of Proportionality, (Oxford University Press, 2012), A Stone-Sweet and J Mathews, 
'Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism' (2008–09) 47 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 72, Y Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle 
of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR, (Intersentia, 2002).    
5 Belgian Linguistics Case, I(B), para 5 
6 X Contiades A Fotiadou, 'Social Rights in the Age of Proportionality: Global Economic Crisis 
and Constitutional Adjudication' (2012) International Journal of Constitutional Law 10 (3), pp. 
660-686 and their more recent 'Socio-Economic Rights, Economic Crisis and Legal Doctrine: A 
Reply to David Bilchitz', (2014) International Journal of Constitutional Law Vol. 12 No.3, pp. 
740-746. Notice that although other scholars suggest using the proportionality doctrine, they 
assume that some theory or principles will have to be fed into it in order to yield correct and fair 
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proportionality is well established across multiple national and international jurisdictions.7 
Tracing the current debate between proponents and critics of proportionality, I wish to 
explore further its relevance and value in deciding which claims to resources and positive 
obligations are justified under the ECHR. My aim will be to raise and discuss the question 
of what institutional and moral concerns the idea of proportionality expresses. In addition, 
I will discuss whether it can help the Court to address and resolve the distributive justice 
question that I claim to be at the heart of claims to resources in positive obligations cases.   
In the literature so far, serious criticism has been raised8 against the prevalent image 
of conflict and balancing that lies at the heart of the idea of proportionality. Critics attack 
the very idea of balancing as incompatible with and hostile to human rights on the basis 
that it places rights on a par with any kind of individual or communal interests. In this 
way, they argue, the balancing exercise deprives rights of any distinctive features and, in 
particular, their special moral importance and normative priority over other individual 
interests or collective goals and societal benefits and welfare. As a result, the critics warn, 
balancing and proportionality disregard the moral analysis that is essential in order to 
discover and interpret the moral rights and principles that ground human rights and open 
the way to utilitarian or cost-benefit analysis. To prove their point, critics refer to 
numerous cases where the Court has found justified and proportional the state’s 
interference with (and ban of) forms of expression on the basis that the majority 
considered them offensive and blasphemous. Let us investigate whether this criticism is 
justified. 
To be sure, judges and scholars often fail to acknowledge why and how cost-benefit 
or utilitarian analysis is incompatible with human rights or fail to see how their arguments 
                                                 
outcomes. As I argue later in this section, I believe it is a problematic feature of their proposal that 
these two authors make no such reference to any substantive arguments. As I will explain later, it 
is one thing to argue against a particular theory as underpinning the proportionality test and quite 
another to claim that it can perform its function in the absence of any theory whatsoever. 
7 See above n. 4. 
8 See G Webber, 'On the Loss of Rights' in G Huscroft, B W Miller and G Webber (eds.) 
Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning, (Oxford University Press, 
2014), pp.123-154, who argues that appeal to proportionality detaches rights from moral 
evaluations of what 'is right'; D Kyritsis, 'Proportionality as a Constitutional Doctrine', (2014) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 395-415; G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, ch. 4 and his 'Rescuing Proportionality', in Cruft, 
Liao and Renzo (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, (OUP forthcoming, 2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346836; D Bilchitz, 'Socio-
Economic Rights, Economic Crisis and Legal Doctrine', (2014) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law Vol. 12 No.3, pp. 710-73; G Webber, 'Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult 
of Constitutional Rights' (2010) 23 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 179, O Ferraz, 
'Poverty and Human Rights' (2008) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 585-603, 
S Tsakyrakis, 'Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?' (2009) 7 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, pp. 468-493; J Fleming, 'Securing Deliberative Democracy' (2004) 72 
Fordham Law Review 1435.  
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are prone to slide into this kind of analysis. As a theory, utilitarianism goes against the 
very idea of human rights as moral rights: utilitarian calculation treats interests protected 
by rights on a par with any other interest, seeing in them no particular moral significance 
or force. In a utilitarian sort of balancing, the decision that produces the maximum possible 
utility or preference satisfaction will be deemed rightful, even if this outcome is produced 
at a significant cost for a particular individual. The problem with this theory is that, if it 
serves to maximize utility, no burden or cost for the individual is considered excessive 
and no treatment is regarded as disrespectful of the dignity or integrity of the person or a 
moral wrong. I believe most proponents of the proportionality principle would resist this 
outlook for the nature of rights and the balancing exercise. Hardly anyone would consider 
morally justified a policy to impose organ donations on some in order to save others or a 
policy to cut short the life of those diagnosed with a terminal illness in order to save public 
funds. For utilitarianism, though, there is no such thing as an unreasonable burden or 
sacrifice, as anything can be demanded of the individual, so long as it serves the ultimate 
moral standard: to maximize overall utility. If most of us would protest against such 
examples, this is because we tacitly or overtly acknowledge that human rights rest on 
moral rights derived from non-utilitarian moral principles, which place special moral force 
and priority on the kind of treatment or respect owed to individuals and the idea of the 
inviolability and distinct importance of each human being.9 
In a similar way, cost-effectiveness analysis fails to explain and justify whether an 
action or omission is morally permissible or whether it constitutes a moral wrong or harm 
to the individual. In fact, cost-benefit analysis is not concerned at all with moral rights and 
wrongs, or worse, it does not even acknowledge their existence: in such an analysis what 
counts as a cost or a benefit is not a moral question and no rights can 'trump' or block 
decisions based on cost-benefit analysis. Still, just like against utilitarian calculation, most 
would protest against a cost-benefit decision or policy if that entailed torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or disrespect for other moral rights of individuals. This means that 
most accept the significance of moral principles in helping us discern and justify whether 
a certain treatment, burden, or cost imposed on an individual is morally permissible, 
whether it imposes an excessive sacrifice or whether it constitutes a moral wrong, in that 
it violates the dignity and moral rights, hence also the human rights of that individual.  
Indeed, in a classic and least controversial example, most would outright reject 
torturing suspected criminals to extract information or confessions. Similarly, even in a 
more controversial example, many would be puzzled about a policy to double the number 
                                                 
9 See Williams 'A Critique of Utilitarianism', Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 3 and 24-30, Nagel, 
'Personal Rights and Public Space', p. 83. See also my discussion in Chapter 3, section 2 (A). 
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of prisoners detained in prisons. They would ask whether, by doing so, the living 
conditions within prisons would fall below a certain standard, they would debate about 
what that standard should be, considering the impact it has on prisoners but maybe also 
the cost it involves for the society as a whole to maintain a particular standard of detention 
conditions. In the same way, when debating about the resources that should be spent on 
the accommodation of the particular needs and rights of people with disabilities or on the 
treatment of certain health conditions, our reasoning and assessment process always 
involves arguments about moral rights and duties, as well as reasonable burdens. Our 
assessment of whether a decision or policy violates someone’s human rights can never be 
a matter of morally neutral cost-benefit analysis. In all cases, more or less controversial, 
in order to assess an action, decision or policy, we deem crucial certain moral 
considerations and especially the moral rights of any individuals involved. Following this 
line of argument, any application of a proportionality test should always rest on 
substantive moral reasoning that cannot be substituted by cost-benefit analysis and should 
not be replaced by utilitarian calculation. For these reasons, we have compelling reasons 
for discarding any accounts of proportionality with utilitarian or cost-benefit connotations.  
However, a balancing or proportionality test need not take the form of utilitarian or 
cost-benefit analysis.10 The idea that claims to goods, benefits or opportunities should not 
be absolute but have to be limited does not necessarily mean that these limits should be 
placed with reference to the satisfaction of the preferences of the majority or a crude 
calculation of costs and benefits, individual and societal.11 To begin with, there are good 
examples in the ECtHR case law where, although the Court used the metaphor of 
balancing, it actually provided substantive arguments to justify and uphold several rights 
of individuals against the preferences of the majority.12 This shows that the proportionality 
test may be justified as a valuable institutional tool to the extent that it produces 
considerable right outcomes.13 That is, if it helps courts around the world and most notably 
the ECtHR, to address important institutional concerns: e.g. to provide a structured, 
transparent and meticulous judicial review of the complex question of whether a certain 
state action or omission justifiably interferes with individual freedoms. On this basis, some 
commentators have recently argued that we should not rush to equate the proportionality 
test or the very idea of balancing with the largely discredited approach of a utilitarian and 
                                                 
10 Letsas, 'Resquing Proportionality'. 
11 Instead, we have very good reasons to believe that rights should be construed in light of relational 
values such as equality and fairness. See my final section of chapter 3 and following paragraphs 
here in Chapter 4. 
12 For instance, Dudgeon v UK, Modinos v Cyprus, Goodwin v UK, I v UK, E.B. v France, Hirst v 
UK. 
13 Letsas, 'Resquing Proportionality', p. 14-15 and 'The Scope and Balancing of Rights: Diagnostic 
or Constitutive?'; similarly Kyritsis, 'Proportionality as a Constitutional Doctrine'. 
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cost-benefit analysis.14 While we have very good reasons to dismiss this kind of reasoning 
as inappropriate in the realm of human rights, as I explained earlier, the idea of 
proportionality need not be reduced to that kind of reasoning. Instead, a different 
understanding and use of it could possibly serve principles of justice. 
Still, critics of proportionality have good reasons to be sceptical about whether we can 
avoid associating the use of balancing or proportionality tools with utilitarian or cost-
benefit analysis, as there are quite a few well-documented cases, where the Court appears 
to have resorted to this kind of reasoning. For instance, the Court has relied on the 
perceived offence to the religious feelings or the moralistic preferences of the majority to 
justify restrictions on the right to freedom of expression.15 Similarly, it has declared as 
inadmissible several cases involving positive duties of the state, without substantive 
examination and with a mere reference to the supposed high cost that they may entail for 
others.16 However, we could as well attribute many wrong decisions on the fact that the 
proportionality test, and balancing at the final stage of it, is often conducted on an ad hoc 
basis and in a vacuum of substantive principles, i.e. with no guidance as to which 
considerations are morally and institutionally relevant and how they should weigh in the 
balancing.17 Discussion then must focus on filling this vacuum.  
Recent scholarly contributions by proponents of the proportionality principle endorse 
the arguments against cost-benefit and utilitarian analysis and employ arguments drawn 
from non-utilitarian theories of rights (liberal or perfectionist) to resolve the tension 
between rights and determine the limitations of rights.18 In fact, many argue that 
proportionality is not devoid of moral analysis but that it is a better, clear and structured 
                                                 
14 Letsas, 'Resquing Proportionality', p. 15. 
15 See Letsas, in 'Rescuing Proportionality' and Tsakyrakis, 'Proportionality: An Assault on Human 
Rights?' who cite for example  I.A. v Trukey, Otto-Preminger, Muller v. Switzerland, Murphy v 
Ireland. 
16 Such as the inadmissible cases discussed in Chapter 2. In fact, in these cases the Court does not 
even consider the proportionality or balancing test itself: it assumes that it will involve complex 
resource allocation decisions and that there is nothing about these that an international human rights 
court can review. Of course, some aspects of resource allocation are matters of policy for the 
national authorities to decide but certain human rights issues will also arise in this as in all forms 
of government (through actions or omissions) and will have an impact on the distribution of 
resources, so we cannot deny review of state actions or omissions with reference to the resource 
allocation implications alone. I will develop this point later. Here I merely wanted to note that the 
Court finds that these claims raise no human rights issue with sole reference to the supposed 
significant financial cost involved. 
17 Letsas, 'Resquing Proportionality', p. 15. 
18 Most notably see K Moller, 'Proportionality: Challenging the Critics' International Journal of 
Constitutional Law (2012), Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 709-731 and his The Global Model of Constitutional 
Rights, as well as M Kumm, Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On The Place And 
Limits of the Proportionality Requirement' in S Paulson and G Pavlakos (eds), Law, Rights, 
Discourse: Themes of the Work of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing 2007) 131; I Porat, The Dual 
Model of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope of Balancing in Constitutional Law' (2006) 27 
Cardozo L Rev 1393; also cited by Kyritsis, 'Proportionality as a Constitutional Doctrine', p. 7. 
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kind of moral analysis, provided that it is underpinned by a morally attractive theory of 
rights that best fits with and explains the practice of human rights adjudication.19  
As I discussed in Chapter 3, many human rights scholars are drawn to interest based 
theories of rights and seek to interpret the idea of proportionality and apply the 
proportionality test based on arguments drawn from such theories. For instance, Moller 
suggests an account of the idea and test of proportionality, in light of a well-developed, 
modified version of an interest based theory of rights.20 Following Joseph Raz's interest 
theory of rights, his account also grounds rights on individual interests in well-being or 
autonomy that are weighty enough to impose duties on others. It focuses on the actions 
and personal resources that are important for leading an autonomous life but departs from 
Raz's theory in that it adopts a first person perspective as to what is important for leading 
an autonomous life: whatever is important from the point of view of the self-conception 
of the agent. In this way, Moller aims to avoid Raz's perfectionism and the criticism 
attached to it:21 individuals, and not the state, dictate which interests are conducive to 
autonomy. In fact, following Moller's theory, individuals may demand protection of their 
personal autonomy interests through prima facie rights to everything, from trivial 
activities, such as feeding the birds, to evil acts, such as murder or paedophilia.22 All these 
interests are then balanced against other interests and considerations at the limitations 
stage of rights, where substantive moral reasons may now be invoked by the state to justify 
the interference with what, otherwise, falls within the sphere of freedom that individuals 
are prima facie entitled to control. In this respect, Moller's account of the proportionality 
test is not a completely morally neutral enterprise, like cost-benefit analysis. Besides, he 
takes care to distinguish it from utilitarian calculation as well.23 At the same time, the 
supposed added advantage of this approach, compared to a perfectionist one, is a 
commitment to neutrality. It purports to allow –at least at the first stage- no room for moral 
evaluation of what is a worthwhile life or what qualifies as an autonomy interest: it counts 
                                                 
19 See Moller, as above in note 18, who suggests that he adopts such an interpretive approach to 
the ECHR. 
20 K Moller, ‘Two Conceptions of Positive Liberty: Towards an Autonomy-based Theory of 
Constitutional Rights, (2009) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 757-786, as well 
as his most recent ‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’ and his most developed theory in The 
Global Model of Constitutional Rights. 
21 See my analysis earlier in Chapter 3. 
22 K Moller, 'Two Conceptions of Positive Liberty: Towards an Autonomy-based Theory of 
Constitutional Rights', p. 775. Moller persists in this account of a 'comprehensive model' of rights 
that incorporates an infinite range of interests as prima facie rights, be they inconsequential or 
outright immoral and finds this 'rights inflation' is required by proportionality analysis and justified 
as the best means to ensure that state action is justified, in 'Proportionality and Rights Inflation' in 
Huscroft, Miller and Webber (eds.) Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, 
Reasoning, pp. 155-172. Notice how this closely follows Berlin's conception of freedom as I 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and suffers from the same criticism. 
23 Ibid. 
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as instances of a person's autonomy even those interests that are not necessarily connected 
to a person's 'well-being'.24 Some may also consider it an advantage of this theory that the 
generic right to autonomy grounds an open-ended range of prima facie rights, which may 
also include socio-economic claims and thus explain a much greater volume of human 
rights practice of the ECtHR and other jurisdictions as well. Although I cannot discuss 
Moller's work in great detail here, I will only highlight some of what I believe to be 
fundamental flaws in his approach to rights and the proportionality test. 
Firstly, Moller's account of autonomy interests and corresponding rights and duties 
rests on a morally unattractive conception of freedom and autonomy. In particular, his 
self-conception approach to autonomy aims to provide a neutral understanding of 
autonomy in that no moral filter is applied to the value of the self-conceptions people 
hold:25 the value and weight of the autonomy interests that serve and further one's self-
conception are judged from the point of view of the agent. So, following this approach, 
any individual interests ground prima facie rights to anything that is of value to a particular 
individual and others have a corresponding duty to protect and further these rights and 
interests or provide a justification for frustrating them or limiting their scope. Now, 
although speaking in terms of personal morality we may allow an 'internal' perspective 
about what adds value to one's life, in the realm of political morality it is implausible to 
assign any moral weight to claims to rights or interests that lack any degree of impartiality 
or objective evaluation. The subjective preferences to murder or eat steaks every day can 
maybe fall under an account of primitive freedom but not under an account of freedom as 
a moral and political value.  
As much as these preferences are strong or worthwhile as exercises of autonomy from 
the point of view of the agent,26 they can only ground moral rights and duties that are 
worth protecting and taking into account in the distribution of resources and opportunities 
if supported by moral arguments about what we owe each other;27 about whether not 
assigning any weight to a particular interest would constitute a moral wrong;28 and about 
whether respecting or promoting certain interests would impose a reasonable burden on 
others.29 Besides, liberal neutrality, properly understood, requires, rather than precludes, 
this kind of moral evaluation. To acknowledge one's self-conception as valuable or to 
assign any normative value and weight to one's interest in murdering or pursuing hugely 
                                                 
24 Ibid, p. 774-776. 
25 Ibid, p. 775. 
26 Ibid, p. 775 n. 45 
27 Scanlon, 'Preference and Urgency' (1975), 72 J Phil,  p. 655 
28 Dworkin, Justice in Robes, p. 114-115. 
29 For a similar criticism to Moller's account of rights to autonomy see Kyritsis 'Proportionality as 
a Constitutional Doctrine', p. 11-15. 
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expensive tastes is a moral position in itself and to call these prima facie rights, whose 
limitation requires justification, is certainly not a neutral position for a court to take.  
On the other hand, if, as Moller argues, we employ moral reasoning at the balancing 
stage to discard such interests and preferences, what is the point of elevating them to the 
status of a right in the first place? Does it not detract from the force that we want rights to 
have in moral and legal discourse if they include –even prima facie- trivial, immoral or 
implausible claims and hold institutions accountable when frustrated?30 Most crucially, if 
we do employ moral reasoning at the balancing stage, in order to assess the weight of 
various interests, then we have to accept that this should be a moral task all the way down: 
either interests and preferences have some independent and objective moral value or 
weight (i.e. independent from that conferred upon them by the agent) or not. Accepting 
that we need moral evaluation to determine their weight requires us to begin with such 
arguments in the first place.  
The only way that one could circumvent this objection would be to argue that allowing 
'definitional generosity'31 in the first stage serves to ease the strain of political opposition 
in a society, by giving those who feel that their projects have been frustrated and their 
freedom curtailed an institutional, judicial explanation and justification. This mitigates 
their sense of loss and frustration.32 That is, by providing a stage of review and explanation 
or justification of any interference with autonomy interests that individuals find important 
for their self-conception we do not give them independent moral weight, we only publicly 
acknowledge the importance they have for the individuals concerned. Although Williams 
might be right that in politics it is better to address our opponents with such generosity,33 
I believe the same does not hold for human rights adjudication. Because, both parties enter 
the realm of justice arguing about and seeking to establish whether a moral right or wrong 
has been done to the individual and not whether and how much a decision of compromise 
(such as is often the case in politics) affects some individuals.  
Leaving aside the problems with the particular theory of rights that Moller develops, 
we may as well appreciate the benefits of a sophisticated analysis of proportionality as a 
structure that guides judges through the reasoning process about whether a policy does 
                                                 
30 For this point see also Ferraz, 'Poverty and Human Rights', pp. 591-594. Along similar lines also 
Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, ch. 4 and pp. 
117-119 in particular. 
31 Tsakyrakis, 'Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?', p. 480. 
32 For this point also see Kyritsis who characterises it as a 'legitimation function' of the 
proportionality test, in the sense that it reassures both sides that their interests are given equal and 
careful consideration, thus making any loss suffered by one of the involved parties more palatable. 
33 Williams, In the Beginning was the Deed, p. 115-127. Williams’s analysis is deeper than the 
institutional/legitimation argument mentioned above. It rests on certain assumptions about the 
nature of values and the possible conflicts between them that I discuss in Chapter 3. 
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(not) respect rights, or as a sort of checklist for all the points that need to be reviewed and 
justified.34 More specifically, proportionality as a constitutional doctrine aims at effective 
and legitimate judicial protection of human rights and for this reason, it addresses various 
institutional concerns: concerns of clarity, transparency as well as concerns of proper 
institutional design such as the allocation of responsibilities between various branches of 
power.35 For what it is, i.e. a diagnostic institutional tool, the proportionality test is 
justified if it actually serves these concerns and to the extent that it produces largely right 
outcomes.36  
On the other hand, this institutional role and justification of the proportionality test is 
seriously depreciated if there is evidence in the courts’ practice that it is misleading and 
produces a significant amount of incoherent or wrong outcomes. For, take the practice of 
the Court in deriving positive duties and socio-economic entitlements from civil and 
political rights. Although ground-breaking steps have been made in certain groups of cases 
in this field since the 1960s the Court has always been quite perplexed and incoherent 
when dealing with other groups of cases that appear to raise more complex resource 
allocation issues.37  
Quite apart from the unattractive features that it has as a theory of rights, Moller's 
approach does not seem to fit as well as he suggests with the practice of the ECtHR. Moller 
may be right to identify a tendency in the practice of the ECtHR to recognize more rights, 
and to interpret existing rights more broadly, such as in positive obligations cases 
mentioned above. However, there is also growing restraint driven by the concern, widely 
shared by judges and governments, to limit the influx of cases with significant social and 
economic policy implications. It seems unlikely that a theory, which grants prima facie 
rights to all conditions of autonomy judged from a wholly subjective point of view and 
with no reference to principles of what is fair for one to demand of others, will help the 
Court to conduct the balancing exercise in an effective and coherent manner. True, 
Moller's account of autonomy interests can offer an expansive platform for rights-claims 
to socio-economic entitlements and rights with horizontal effect. Still, it would also need 
to provide a principled way of determining the reasonable burdens that may be imposed 
on others, in order to adjust the weight of competing interests and define their limits. 
                                                 
34 Kyritsis, 'Proportionality as a Constitutional Doctrine', p. 19. 
35 Ibid, p. 17-18. 
36 For the argument that the proportionality test is a diagnostic institutional tool and the distinction 
between diagnostic and constitutive tests see G Letsas, 'The Scope and Balancing of Rights: 
Diagnostic or Constitutive?', in Eva Brems & Janneke Gerards (eds), Shaping Rights: The Role of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of Human Rights, Cambridge 
University Press (2013), pp. 38-64. 
37 Such as the provision of health care, social security benefits and housing or the accommodation 
of the needs of people with disabilities. See my Chapter 2. 
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Because, without objective criteria or principles (independent of the preferences of the 
agent) about what duties or burdens it is reasonable to impose on others in the service of 
our interests, any balancing exercise is highly likely to be incoherent or even unfair. 
Although Moller acknowledges the necessity of this and offers an account of 
proportionality analysis that encompasses moral reasoning,38 his theory does not clearly 
point to any such principles.39  
For this reason, as well as for others that I will develop in the following paragraphs, I 
suggest that we need to turn to theories that better accommodate the idea of reasonable 
burden and fairness in the allocation of resources and opportunities. Specifically, we need 
to turn to theories of rights that are anchored in a broader theory of distributive justice, i.e. 
a theory that stipulates the resources and opportunities a government should make 
available to people it governs.40 Our aim should be to incorporate certain distributive 
justice principles within a theory of rights, which would underpin our conception and 
application of proportionality as an institutional tool.  
As I explained in the previous chapter, I will not turn to perfectionist theories, as I 
believe they are incompatible with the point and purpose of human rights. Also, in this 
section, I provided arguments against an approach, such as that suggested by Moller. I 
explained how this aims to circumvent the objections against perfectionism but suffers 
from other significant flaws as a theory of rights and lacks any reference to distributive 
justice principles. For all these reasons, I suggest that we had better turn to egalitarian 
theories, such as those of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. These theories stipulate that 
the only rights granted and duties imposed are those allocated under a fair distributive 
scheme of the society’s available resources41 and are grounded on an abstract moral right 
to be treated by the state with equal concern and respect.42 The distinctive feature of such 
                                                 
38 Moller, 'Proportiontionality: Challenging the Critics', p. 716. 
39 To be sure, Moller, in his The Global Model of Constitutional Rights, offers a well-developed 
theory of balancing in four stages and four different types of balancing that operate as 'consecutive 
circles': autonomy maximizing, interest balancing, formal balancing and balancing as reasoning. 
This is definitely a move away from simplistic accounts of the idea of proportionality and towards 
structured moral analysis. However, I believe that Kyritsis is right to point out that it is not at all 
clear firstly, why this moral analysis does not apply at the first stage at all but has to come in a 
second wave and, secondly, what principles or objective criteria in particular will determine the 
relative weight of competing autonomy interests, in a way that transcends the first-person 
perspective. On this point, see Kyritsis, 'Proportionality as a Constitutional Doctrine', pp. 6-7 and 
14-15. 
40 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 2. 
41 In Rawls’s terms, such a theory grants only those rights to individuals and places only such duties 
on others that are allocated under a fair system of social co-operation between free and equal 
citizens, see J Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Belknap, Harvard, 2001). 
42 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs. Various egalitarian distributive justice theories, such as 
prioritarianism, sufficientarianism and the capabilities approach, have been developed as variants 
or modifications of Rawls’s or Dworkin’s theories and as better interpretations of this abstract 
requirement to treat people with equal concern and respect and I will defend my preferred 
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liberal egalitarian theories of distributive justice is that they appeal to relational 
cooperative values such as fairness, equal concern and respect and reciprocity in justifying 
any claims to rights or duties.43 What one can claim is determined after a fair distributive 
scheme is set up and not before or independently of it. The question of the precise content 
of a fair share, or a reasonable claim to resources is the subject of an ongoing debate in 
political philosophy. Nevertheless, Dworkin’s abstract moral requirement that all 
individuals must be treated with equal concern and respect is widely considered as 
common ground between all plausible theories of distributive justice. Dworkin further 
analyses this moral requirement in his two principles of dignity: the state must show 
concern for the equal importance of the lives of all individuals but it must also respect 
each one’s special responsibility for her own life. In order to understand the implications 
of this abstract moral requirement, we need to investigate the general fundamental features 
of a fair distribution of resources and of reasonable or fair shares to resources under such 
theories. 
As I explained in chapter 3, equal concern and respect requires the state to treat as 
irrelevant or impermissible considerations such as sex, race, sexual orientation, religious 
or political beliefs, when it makes decisions or adopts policies that affect the distribution 
of resources. That is, unless they affect the distribution of resources or opportunities in a 
positive way, e.g. in order to protect vulnerable or disadvantaged individuals or groups. If 
an individual suffers disadvantage in the allocation of goods, resources or opportunities 
based on such grounds, the first principle of dignity is violated: the state enforces the 
external and hostile moralistic preferences of some individuals on others and denies them 
their ethical independence and their special responsibility for their life.  
                                                 
interpretation at a later stage. Still, there is a common plateau that they all share and this is marked 
by Dworkin’s two principles of dignity. In fact, Dworkin argues that even non-egalitarian theories 
such as utilitarianism begun as interpretations of this abstract egalitarian requirement but fail to 
provide morally attractive interpretations of it and violate the two principles of dignity that it 
entails. See also Letsas, ‘Rescuing Proportionality’, for the argument that the idea of 
proportionality is grounded on an interpretation of the abstract right to be treated with equal concern 
and respect.  
43 And not a-social absolutes such as need or wholly subjective criteria such as autonomy interests 
grounded on the self-conception of the agent. See S Meckled-Garcia, 'Giving Up the Goods: 
Rethinking the Human Right to Subsistence, Institutional Justice and Imperfect Duties', pp. 73-87, 
for the argument that social rights claims –or in our case, claims to resources in the context of civil 
and political rights- must be based on principles of distributive justice based on social values such 
as fairness or equality that determine fair shares and reasonable burdens. Meckled-Garcia 
convincingly argues that if such claims are made regardless of a social scheme governed by 
principles of fair distribution there seems to be no alternative way or principle for determining what 
a reasonable burden amounts to. As a consequence any such a-social claims are implausible as 
unreasonable or, as we could put it in the language of the ECtHR, disproportionate. 
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At the same time, equal concern and respect also imposes an obligation on the state 
to look out for and take into account any relevant moral considerations44 and undertake 
action that is necessary in order to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of goods, 
benefits or opportunities, thus ensuring the 'equal worth'45 of freedoms granted to all. Such 
relevant moral considerations could be the circumstances that place particular individuals 
or groups in a vulnerable or disadvantaged position, e.g. disability, poverty, immigration, 
illness, trafficking etc. Besides, even the characteristics mentioned above, i.e. sex, race, 
sexual orientation, religious or political beliefs, could be relevant considerations in 
designing policies to protect individuals or show concern, so that these features do not 
hinder individuals' ability to exercise their rights and freedoms. Of course, distributive 
justice theorists disagree about the circumstances under which these considerations are 
morally relevant. In addition, they disagree about what makes a distribution fair or 
equitable and therefore what is the precise content of rights and obligations as fair shares 
to this distribution. I will explore these issues later but for now I will briefly explain why 
I believe that liberal egalitarian theories of distributive justice appear to fit better with the 
practice of the ECtHR. 
Taking a closer look at the practice of the ECtHR, we notice that, ever since its 
inception, the Court has always considered two principles as 'inherent' in the system of 
the Convention. For one thing, it regularly states that a search for a fair balance between 
various competing interests is inherent in the system of the Convention.46 At the same 
time, it takes positive obligations to be inherent in an effective respect for ECHR rights.47 
Referring to the principles of proportionality and effectiveness, side by side, in all the 
relevant case law, the Court appears to me eager to address a twofold moral concern. 
Firstly, that the obligations we place upon the state in order to provide effective protection 
of an individual's interests must not place an impossible, unreasonable or disproportionate 
burden upon others or the state.48 This is linked to the idea that we must be able to 'balance' 
or determine limits to rights and corresponding duties in a reasonable and coherent way 
                                                 
44 This is a more positive way of putting the point also made by Letsas who argues that equal 
respect and concern requires the state not to make any decision that will prevent it from taking into 
account morally relevant considerations.  
45 For the distinction between liberties and equal worth or fair value of liberties see Rawls, A Theory 
of Justice, n. 36, pp. 194-200, and his Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Belknap, Harvard, 
2001), pp. 148-152, where he makes it clear that the idea of fair value applies to equal political 
liberties and that the difference principle is aimed at ensuring the equal worth (as much as possible) 
of other liberties. In Chapter 5, I discuss the relationship between Rawls's two principles of justice. 
46 In the famous Belgian Linguistics Case (1968) the Court noted that, alongside the principle of 
effectiveness, the Convention also implies 'a just balance between the protection of the general 
interest of the Community and the respect due to fundamental human rights while attaching 
particular importance to the latter' (my emphasis), see I(B), para 5. 
47 Since Marckx v. Belgium (1978) and in most positive obligations cases to date. 
48 This is exemplified in the famous Osman v UK and all similar cases that I discuss in Chapter 2. 
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and that claims cannot be absolute. Secondly, in trying to serve legitimate public aims and 
interests through its policies and decisions, the state should seek a fair balance: it must not 
place an excessive or unreasonable burden upon any individual rendering her freedom 
ineffective or meaningless.49  
In light of this long tradition in the Court's jurisprudence, I take it that the judges and 
scholars' moral concern behind the idea of proportionality, especially in positive 
obligations cases, is linked to the idea of some kind of fair distribution of burdens and 
resources in society. In cases with socio-economic implications, such as many of the 
positive obligations cases, judges and scholars are conscious of the fact that a society's 
resources are (to a smaller or larger extent) scarce. For this reason, it makes sense for the 
ECtHR to seek out principles that define reasonable burdens and fair shares, in order to 
resolve the tension between competing claims to these resources. Similarly, it makes sense 
to acknowledge that neither individual nor communal claims must be based on absolutes 
but must be delineated by principles expressing relational, cooperative values, such as 
fairness or equality.  
Viewed in light of such principles, the question of reasonableness or proportionality 
is primarily a question of fairness, rather than one of weighing or balancing, and not the 
other way around. It goes against the moral concern of those involved in this practice to 
claim that any outcome of ad hoc balancing will be deemed fair. Instead, there will be 
balance and proportionality, where there is fairness. To be sure, not many would suggest 
that the balancing or proportionality test should be carried out in a random and wholly 
unprincipled way. Still, only recently have some scholars begun to spell out the necessity 
and priority of moral principles and, in particular, principles of fairness and equality, as 
inherent in the moral point of this test.50 So, to make best sense of the moral concern that 
                                                 
49 Such are the cases where the ECtHR found that the state had not struck a fair balance because 
the legitimate aim that the state pursued was placing an 'unreasonable or excessive burden upon 
the individual', e.g. when being divested of a benefit through a measure aimed at correcting of a 
previous mistake, which was legitimate but not imposed 'in good time and in an appropriate and 
consistent manner' as required by the 'principle of good governance' that the Court found to be 
important in the context of property rights (Moskal v Poland, (2010) 50 EHRR 22, para. 72-73). 
Similarly, the ECtHR found that a state had placed an 'excessive and disproportionate burden' upon 
the applicant by depriving him of his pension altogether because this was 'a total deprivation of his 
entitlements' and not just a 'reasonable and commensurate reduction' –although the Court noted, 
citing previous case law, that the Convention cannot be interpreted as entitling people of pension 
of a particular amount (Asmundsson v. Iceland, (2005) 41 EHRR 42, para 45). In another context, 
in Sen v. Netherlands, Application no. 31465/96, (21 December 2001), the Court reflected on the 
kind of choice that the applicants would be left with and found that 'to impose upon the parents the 
choice between severing the family life contact with their oldest child (in Turkey) or abandoning 
their position in Dutch society was a failure to establish a fair balance between the interest of the 
family and those of the state.' Of course, the question I press throughout this thesis is: what are the 
criteria or principles that can help us determine in a coherent and fair way what counts as excessive 
or disproportionate. 
50 See Webber, Ferraz, Tsakyrakis, Letsas, Kyritsis and Bilchitz, as above n. 8. 
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seems to underlie the idea of proportionality and balancing, we must remember that it 
could not be and is not meant to be a morally neutral, a utilitarian or a cost-benefit analysis 
device but, rather, that it aims to serve principles of justice, fairness and equality. This is 
particularly important to bear in mind when attempting to introduce the idea of balancing 
and proportionality in the field of social and economic rights or positive obligations and 
claims to resources in general, where the need for reference to distributive justice 
principles is even more pronounced than in negative rights claims to non-interference. 
Such cases raise complex moral questions about the fairness in the allocation of resources 
and demand an analysis of what amounts to a justified right-claim to a fair share in the 
society's available resources. 
To begin with, we cannot and should not aim to substitute this distributive justice 
debate with a structured proportionality test. As I explained earlier, proportionality may 
function as an institutional tool that serves important institutional concerns by helping 
judges structure the analysis of the matters before them. However, appeal to the idea of 
proportionality also carries with it significant moral concerns of justice. Therefore, when 
applying the test we also need to draw on principles of fairness and equality, without 
which any balancing exercise is incapable of producing a coherent and fair assessment of 
the interests, rights, goals and burdens that appear to be in tension. In this light, those who 
argue that the debate about the minimum core content of social and economic rights –or 
claims to resources in our case- is secondary or outdated and that a structured 
proportionality test alone can help us determine the content of social and economic 
entitlements,51 are misguided. In particular, they argue that we should not be consumed 
by the supposedly inconclusive theoretical debate about the minimum core content of 
social and economic rights but, instead, rely on 'a structured balancing test in order to 
enclose in the fluid, flexible content of social rights the demanding balancing acts 
regarding the social, economic, and fiscal policy.'52  
In its best interpretation, this view's underlying concern is that the content of social 
and economic rights should be construed in light of and not independently of social and 
economic conditions and available resources. A preliminary observation is that this 
resource-dependence is not only due to practical or institutional reasons, such as the need 
                                                 
51 See X Contiades A Fotiadou, 'Social Rights in the Age of Proportionality: Global Economic 
Crisis and Constitutional Adjudication', pp. 660-686, who argue that the application of 
proportionality in the area of social and economic rights does not presuppose the existence of a 
minimum core content of social rights but offers a different approach to the question of their 
justiciability. They defend this position in their most recent debate with Bilchitz who argues for a 
minimum core theory in their 'Socio-Economic Rights, Economic Crisis and Legal Doctrine: A 
Reply to David Bilchitz', pp. 740-746. 
52 Contiades and Fotiadou, 'Social Rights in the Age of Proportionality: Global Economic Crisis 
and Constitutional Adjudication', p. 666. 
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to be realistic given social or economic crises or be respectful of the legislator's primary 
role in designing social and economic policies. We had better think of this resource-
dependence as a requirement of justice: it ensures that we only grant those rights-claims 
to resources or impose those burdens that can be justified as fair shares under a scheme of 
fair and equitable distribution of the society's available resources. We need to refer to 
principles of fairness or equality, in order to construe the content of these fair shares and 
any corresponding rights and duties. Otherwise, we risk being arbitrary or unfair in the 
allocation of rights and benefits, duties and burdens in society. Of course, this is also true 
in the context of civil and political rights to the extent that they, too, entail claims to 
resources and positive obligations. 
The structured form of the proportionality test may assist judges in applying principles 
of fairness and equality but only such principles can assign any normative weight to the 
competing interests and considerations and help us resolve the tension between them. In 
order to 'evaluate distributive policies' and decide whether lawmakers have made 'fair 
choices in the way they have decided to interfere with social rights'53 it is not enough to 
look for less restrictive ways to pursue her legitimate aims. An investigation on the impact 
of the legislature's decisions on those who bear the burden of the limitations imposed on 
social rights54 must refer to criteria about what is a fair, and thus reasonable, or unfair and 
thus excessive, burden. For, the lawmaker may have deliberated elaborately and openly 
and justified a measure as the least restrictive one. However, this may still be less than a 
fair share in an equitable distribution of resources or, at times, fairness may require a more 
restrictive measure in order to bring about an equitable distribution. Because she would 
need to refer to principles of fairness and equality, in order to take into account any 
morally relevant considerations or block any impermissible ones in the decision-making 
process.55 So, fairness cannot be guaranteed unless we feed such principles into the 
proportionality test. These principles will be crucial in determining the content of claims 
to resources or positive obligations, as well as when we aim to check on the legitimacy of 
a political process, through which limit-setting decisions are made in the allocation of 
resources, i.e. determining the features that these processes must have if they are to treat 
                                                 
53 My emphasis. See Contiades and Fotiadou, 'Social Rights in the Age of Proportionality: Global 
Economic Crisis and Constitutional Adjudication', p. 673. 
54 Ibid, p. 674. 
55 Ibid, p. 685 where Contiades and Fotiadou claim that a structured proportionality test would 
guarantee fairness but they only refer to procedural aspects of the test and fail to acknowledge the 
need to feed such principles into the proportionality test. Along the same lines is Bilchitz's response 
to an attempt to use the doctrine of proportionality to determine the content of social and economic 
entitlements, either in times of economic crisis or not, in his 'Socio-Economic Rights, Economic 
Crisis and Legal Doctrine' and 'Socio-Economic Rights, Economic Crisis and Legal Doctrine: A 
Rejoinder to Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou', last section. 
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all those bound by the decisions fairly, and in a way that all those concerned can regard 
as legitimate.56 
Minimum core content theories aim to function in this way but whether these theories 
actually offer a morally attractive approach to the justification, content and allocation of 
rights and duties is a matter that I will explore further in the following section. For now, I 
only want to note that, even if true, any criticism directed at minimum core content 
theories would merely prove that these particular theories are unconvincing or 
inappropriate and not that we should conduct the balancing that proportionality requires 
without reference to any theory or principles whatsoever. Instead, it only means that we 
have to look elsewhere. An institutional tool, such as the proportionality test, cannot offer 
substantive moral arguments, only provide a structure that could help practitioners frame 
their analysis. 
 
2. The Minimum Core Approach 
 
An approach to the question of the content of claims to resources that has gained 
significant appeal in social and economic rights literature and human rights practice in 
recent years is that of a minimum core of rights or of minimum core obligations.57 The 
central idea of this approach is that, if we could define this minimum core, then claims to 
resources or positive obligations would not be vague requirements or mere aspirations. A 
minimum core approach would help us specify, determine and adjudicate on claims to 
resources. As is often pointed out by those who advocate applying this approach in the 
context of social and economic rights, courts would not have to impose extensive 
obligations for the 'full realisation' of social and economic rights. They could immediately 
require the provision and protection of a minimum level of food, health, shelter or other 
goods and interests that are deemed of greatest importance or urgency and that 
government would need to prioritize over all other needs and goals and secure no matter 
the scarcity of resources.  
This approach has been used extensively in the context of the International Covenant 
on Social Economic and Cultural Rights but some scholars are now suggesting introducing 
                                                 
56 For this point see S White, 'Social Minimum', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2008 Edition), Zalta Edward N. (ed.), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/social-minimum. In the health-care context, this 
issue is explored by Norman Daniels and James Sabin, in 'Limits to Health Care: Fair Procedures, 
Democratic Deliberation and the Legitimacy Problem for Insurers', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Vol. 26, Issue 4, October 1997, pp. 303-350. See also, N Daniels and J Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly 
(2002) 
57 For an overview see K G Young, 'The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept 
in Search of a Content.', The Yale Journal of International Law, Vo.33: 2008, p. 112-175. 
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it in the context of the ECHR too, as a way to determine the content of social and economic 
entitlements and positive obligations.58 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which supervises the implementation of this UN Covenant, has explained that, 
although the Covenant provides for a progressive realisation and acknowledges the 
constraints due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes various minimum core 
obligations of immediate effect to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of 
the most basic forms of education and must demonstrate that every effort has been made 
to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, 
those minimum obligations.59  
In constitutional law theory, there is a great similarity between this idea of a minimum 
core of rights and obligations and the argument about the inviolable core of civil and 
political rights. Most commonly, when referring to the metaphor of balancing, 
constitutional and human rights scholars and judges argue that the method of balancing is 
supposed to reach a decision, through which any limitations imposed will not violate the 
essential core of either of the competing rights.60 Notice that, as I explained in the previous 
section, this structure implies that the minimum core content of rights is determined in 
advance and independently of any other considerations (moral, social, economic). 
According to this approach, other considerations become relevant for and may influence 
the determination of specific rights and obligations only at the second, limitations stage. 
In the same vein, in the context of social and economic rights or claims to resources 
and positive obligations more generally, this approach is also linked to the idea that an 
inviolable and justiciable core content is determined independently of social and economic 
circumstances. This supposedly brings social and economic rights –at least their core 
content- at an equal standing with civil and political rights. Namely, the minimum core of 
both types of rights is supposedly determined independently of competing considerations, 
such as the demands of other individual interests or the general welfare and the state must 
make every effort to use all resources available to satisfy the essential minimum 
                                                 
58 I Leijten, 'Defining the Scope of Economic and Social Guarantees in the Case Law of the ECtHR', 
in Brems & Gerards (eds), Shaping Rights: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Determining the Scope of Human Rights, pp. 109-136, esp. p.125-136. For the same approach in 
another international human rights concept and in socio-economic rights more generally see 
Bilchitz, 'Socio-Economic Rights, Economic Crisis and Legal Doctrine' (2014). 
59 General Comment No. 3, 'The nature of States parties' obligations', (Fifth session, 1990), U.N. 
Doc. E/1991/23, Annex III. Various national constitutional courts around the world and other 
regional courts for the protection of human rights have followed similar approaches. For an 
overview of how this has been applied in practice see Malcolm Langford, 'The Justiciability of 
Social Rights: From Practice to Theory', in Malcolm Langford (ed.), Social Rights Jurisprudence: 
Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
60 For an analysis of this approach in German Constitutional Law see Alexy, A Theory of 
Constitutional Rights. 
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obligations to these basic goods or needs as a matter of priority. Different theorists who 
espouse minimum content theories of rights justify the minimum core of goods to be 
secured or needs to be satisfied on the basis of different purposes: as a minimum necessary 
to enable agency, to secure a minimum worthwhile life, a minimally decent life, or the 
minimum necessary to be able to be a holder of other rights.61 Many find this approach to 
the content of claims to social and economic entitlements appealing, as they believe that 
it can 'give them teeth': 62 they hope that it can provide a fair, more determinate and easily 
justiciable content to social and economic rights and claims to resources.  
However, a minimum core approach fails to offer an effective and morally attractive 
theory or set of principles for determining the content of claims to resources and positive 
obligations in the ECHR. To begin with, a first problem is whether we are able to assume 
that the resources available within most of the ECHR Member States are enough to 
guarantee the provision of certain goods or conditions or the satisfaction of certain needs 
at a minimum level as the minimum core content of the ECHR rights. A first response 
could be that none of these countries is so poor as to raise an objection of such an extreme 
scarcity of resources that makes it impossible to satisfy baseline rights. But, surely, this 
depends on what expenditure precisely this minimum level requires.  
Suppose we distinguish between two levels of protection. We could then set the 
minimum level to cover merely a first level of 'survival needs'63, in which level we could 
grant unconditional rights and obligations to the satisfaction of survival needs, irrespective 
of any consideration of responsibility for one's inability to meet them. Although we may 
be able to argue that most Member States to the ECHR have enough resources to reach 
this level, protection would be restricted to too little and we would face the following 
problem: many of the claims to resources that regularly reach the ECHR would be 
dismissed as moving beyond this threshold or minimum core. Consider examples such as 
                                                 
61 See criicism of this approach in Meckled Garcia, 'Giving Up the Goods: Rethinking Human 
Rights to "subsistence", Institutional Justice, and Imperfect Duties', with reference respectively to: 
A Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982, 20; J Griffin, On Human Rights, OUP, 2008; T Pogge, World Poverty and 
Human Rights, 2nd ed. 54; A Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and self-determination, New York: 
OUP, 2004, 128; Shue, Basic Rights, p. 18.  
62 Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights, and more recently in his 'Socio-Economic Rights, 
Economic Crisis and Legal Doctrine'. Some hope that a 'consensus approach' to the minimum core 
rights or obligations, i.e. what most states seem to consider essential social and economic 
guarantees, can help us determine their scope without entering the normative discussion about what 
people are entitled to, see, Leijten, 'Defining the Scope of Economic and Social Guarantees in the 
Case Law of the ECtHR', p. 132-133, citing Young (as above) and others in this respect. This view 
is implausible for reasons I explain in the text throughout this thesis: the question of what claims 
to resources are justified under the ECHR is unavoidably a question of political morality and 
distributive justice, an essentially normative matter that is only circumvented and not resolved 
through proposals such as this. 
63 Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007), esp. pp. 94-97 where he discusses the role and 
limits of considerations of responsibility with regards to what people are entitled to. 
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those I discussed earlier in chapter 2, of those who argue that respect for their private and 
family life require a robotic arm64, or access to public beaches65, public buildings66 or 
polling stations.67 However, notice that, in most of these cases, the Court acknowledges 
that a human rights issue may be at stake but defers the judgment about how to define its 
precise content to the margin of appreciation of the national authorities –due to the lack 
of a principled method about how to determine such questions. 
On the other hand, if we set the threshold too high to also cover basic freedoms and 
'sufficient resources' that provide the enabling conditions for individuals to achieve a 'wide 
variety of goals'68 then the gap is too wide between conditional and unconditional claims 
to those freedoms or resources.69 To bridge that gap we will need to decide whether these 
claims can counterbalance conflicting considerations and yield unconditional determinate 
rights to certain resources. Now, f, in order to make such difficult decisions, we turned to 
a balancing method, such as that used in the context of the proportionality doctrine 
examined earlier, we could not reach any determinate answers unless we relied on a 
principle about what is a fair share of resources for people to demand from others. 
Therefore, a minimum core approach would also need to turn to the question of a fair 
or equitable distribution of resources and this is where its problem of justification begins. 
In particular, following the minimum core approach, the justification and priority of rights 
and obligations is exclusively based on arguments about the importance of certain 
interests, needs or goods and independently of any argument or principle about a fair or 
equitable distribution of resources and burdens in society. I will briefly explain why this 
principle is morally relevant and necessary and why justifying claims to resources 
independently of it is a problem.  
Although most of us feel sympathy for those who lack such important and basic 
resources, we would not feel comfortable with a political decision to re-direct a significant 
amount of valuable resources to the satisfaction of those needs of some individuals, 
without inquiring at all, about how those who are worst-off ended up in this position. 
When thinking this way, we actually locate the problem with this approach in a doubtful 
assumption, on which it rests. In particular, the assumption that it is inherently unjust for 
people to lack these resources irrespective of any personal responsibility they may have 
for how they ended up lacking those resources and irrespective of how much it is 
                                                 
64 Sentges v. The Netherlands 
65 Botta v. Italy 
66 Zehnalova and Zehnal  
67 Molka v Poland 
68 Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007), pp. 64-65. 
69 Ferras, 'Poverty and Human Rights', pp. 590-594. The same applies to Moller's and Alexy's 
account of rights as I discuss in the text. 
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reasonable to burden others in order to compensate for that disadvantage. The classic 
illustrative example is that of Aesop's fable of the Ant and the Grasshopper: should we 
take away resources from those who have worked and contributed to the production of 
resources in order to satisfy the basic needs of those who denied to work and contribute? 
Of course, there is a great philosophical discussion around the distinction between choice 
and circumstance. I will return to this distinction and the relevant debate about the 
plausibility and role that individual responsibility should play in the distribution of 
resources in the following chapter. For now, I only wanted to clarify our objection: what 
we object to is not really that this approach defines a minimum but that it determines and 
justifies it based on a dubious assumption.  
To be sure, we are often inclined to think that individual behaviour and responsibility 
does not influence whether and how we protect rights such as the right to freedom of 
expression, thought, conscience, religion, the right not to be tortured or enslaved etc. We 
assume that we ought to respect and protect these rights irrespective of any expectation of 
reciprocity or dependence upon the overall behaviour or responsibility of the individual 
concerned.70 Still, as I argued in the last section of chapter 3 of my thesis, on closer 
inspection, and following an integrated account of liberty and equality, all rights and 
freedoms are determined in light of the demands of equality. Therefore, even in the case 
of rights such as those mentioned above, we do take into account the demand of equality 
to respect the moral rights of others; in this sense, before granting those rights we consider 
whether the behaviour that claims protection will impose excessive cost for other 
individuals or impair their moral rights and equal standing.  
For instance, we do not consider the claim not to have one's religion criticized as 
falling within the right to freedom of religion, because that would significantly impair the 
right of others to freedom of expression. For the same reason, we believe that the right to 
private life and the development of one's personality, as well as the right to freedom of 
expression, would be meaningless, if we restricted it on the demand of others not to be 
shocked or provoked by the appearance, actions or words of others. Of course, we protect 
the right to one's image and personality and exclude defamation from the ambit of the 
right to freedom of expression. As for the right to be free from torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment, notice that the ECtHR sets a quite high threshold for classifying an 
interrogation technique, police action, treatment by public officials or those that are under 
their control and supervision or for the conditions of life or detention in the care of public 
authorities. Any action or inaction below that threshold is not protected under Art. 3 of 
the ECHR (although it may fall under the right to life or bodily integrity or the respect for 
                                                 
70 Ferraz, 'Poverty and Human Rights', p. 595.  
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private and family life) and is considered an acceptable compromise required, in order to 
show due respect and concern for the rights of others. In other words, interrogation 
techniques that do not cross this threshold but are still quite pressing are deemed necessary 
to protect the rights of others or for the investigation and prevention of crime. Similarly, 
uncomfortable prison conditions would be deemed acceptable, if they reasonably 
correspond to the economic conditions of the state. Following this line of reasoning, 
principles of fairness or equality will determine what should fall below this threshold of 
inhuman and degrading treatment and outside of the ambit of the rights discussed above, 
taking into account what is necessary for the protection of (and the essential content of) 
the rights of others. In the case of claims to resources and positive obligations in particular, 
the demand of equality is to claim and receive only those resources that one is entitled to 
under a fair distribution of resources that also somehow accommodates people's 
responsibility for their choices.  
In the previous paragraphs, I aimed to show that it is misleading to argue that civil 
and political rights are regularly interpreted in isolation from the demands of the values 
of fairness or equality. No rights and freedoms (negative or positive, civil and political or 
social and economic) have any minimum core content that is determined irrespective of 
relational values of social co-existence and co-operation, such as fairness and equality. 
The idea of responsibility and a concern about the cost of our choices to others is central 
to both types of rights. Besides there may be another way to justify minimum claims to 
goods and resources, i.e. through an interpretation of the values of fairness and equality 
that accommodates the idea of individual responsibility. For instance, a claim to provide 
and protect certain minimum core socio-economic rights or entitlements, as the essential 
preconditions for the exercise of civil and political rights, could be based on a presumption 
of unfairness in the distribution of resources in a society.71 In this way, individual 
responsibility is not deemed irrelevant in a discussion about the content of these 
entitlements. To the contrary, it is considered morally relevant to the extent that it is 
impaired when by the unfair circumstances that people find themselves in. The difference 
is significant and should be reflected both in how we justify claims to resources and 
positive obligations but, also, in the way we determine their content. I will return to this 
in Chapter 5 but in the last section of this chapter, I examine the capabilities approach, an 
alternative theory that could be employed to determine the content of claims to resources 
and positive obligations. 
 
 
                                                 
71 Ferraz , 'Poverty and Human Rights', p. 602. I develop this point further in Chapter 5. 
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3. The Capabilities Approach 
 
Within the debate about the 'currency of egalitarian justice',72 or else, the debate about 
what an egalitarian state should aim to equalize people in, Amartya Sen has argued that 
we should aim to measure and improve people's well-being by attending to their 
'capabilities to function'. In particular, for the 'capabilities approach', as it is now widely 
known, the state's egalitarian action must turn to a more inclusive conception of the well-
being of individuals. Sen argued that, unlike other welfarist theories, the focus of 
egalitarian concern should not merely be the maximization of happiness or desire or 
preference satisfaction.73 He identified the flaw of these theories in that they are overly 
sensitive to interpersonal variability. He argued that they make the task of identifying 
which preferences or desires should matter and be satisfied a highly subjective task: all 
kinds of preferences, either reasonable and modest or extravagant, will be equally relevant 
for the purposes of distributive justice and for grounding claims to resources.74 As an 
alternative to this, he argued that things other than happiness or preference satisfaction 
matter fundamentally for people and that our understanding of a person's well-being must 
also encompass the 'functionings' that people can achieve. These are:  
 
'beings and doings [which] …can vary from such elementary things as being 
adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable morbidity and 
premature mortality, etc., to more complex achievements such as being happy, 
having self-respect, taking part in the life of the community, and so on.'75 
 
It is crucial to note here, that a point that differentiates the capabilities theory from theories 
of welfare and gives it much of its appeal is that it somehow accommodates the idea of 
individual responsibility for the outcome of one's life and for the cost of her choices. 
Specifically, people have justice claims to the capabilities that enable them to achieve 
functionings but no claim that others help them to actually achieve these functionings if 
they fail or neglect to do so.76 The state may have positive duties and people may have 
corresponding rights to the capabilities as means for achieving the ends, i.e. the 
functionings, but not to the functionings themselves. Therefore, the state does not have 
                                                 
72 See GA Cohen 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', in (1989) Ethics 99, pp. 906-944.  
73 A Sen, Inequality Re-examined, (Oxford University Press, 1992) and his Development as 
Freedom, (Oxford University Press, 1999) 
74 Sen, 'Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, The Journal of Philosophy 
82: 169-221. For this criticism to welfarist theories see also: Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, ch.1, TM 
Scanlon, 'The Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons' in Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-
Being, in (eds.) J Elster and JE Roemer, (Cambridge University Press) p. 17-44. 
75 Sen, Inequality Re-examined, p. 39. 
76 For this point see J Wolff, 'Equality: The Recent History of an Idea', (2007) Journal of Moral 
Philosophy 4  
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any positive duties to facilitate their attempts to achieve functionings and people do not 
have any such corresponding rights or additional claims to resources.  
Following this theory, we may suppose that applicants to the ECtHR, such as Sentges, 
Botta, Zehnalova and Zehnal or Molka, would have a claim, respectively, to a robotic arm, 
access to public beaches, public buildings and polling stations for people with impaired 
mobility.77 They would have justified claims to these capabilities that enable them to enjoy 
a private life, establish relationships with others and participate in the life of the 
community but not to be facilitated in the actual enjoyment or development of these 
functionings. This, on first sight, seems like a plausible and attractive theory for 
determining the content of claims to resources and positive obligations in the context of 
the ECHR. For instance, it may be true that many of the ECHR provisions that are relevant 
to the protection of labour rights (such as those of Art. 4, 8 and 10 and 11), can be analysed 
in light of the capabilities approach. In light of this theory, they can be understood as 
aiming to secure key capabilities, such as the capability of 'being able to work as a human 
being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of human 
recognition with other workers' or the capability to have 'control of one's political and 
material environment',78 such as the work environment, through having a meaningful right 
to voice at work (including strong protection of collective bargaining, freedom of 
association and rights to strike).79 This approach appears to have the benefit that it does 
not confine the state's concern to the tangible benefits that are derived from work, e.g. 
income, but also requires positive action to secure intangible benefits, such as the 
development of one's identity, personality and social relationships through the work 
environment.80 Supposedly, these benefits of work are best captured and served by 
capabilities equality because this theory is not solely concerned with income and resources 
but also with actual freedom and opportunities.81 The view that equality theories that focus 
on resources are not concerned with actual freedom and real opportunities or 
circumstances is based on a common misinterpretation of these theories and I will argue 
against it in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
For now, although I do accept that the capabilities approach expresses an important 
concern, when it advocates for a proactive role of the state to secure real freedoms and 
                                                 
77 See discussion of the relevant cases in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
78 M Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 79-
80. 
79 For an analysis of labour rights may be integrated into ECHR provisions through the capabilities 
approach see V Mantouvalou, 'Labour Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights, An 
Intellectual Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation', in Human Rights Law 
Review, (2013), pp. 529-555. 
80 Ibid, p. 550-551. 
81 Ibid, p. 551. 
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opportunities I will highlight the reasons why I believe it is nonetheless unattractive as a 
theory of distributive justice and rights. 
To begin with, the capabilities theory may be criticized with similar arguments such 
as those directed against welfarist theories. Despite Sen’s attempt to argue otherwise,82 
Dworkin is right to point out that an account of human capabilities and functionings based 
on this theory necessarily suffers, to a certain extent, from the problem of subjectivism, as 
it relies on welfarist notions and is sensitive to interpersonal comparisons on various 
aspects of well-being.83 Notice that Sen has not provided in his theory any specific list of 
capabilities that the egalitarian concern should focus on or any way to assess their relative 
weight that would be independent of people’s views of what contributes to well-being. To 
the all-important question of which capabilities should be the focus of a proactive 
egalitarian state and the basis for claims to resources, the state will respond that we have 
obligations to secure those capabilities that are necessary to achieve various functionings, 
such as 'being happy, having self-respect, taking part in the life of the community'84 or to 
enter into meaningful relationships of human recognition with others. A capabilities 
theorist would note that all egalitarian theories must ultimately rely on such welfarist 
notions. For instance, we seem to assess the significance of disability or poverty with 
reference to what choices or opportunities they deprive us of and then seek to remedy or 
compensate for them accordingly. 
This is partly true but not an accurate conclusion, at least for Dworkin’s equality of 
resources, as I will develop it in Chapter 5. As I explained in Chapter 3, the abstract 
obligation to treat all individuals with equal concern about the morally arbitrary 
circumstances that they find themselves in and bear no moral responsibility for, relies on 
arguments about what these circumstances deprive individuals of. However, these 
arguments are significantly different from those that figure in a capabilities theory. They 
are based on what choices individuals would have had in the distribution of resources were 
circumstances more nearly equal and not based on what choices they would have had in 
a distribution of resources that aims to secure a particular outcome or effect, which relies 
on welfarist notions and ideals. The first argument is deontological and agent-relative and 
has to do with the kind of treatment of individuals in the distribution of resources and the 
distribution per se, while the latter is agent-neutral and points to a particular desirable 
outcome or effect of a distribution of resources.85 The connection between circumstances 
                                                 
82 See generally Sen, Inequality Re-examined, pp. 36-38 and more recently in his The Idea of 
Justice, p. 207. 
83 See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, ch. 7, esp. p. 301-303 and Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 476-477. 
84 Sen, Inequality Re-examined, p. 39 and Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 79-80. 
85 The difference is significant, although I do believe that the outcome of a distribution may be 
relevant in some way: certain outcomes may indicate that there is an injustice in treatment. See my 
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and welfarist notions in a welfarist or a capabilities approach is necessary, whereas any 
such connection in the context of a resourcist theory is not necessary but merely incidental. 
In support of that conclusion, notice that, under a theory of equality of resources, the level 
of compensation for these circumstances will be determined through a prudent insurer test, 
whereby we will have to assume whether and how much a prudent individual would have 
chosen to insure herself for the risk of facing particular circumstances. In this test, nothing 
is pre-determined as a disadvantage, let alone one of particular weight: rather, it is a moral, 
interpretive (and secondarily empirical) question whether in the particular conditions 
pertaining in a particular community an average prudent person would have deemed some 
(and which) circumstances as causing disadvantage and to what extent.86  
Now, I take it that no capabilities theorist would want to concede that, in order to 
avoid the problems common with welfarism that are discussed above, equality of 
capabilities actually aims to secure those personal resources that are necessary for various 
functionings. Recall that Sen has developed his theory as an alternative and distinct from 
primary goods (Rawlsian) and resourcist (Dworkian) theories that focus, as he claims, in 
a 'fetishistic' way on primary goods or resources as means rather than on the supposed 
actual freedom that one can enjoy with them. Therefore, it seems to me right that any such 
move would cause a capabilities theory to collapse into equality of primary goods or 
resources: as Dworkin argues, understood in this way, capabilities are part of what he 
describes as personal resources and therefore within the focus of egalitarian concern in his 
theory too.87 Of course, this may not be such an unattractive combination after all and I 
discuss it later in Chapter 5. However, it means that a resources theory is doing the work 
here, rather than a clearly distinct capabilities theory. 
                                                 
discussion in Chapter 3. On the difference between agent-neutral and agent-relative arguments as 
the basis of rights see T Nagel, 'Personal Rights and Public Space', 24 (2) Philosophy and Public 
Affairs (1995). 
86 It is for this reason that Dworkin argues that the prudent insurer test in the context of the 
hypothetical insurance device should take into account the public opinion before rationing 
decisions are made: because rationing should not just reflect cost-benefit calculations but also the 
public's sense of priorities: in order to determine whether an average prudent insurer would have 
insured and at what level. See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 318. 
87 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, ch. 7, esp. p. 301-303 and E Kelly, 'Equal opportunity, unequal 
capability' in Measuring Justice. Primary Goods and Capabilities, (Cambridge University Press, 
2010) who argues that capabilities theory collapses into equality of primary goods. On the point 
whether these theories are indeed distinct see the exchange between Dworkin and Williams who 
argues that Sen’s capabilities theory is actually distinct from equality of resources on the basis that 
it is more sensitive to and responds differently to social contingencies that matter for equality and 
attaches greater importance to individuals’ evaluation of their own circumstances. See A Williams, 
'Dworkin on Capability', 113 Ethics (October 2002), 23-39 and R Dworkin, 'Sovereign Virtue 
Revisited', 113 Ethics (October 2002), p. 136-140. I believe his objection is unconvincing but it is 
beyond the scope of my argument to discuss this here. I give some reasons against such an objection 
later in Chapter 5, when I examine certain misconceptions of Dworkin’s theory of equality of 
resources. 
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An alternative move would be to confine the capabilities theory, and a corresponding 
account of rights and claims to resources and positive obligations, to securing the 
minimum capabilities that supposedly both primary goods and resourcist theories deem 
necessary for the moral powers of an autonomous person or personal responsibility, 
respectively. True, in order to hold people responsible for the outcome of their lives, we 
must show concern for the essential conditions for choice. However, if we really hold this 
to a minimum then it will cover too little and will not capture a significant range of 
circumstances that we normally think of as disadvantageous and worthy of some form of 
remedy. On the other hand, if we wish to argue for rights to capabilities above that 
threshold or if we make the idea of essential conditions for responsibility over-inclusive, 
then we run the risk of subjectivism and perfectionism, which is the other major problem 
with capabilities theory. Sen’s approach greatly suffers from these two flaws, because it 
is underspecified as to which capabilities matter, what their relative weight is and what 
level of priority or urgency should be assigned to them. 
Yet another alternative would be to develop an approach with a supposed universal 
appeal, such as that offered by Martha Nussbaum, who argues for an objective list of basic, 
key capabilities.88 This alternative faces the problem of perfectionism, though: any list of 
key capabilities is unavoidably justified on a particular conception of what the good life 
consists in –as broad and inclusive as we may construe it. In fact, it seems that if we 
construe it in very broad terms, it will be too abstract or too subjective to be of any use. 
On the other hand, if we attempt to narrow it down, we can only do so guided by the only 
criterion that is available to this theory: namely, a particular conception of well-being. For 
reasons that I developed in Chapter 3, when I was discussing perfectionism and the 
abstract ideal of equal concern and respect, resting on a particular conception of well-
being would violate the principle of special responsibility, as it could impose on some 
individuals a distribution of resources and opportunities based on the ethical values and 
beliefs of others. This means that some could either be prevented from making certain 
choices of ethical foundation for themselves or that they would be denied assistance or 
compensation for choices they claim that they should have had. As Dworkin’s puts it: 'it 
doesn't follow from the fact that sensible people value resources as means to better lives 
that government should aim to make people equal not in resources but in the goodness of 
their lives. … [A]ny such program would impair personal responsibility.'89 
Besides, even if we conceded to perfectionism and used such a list of capabilities as 
a basis for determining what individuals can claim as fair shares in a just distribution of 
                                                 
88 M Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p. 23-33. 
89 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 480, note 13. 
           Three Approaches to the Content of Claims to Resources and Positive Obligations 163 
 
resources, the project of assessing the personal circumstances and level of capabilities of 
all individuals by official state agencies or courts seems implausible and potentially 
offensive. It would require a detailed assessment of an immense amount of personal, 
sensitive data, managed by a large administrative bureaucracy and could still fall short of 
accomplishing an equitable outcome.90 To this Arneson responds that it is better than 
nothing and develops a prioritarian account for a capabilities theory but the merits of this 
theory aside, it starts off with a flawed premise: that there is no alternative egalitarian 
theory that can perform this task in a less complicated or stigmatizing way.91 As I will 
argue in the following chapter, this is based on certain misinterpretations of Dworkin’s 
equality of resources and his hypothetical insurance device.92 I will turn to this shortly but, 
before I close this section, I wish to draw attention to the fact that, despite its problems, 
the capabilities theory expresses a very important concern that is central to all egalitarian 
theories and has contributed to its great appeal and recognition. This is the concern about 
a proactive human rights ethic and it may be wise to incorporate this into any other theory 
that we find more attractive and workable. 
To be sure, it is difficult to promote a proactive human rights ethic unless we also 
suggest a fair and feasible way of determining the content of rights and corresponding 
obligations. In other words, as I have stressed throughout this thesis, state authorities could 
only adopt the positive measures necessary for the effective protection of human rights, if 
they have a workable method for identifying their content, i.e. which circumstances 
constitute an unfair disadvantage, which circumstances leave some people with less than 
a fair share and which require special concern. The capabilities approach assigns a very 
proactive role to the state by recognizing that all entitlements entail affirmative tasks with 
respect to people’s capabilities93 but, as I argued in the previous paragraphs, we have good 
reasons to believe that focusing on equalizing people in their capabilities to function 
contradicts central liberal egalitarian principles. Furthermore, an interpretation of this 
theory that suggests a specific list of capabilities may offer judges some guidance. 
However, a specific list of capabilities could also pose significant difficulties, e.g. with 
respect to measuring their weight and importance and prioritizing them or demarcating 
claims based on them in relation to other individual or communal goals. Still, the work of 
capabilities theorists in identifying the plurality and complexity of human needs and forms 
                                                 
90 T Pogge, 'A Critique of the Capability Approach', in H Brighouse and I Robeyns (eds.), 
Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), p. 51. 
91 R Arneson, 'Two cheers for capabilities' in Measuring Justice. Primary Goods and Capabilities, 
p. 118-122. 
92 On this point see also Pogge, 'A Critique of the Capability Approach', p. 44-48. 
93 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities – The Human Development Approach, p. 65. 
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of disadvantage, may offer complementary insights that another liberal egalitarian theory 
of distributive justice, and an account of claims to resources and positive obligations based 
on it, can incorporate.94 
                                                 
94 This suggestion comes from an advocate of the capabilities approach, see I Robeyns, 'The 
Capability Approach in Practice', (2006) 14 The Journal of Political Philosophy, Number 3, p. 351-
376. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CLAIMS TO FAIR CAPABILITIES THROUGH EQUALITY OF RESOURCES 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that the problem that claims to resources and positive 
obligations pose for the ECtHR is primarily a problem about their content and, therefore, 
related to distributive justice questions. In the previous chapter, I assessed the relevance 
and merits of the doctrine of proportionality and of two theories of distributive justice that 
have been employed widely in the context of human rights theory and practice, in search 
for a principled framework for the ECtHR to determine the content of and adjudicate 
between competing claims to resources.  
I explained that the widely used proportionality and balancing tests could serve as 
institutional tools that assist judges to structure their analysis and assessment of the 
complex matters before them. Moreover, I highlighted the moral concerns underlying the 
idea of proportionality and argued that, in order for it to serve its institutional role 
effectively, it would have to be supported by relational principles of distributive justice, 
such as fairness and equality. Furthermore, I argued that the minimum core approach 
downplays the significance and role of individuals' personal responsibility for choice and, 
therefore, treats as unfair distributions that are not necessarily (inherently) unfair. Finally, 
I explained that the capabilities theory suffers from the following significant flaws. It 
suffers from the flaw of subjectivism, if it takes personal preferences as relevant to the 
distributive justice question of which capabilities should be secured equally to all and at 
what level. On the other hand, if we try to avoid subjectivism by drawing up a list of 
capabilities that are supposedly universally shared by all human beings, we run the high 
risk of perfectionism and paternalism. Despite these problems, I argued that the 
capabilities approach has an important and interesting feature that makes it appealing to 
human rights theorists and international organisations: it puts the focus on what 
individuals can actually do within the spheres of freedom that are granted to them and 
calls for a proactive role of the state in securing these capabilities.  
In this chapter, I will argue that concern about the actual circumstances that 
individuals find themselves in is also central to Dworkin's theory of equality of resources. 
Moreover, I will suggest that his theory is more convincing and morally attractive than 
the ones examined earlier, as it shows enough concern for mitigating the impact of morally 
arbitrary circumstances in what share of resources people get in life but also 
accommodates the idea of individual responsibility for choice, better than any other 
theory. In particular, I will explore how Dworkin's equality of resources is shaped in light 
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of his two principles of dignity and how it accommodates both concern for the 
circumstances that individuals find themselves in and respect for their individual choices 
and personal responsibility for the outcome of their lives. I will then develop and justify 
an interpretation of Dworkin's theory of distributive justice in a way that endorses the 
appealing features of the capabilities theory (leaving aside its flaws) and uses them to 
facilitate the application of the theory of equality of resources to the non-ideal, real world 
context of human rights adjudication. I will argue that this is the best starting point for 
framing plausible and fair claims to resources and positive obligations in the context of 
the ECHR. 
 
1. Overview of Dworkin's Equality of Resources 
 
Dworkin's theory of distributive justice is based upon the same foundation as other liberal 
egalitarian theories, Rawlsian or welfarist: namely, respect for the 'common humanity' of 
people, or their 'equal objective moral worth' and concern to mitigate the impact upon 
them of their 'culpable' environments1 or their natural endowments and circumstances as 
all egalitarians refer to them. In fact, Dworkin argues that no plausible political theory and 
society can disregard the fundamental right of all individuals to be treated with equal 
concern and respect: he claims that they are all egalitarian, in the sense that they are all 
premised upon different interpretations of this abstract ideal, some more plausible and 
attractive than others.2 In Chapter 3, I explained how Dworkin further develops this 
abstract moral principle into two principles of dignity: the principle of the equal objective 
moral worth and importance of each individual's life and the principle of personal 
responsibility of each individual for making the ethical choices that bring success and 
value in her own life (the principle of ethical independence). In Chapter 4, I highlighted 
the reasons why the three most popular approaches to the distributive justice questions in 
the context of claims to resources and positive obligations fall short of or fail to respect 
adequately these two principles of dignity. In this section, I will draw attention to and 
reinforce the special importance that Dworkin places on responsibility for choice and its 
role in the distributive justice theory that he develops, namely, equality of resources. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See the famous essay by B Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, 
2nd series, ed. P Laslett and W G Runciman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962). See also S Guest, Ronald 
Dworkin, 3rd edition, (Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 144-148.  
2 W Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, An Introduction, (2nd Edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 3-4.  
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The central importance of responsibility for choice  
 
So far, I have argued that claims to resources and positive obligations before the ECtHR 
raise complex distributive justice questions. In particular, I explained that, when we seek 
to determine what principles must govern the distribution of goods, resources, benefits, 
burdens and obligations, we should better turn to relational values such as fairness and 
equality.3 Following this, a superficial and hasty assumption would be that the value of 
freedom has no role to play here: in this realm, any claims to freedom would seem to 
conflict with, rather than complement, the aims of social justice, fairness and equality.4 
Contrary to this widely held belief in legal and political philosophy, I developed and 
reinforced, in Chapter 3, Dworkin's integrated account of the values of freedom and 
equality. I will follow up on this discussion here, in order to defend the implications of 
this moral and political outlook for a theory of distributive justice: freedom has an integral 
role within a theory of distributive justice alongside and not in competition with the other 
relational values mentioned above. 
 In fact, the idea that freedom and responsibility for choice should have an important 
role within an egalitarian theory of distributive justice has its roots in Dworkin's criticism 
of Rawls's two principles of justice. Rawls develops an ideal theory of justice starting 
from a thought experiment. He describes an 'original position', where people are required 
to choose principles of justice for their social institutions behind a veil of ignorance about 
their natural endowments, gender, age, ethnicity, race, income and wealth, their 
comprehensive doctrines as well as the political and economic system and circumstances 
of their society.5 Rawls assumes that, under such conditions, reasonable citizens would 
reject utilitarianism because it does not respect the 'distinctness of persons' and they would 
most likely choose the following principles: 
 
First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same 
scheme of liberties for all; (the liberty principle) 
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two 
conditions: 
a.  They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity; 
b. They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of 
society (the difference principle).6  
                                                 
3 Earlier in Chapter 4 I justified my position that we should better turn to egalitarian rather than 
utilitarian or libertarian theories to look for such principles. 
4 For a discussion of these arguments, see Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
5 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Revised Edition, Harvard University Press, 1999) and his Justice 
as Fairness: A Restatement, (Belknap, Harvard, 2001). 
6 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 42-43. 
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It is not my aim here to discuss in length Rawls's theory but only to draw attention to the 
relationship between the 'liberty principle' and the 'difference principle', which, in turn, 
reveals Rawls's position about the relationship between the values of liberty and equality.  
Following these principles, a scheme of social cooperation is fair if all individuals 
enjoy equal basic liberties (including the traditional civil and political rights) and the state 
always strives to distribute social and economic resources in a way that maximizes the 
wealth and income of the least advantaged in society. This arrangement gives all 
individuals significant areas of freedom of choice: each member of the society is free and 
responsible to choose and pursue her own conception of the good life. At the same time, 
a society treats all persons as equals if it seeks to remove those inequalities that 
disadvantage some of its members but considers as fair those inequalities that make the 
worst-off in society as better-off as possible. Following these principles, the state must 
take care, firstly, to allow people to enjoy the benefits of their free choices (in shaping 
their lives and choosing their own ends) and, secondly, to compensate them for 
circumstances that place them in a disadvantaged position in the distribution of social and 
economic resources.  
Notice, there is little, if any, connection between the two principles of justice: Rawls 
himself explains that they are meant to operate at different levels. The liberty principle is 
apt for constitutional provision and adjudication by the courts, whereas the difference 
principle is to be interpreted and applied by economic institutions and arrangements. Still, 
we may identify points of overlap between these two, if we assume, as Rawls suggests, a 
further, lexically prior, principle. This principle would guarantee certain basic needs as 
part of what he calls 'constitutional essentials', namely, certain minimum social and 
economic conditions that are essential for individuals, in order to be able to exercise their 
all-important two moral powers: to have a sense of justice and to be able to choose and 
pursue their own conception of the good life.7 This principle would pick out certain claims 
to basic socio-economic entitlements from the wider scope of social and economic justice 
covered by the difference principle and elevate them to the level of justiciable equal basic 
liberties or assign them even greater urgency and priority.8  But Rawls has not developed 
this idea and, besides, this too could be open to the same criticism as his difference 
principle. To this I now turn. 
To begin with, criticism came from libertarians such as Nozick, who argued that the 
exercise of the liberty principle should be extended to economic liberties too. This, Nozick 
                                                 
7 Ibid, p. 44 note 7 and p. 47-48. 
8 Ibid, p. 161-162. 
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suggested, would lead to an inconsistency and a clash between the exercise of this 
principle by individuals and the distributive justice arrangements required by the 
difference principle.9 According to this view, Rawls placed unjustified emphasis on the 
value of equality and the demands of distributive justice at the expense of the value of 
liberty. This view is premised upon a conception of the values of liberty and equality that 
has similarities with the one I criticized earlier in Chapter 3 of this thesis, so I will not 
develop it here again. However, Nozick's significant contribution to the debate is the idea 
that the motivations and rights of those who produce a society's resources must have some 
bearing on the way these goods and resources are distributed.10 Of course, Rawls does not 
disregard this altogether, as theories of flat equality would do. His difference principle 
aims to provide incentives for people to be productive, albeit for the benefit of all and with 
no claims of natural right or desert over their production.11 This still leaves the difference 
principle open to further points of criticism, which were best formulated by Dworkin.  
In particular, elevating the debate between libertarians and egalitarians to a more 
abstract level, Dworkin argues that they both provide interpretations of the abstract and 
fundamental ideal of treating people with equal concern and respect but offer unattractive 
or indefensible accounts of what that amounts to in terms of liberty and equality. Making 
this move, he creates what many have called 'an egalitarian plateau' where all theories are 
treated as fundamentally egalitarian and measured by how well or badly they interpret and 
apply this widely held and indisputable abstract ideal.12  
Dworkin goes along with Rawls (and Nozick for that matter) in his critique of 
utilitarian and welfarist theories. Nevertheless, he points out that the two principles of 
justice as fairness of social institutions fail to treat people with equal concern and respect 
because they fail to account for a crucial aspect of it: individual responsibility and the cost 
and burdens that the exercise of free choice of some entails for others. Dworkin 
convincingly argues that Rawls's theory is not sufficiently choice-sensitive and 
endowment-insensitive. I will explain. 
To begin with, it is not sufficiently choice-sensitive as it aims to always compensate 
the worst-off in society, without investigating whether they are, and to what extent, 
                                                 
9 See R Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974) 
10 See Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, and W Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: 
An Introduction, p. 103-138.  
11 J Wolff, 'Equality: The Recent History of an Idea', (2007) Journal of Moral Philosophy 4, pp. 
125-136. 
12 See in general W Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Introduction 
and Chapter 3, also S Guest, Ronald Dworkin, and A Ripstein, 'Liberty and Equality' in A Ripstein 
(ed.) Ronald Dworkin (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 82-108. It is beyond the scope of 
my research here to develop his criticism of Nozick's interpretation of the value of liberty but some 
points are common with the criticism to the view discussed in Chapter 3, i.e. that liberty and 
equality are distinct and conflicting values. 
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responsible for ending up in this disadvantaged position through their own free choices, 
or as Dworkin labels it, through bad 'option luck'. In this way, it may often be counter-
intuitive, as it subsidizes those who make a lifestyle choice to be under-productive at the 
expense of the hard-working. Taxing the hard-working, talented and ambitious, in order 
to redistribute resources to those who are indiscriminately viewed as disadvantaged does 
not just remove all incentives for the former to be productive. It also unfairly allows some 
to bear none of the cost that their freely made choices entail and allows them to transfer 
the burden to others. Treating people with equal respect for the responsibility of each for 
the success of her own life requires us to accept as fair those outcomes in the distribution 
of resources that result from peoples freely made choices.  
On the other hand, Dworkin distinguishes bad option luck from bad brute luck, which 
is the outcome of circumstances beyond the individual's control or free choice, such as 
natural endowments (disabilities, lack of talents, genetic predispositions etc), social 
circumstances (race, gender, ethnicity), deprived upbringing or natural disasters. All these 
are morally arbitrary circumstances: individuals did not choose them through the exercise 
of their free will, according to a preference, evaluation or life plan. For this reason, a fair 
scheme of social justice and cooperation should not allow such circumstances to place 
individuals in a disadvantaged position in the distribution of resources and opportunities.13  
The central problem in dealing with bad brute luck is the kind and extent of 
compensation that the state owes individuals who suffer from it. Rawls and Dworkin are 
right to argue, against welfarist theories, that it would be unfeasible and unfair for the state 
to try to constantly equalize people's circumstances in terms of welfare (happiness, 
preference satisfaction or else). This, they both argue, could require an endless and 
excessive sacrifice on the part of others: diverting all of society's resources to this could 
deprive other individuals from pursuing their life plans and the society as a whole from 
supporting other valuable goals and activities.14 To be sure, this is the reasonable concern 
behind Rawls's reluctance to compensate for natural disadvantages too. If we try to 
equalize people as much as possible in these circumstances, in order to help them achieve 
their ends, we might have to devote all resources to that end and, therefore, we will prevent 
anyone from achieving their goals.15  
                                                 
13 Note, here I imply that we should, firstly, not allow morally arbitrary circumstances to reduce 
the share that one is entitled to and, secondly, that we ought to take them into account in order to 
increase the share of resources that one is entitled to in the form of compensation for the choices 
she would have had were circumstances more nearly equal, as Dworkin puts it in his Sovereign 
Virtue, p. 334. I will develop this argument in the text in the following section. 
14 See generally Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, ch. 1. 
15 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, p. 72-74. 
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Still, Dworkin is right to note that Rawls's theory is not sufficiently endowment-
insensitive: it allows the distribution of resources to be unduly influenced by morally 
arbitrary natural endowments, such as talents or mental, physical or psychological 
integrity and ability. In particular, by focusing on social primary goods, it directs 
distributive justice concerns mainly on income and wealth and does not contain any 
compensatory mechanism whatsoever for the lack of natural endowments. However, 
treating people with equal concern and respect, Dworkin argues, requires us to consider 
natural endowments as morally arbitrary factors outside of the free will and choice of 
individuals and compensate individuals who find themselves in a disadvantaged position 
in the distribution of resources, goods and opportunities due to such circumstances. This 
is the so-called problem of expensive needs.16 In particular, given what Rawls regards as 
a fair share of social primary goods, some people will be much less productive and less 
able to use these goods and opportunities due to circumstances beyond their control, such 
as lack of talent or due to some form of disability or frail health. As a result, they will need 
to use a significant amount of their share of resources to mitigate for their lack of health 
or other abilities.  
In response to the problem of expensive needs, Dworkin developed his theory of 
equality of resources, taking particular care to distinguish it from egalitarian theories that 
tend to equalize people in some form of welfare rather than social primary goods. In this 
way, he wanted to avoid running the opposite risk of encouraging some to enjoy their 
expensive tastes at the expense of others. As explained above, Dworkin argues that it is 
highly subjective and, therefore, unfeasible to measure and determine relative welfare and 
equalize people in e.g. happiness or preference satisfaction. Most importantly, it is 
potentially unfair, as it may require a transfer of resources from those with ordinary tastes 
and preferences to those with expensive tastes.17 To be sure, Dworkin does not deny the 
freedom of individuals to cultivate or embrace expensive tastes; he only points out that it 
is counter-intuitive and unfair for those who have expensive tastes to demand that those 
with ordinary tastes be burdened with the additional cost of satisfying them.  
However, not only expensive but even ordinary tastes entail some cost upon others 
and the society as a whole so the crucial aspect of our objection here is not really the 
smaller or greater cost of satisfying them compared to that of other preferences or tastes. 
Of course, the greater the cost, i.e. the more expensive and extravagant the tastes that 
demand satisfaction the greater the sense of resentment will be. Still, what we actually 
find as counter-intuitive and unfair is the fact that welfarist theories do not take into 
                                                 
16 See generally Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, ch. 1. 
17 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 48-59. 
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account the distinction between morally arbitrary circumstances (such as disability) and 
individual responsibility for choices, tastes, preferences, life plans and goals, no matter 
how modest or expensive they are. The problem is there in both cases but only becomes 
pronounced the more expensive or extravagant the tastes appear to others. Besides, those 
with expensive tastes could also object to diverting any resources at all to the satisfaction 
of, what they regard as, the inferior or unworthy preferences of others. To cite one such 
common example: many would complain against transferring some of a society's valuable 
resources to subsidize the opera, music venues and organizations (such as orchestras) or 
art galleries, especially during a financial crisis. At the same time, classical music or art 
lovers would consider this as an investment in culture and they would as regard wasted 
any money spent on subsidizing football clubs.18 My point is that the problem lies not in 
the actual relative cost of tastes and preferences to be satisfied but in the fact that people 
are bound to disagree about what goals and preferences resources should be spent on.  
So, Dworkin rightly responds to the problem of expensive tastes with a criticism of 
welfarist theories in general, based on the argument that they are highly subjectivist and 
that they focus on equalizing people in some form of welfare or preference satisfaction, 
without any objective criterion about what claims to resources are reasonable.19 He 
discusses the problem of expensive needs and that of expensive tastes as two sides of the 
same problem with welfarist theories.20 This opens the way for Dworkin to offer, in 
response, a theory about the fair distribution of resources that aims to mitigate the impact 
of circumstances of brute luck but also place individual responsibility of each person for 
the cost of her own choices at its heart. Many have criticized this move and I will briefly 
discuss their views in the following paragraphs but, first, I will provide an outline of 
Dworkin's theory of equality of resources. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 See the example of Greece where the debate about discontinuing state funding for Athens's major 
classical music organization and venue, the Athens Music Hall, revolved around whether in times 
of financial crisis and austerity valuable resources should be spent at all for an organization that 
offers 'elitist' entertainment. In fact, none of those criticizing state subsidy for the Athens Music 
Hall was able to argue that this is in fact an expensive preference of some as it actually is not: the 
amount of state support is not that significant. Rather, the focus was on the fact that, in the face of 
scarcity of resources, no money should be spent on satisfying what most regard as 'elitist' 
preferences not shared by most others. Still, as the famous violinist Leonidas Kavakos observed in 
an interview published in a Greek newspaper, no one raised this argument against state funding of 
football clubs. For this reason, welfarist theories are bound to fail to provide a fair scheme of social 
cooperation and fair distributive claims to resources. 
19 Guest, Ronald Dworkin, p. 184-188. 
20 Ripstein, 'Liberty and Equality', (2007), p. 86-89. 
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Equality of Resources 
 
With his theory of equality of resources, Dworkin aims to provide a theory of fair 
distribution of resources that is more choice/ambition-sensitive and endowment-
insensitive than Rawls's theory of justice. As I explained above, this means that his theory 
aims to mitigate the impact of a wider range of morally arbitrary natural and social 
circumstances in the distribution of resources. At the same time, it purports to do so while 
better accommodating the idea of responsibility of individuals for the free choices that 
they make and allow these choices to influence the distribution of resources to a certain 
extent. But what other circumstances is his theory sensitive to, and in what way? Also, 
how and to what extent should we make a scheme about the distribution of resources 
sensitive to the responsibility of individuals for their choices and the inequalities in the 
distribution of resources that these produce?  
To answer these central questions Dworkin devises a thought experiment that is 
similar to Rawls's but aims to produce an ideal, 'envy-free' distribution, i.e. a distribution 
that satisfies the 'envy test': a distribution shows equal concern and respect for all if, once 
the division of resources is complete, no one envies someone else's bundle of resources.21 
This is consistent with Dworkin's dynamic or integrated conception of the values of liberty 
and equality as described and defended earlier in Chapter 3 of my thesis. Firstly, equality 
is preserved when no one envies someone else's package of work and reward because the 
package that they have achieved reflects their own authentic choices and preferences. 
Secondly, liberty is respected, if people are free to shape their lives according to their 
choices and preferences about how to use the resources that have been awarded to them 
under a reasonably fair distribution, so long as they violate no one's rights.22 It is crucial 
to note here that the envy test is not meant to be a psychological test but a technical and 
economic test.23 Resentment is a feeling that cannot be eliminated, no matter how ideally 
we design social institutions and a scheme for the distribution of resources. But the envy 
test as an economic test is also an indicator of the fairness of our social institutions: we 
should and can alleviate injustice and respond to reasonable claims of an injustice in the 
distribution of resources. I will briefly sketch how equality of resources approaches this 
ideal. 
Dworkin's ideal of a fair distribution takes place in an imaginary auction: suppose all 
human beings, bearing no economic resources of their own but capable of 'authentic' 
                                                 
21 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, see generally ch. 2. 
22 Dworkin, 'Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog's Approach', Isaac Marks Memorial Lecture, (2001) 
Arizona Law Review, Vol. 43 (2), p. 253-254. 
23 See Dworkin's reply to critics on this point in R Dworkin, 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited', (October 
2002) Ethics, p. 117 n. 19. Also, Guest, Ronald Dworkin, p. 189. 
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choices, arrived as immigrants in an uninhabited island and were each given 100 clam 
shells as a form of currency by which to bid in an auction for the island's resources. The 
bidding determines the price/cost of goods and resources, it continues until the envy test 
is satisfied and is repeated any time that it is necessary in order to re-adjust and produce 
an envy-free distribution. This scheme satisfies the envy test and respects Dworkin's 
fundamental principles of dignity. It respects the principle of equal importance of all 
human beings, as all arrive at the island having the same knowledge and with no extra 
resources of their own. Also, if conducted successfully, the auction is adequately 
ambition-sensitive and respects the special responsibility of each individual as all are 
given equal purchasing power to bid for those resources that best reflect their life plans, 
ambitions and values. This way, it ensures that all are responsible for making their own 
free and authentic choices but lets them bear the cost of these choices and accept the 
impact that they may have on how their lives turn out. Following this, no one would envy 
someone else's bundle of resources because they could have bid for it. Instead, everyone 
is happy with their bundle of resources, as it reflects their individual choices about what 
brings value to their lives, e.g. what kind and amount of work and leisure, material 
resources, social recognition etc. Notice, this means that those found in a worst-off 
position would not necessarily have a justified claim to resources, as their unequal position 
in the distribution of resources is not necessarily morally arbitrary but could be attributed 
to their own free will and choices and not some moral wrong or injustice. But surely, this 
means that we need to establish exactly what can be attributed to free will and choice. 
This may turn out to be an intractable problem in real-world conditions: we may find that 
those who make bad choices with a significantly bad impact on their lives are often those 
who are brought up and live in deprived social and economic conditions or belong to 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. So, how are we to distinguish the morally arbitrary 
circumstances from the morally relevant choices and grant people what they are entitled 
to? To deal with this challenge in a more effective way than Rawls's theory of justice, 
Dworkin supplements his imaginary auction model of a fair distribution of resources with 
the device of a hypothetical insurance market.  
 
2. The Hypothetical Insurance Device as a Safety Net 
 
Outside of Dworkin's imaginary deserted island, the envy test could never be satisfied as 
people come to the world with very different natural endowments and often in unequal 
social and economic conditions. A just society must somehow compensate them for the 
circumstances that cannot be attributed to bad option luck, i.e. they are not the bad 
outcome of their free choices taking 'deliberate and calculated gambles' but are the 
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unfortunate outcome of brute bad luck, 'which is a matter of risks fall out that are not in 
that sense deliberate gambles.' In the real world, insurance schemes give people an 
opportunity and choice to cover themselves against various forms of brute luck, such as 
against the risk of suffering natural calamities, disability or health issues: brute luck is in 
this way converted to option luck. Nevertheless, many people find themselves in these 
circumstances or instances of brute bad luck before they even get the chance to exercise 
their choice to protect themselves through insurance. For instance, they may have pre-
existing conditions, belong to vulnerable or disadvantaged groups or be too young, i.e. 
lacking knowledge and financial resources to take up insure or relying on others to have 
purchased insurance for them. So, our ideal theory of fair distribution should include a 
hypothetical insurance device that aims to mitigate this real-world injustice. Here we have 
to reason about and assume whether, and at what level, a prudent insurer would have 
insured herself, knowing the average risk of someone suffering from various forms of 
brute bad luck but behind a veil of ignorance about whether and to what extent she would 
actually suffer from it.  
Notice here a very important function of the hypothetical insurance device for the 
overall scheme of equality of resources that is often overlooked. Not all instances of brute 
bad luck are deemed as worthy of compensation but only those that a prudent insurer 
would have protected herself against, if she had had a fair opportunity to do so. This does 
not make this strategy 'a compromise or a second-best solution that accepts some injustice 
out of necessity' but it is 'what equality, properly understood, requires'24 in light of the 
principle of special responsibility and the need to show equal concern for the lives of all. 
This test can be the objective criterion that will help us decide if and how much 
compensation society owes to certain individuals. I will explain. 
To be viable and burden individuals with reasonable premiums –calculated, collected 
and redistributed through taxation and tax funded policies- this scheme will mitigate, 
rather than fully compensate, for real-world injustice. As rational people normally do in 
real insurance markets, so prudent insurers in the hypothetical insurance market would 
only devote part of their resources to pay for insurance, while retaining a considerable 
amount for themselves to spend on living well and pursuing their life plans. After all, the 
aim of this scheme is to correct ex ante inequalities in a rational and practicable way but 
                                                 
24 See R Dworkin, 'Equality, Luck and Hierarchy', (2003) Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 31, 
No. 2, p. 190-198, for this and other rebuttals of misinterpretations of the theory of equality of 
resources under the label of 'luck egalitarianism' in Samuel Scheffler's 'What is Egalitarianism?', 
(2003) Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 31, p. 5-39. In greater length, Dworkin explains why a 
real-world justice scheme cannot require society to 'rescue' individuals from all bad luck and, 
therefore, why any rights or claims to resources as compensation cannot be construed to cover the 
whole realm of ideal justice, in Sovereign Virtue, p. 340-346. 
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at the same time make sure to respect the value of liberty, with its emphasis on individual 
responsibility for free choices.25 As I will further discuss below, this test does not rely on 
a person-by-person psychological or factual inquiry about one’s actual disadvantaged 
position due to choices rather than circumstances. Instead, it rests on assumptions about 
the risk that people would have insured against before they even encounter real-world 
choices or circumstances.26 
Following these principles, it is difficult to argue against the reasonable assumption 
that Dworkin makes: in such hypothetical circumstances, we can assume that almost 
everyone would have purchased at least a given level of insurance against accident, 
disease, unemployment, or low wage. Therefore, the hypothesis continues, if some people 
in our non-ideal society are in a disadvantaged position in the distribution of resources 
because of such instances of bad luck, then we may assume that this is due to a failure or 
injustice in ex ante equality and not down to their bad choices, for which they, alone, 
should bear the burden. For instance, we can safely assume that if some people lack basic 
medical care this is due to unfairness in the distribution of resources in our society27 or 
that if they lack basic unemployment insurance this is attributable to circumstances, such 
as that it is unavailable or unaffordable in their community.28 Individuals in such 
circumstances would then have reasonable and justified claims to those resources that 
would bring them up to the level or conditions that we can safely assume they would have 
insured themselves for, had they had the fair opportunity to do so.29 On the other hand, 
resource redistribution through a hypothetical insurance market may well exclude 
cosmetic or vanity insurance, because it is irrational to assume that prudent citizens would 
have paid the extravagant premiums necessary to cover such services.30 Besides, the 
principles of justice explained above31 would also exclude speculative and hugely 
expensive diagnostics and treatments from the hypothetical insurance compensation owed 
to individuals because they would too raise premiums well beyond a practicable and 
affordable for all level of reasonable and necessary medical care and make other public 
and individual goals unfeasible.  
For the same reason, it seems fair to argue that, under a hypothetical insurance scheme, 
those living close to a major international airport would only have a justified claim to 
                                                 
25 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, (Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 115. 
26 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 333-334. 
27 Ibid, p. 315. 
28 Ibid, p. 334. 
29 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, p. 115-116. 
30 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, chapter 8. 
31 Notice that it is always these principles of justice and not other arbitrary or accidental factors 
that determine what we can assume is reasonably owed to individuals. See Dworkin's reply to 
critics on this point in Dworkin, 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited', p. 115-116. 
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compensation for relocation, if a new policy of regular night flights affected their sleep 
but not a right to block that policy from materializing altogether.32 Serious sleep 
disturbance can be detrimental to one's health and private life, so the point here is not 
whether this is an important enough interest to ground a human right. Neither is this 
merely a question of whether the moralistic preferences of the majority played a part in 
this decision to allow or cause sleep disturbance to some or force them to relocate.33 In 
positive obligations claims this is rarely, if ever, the point of contention. Instead, my point 
is that the premium to insure against the risk of suffering from those circumstances would 
be very high and it seems reasonable to assume that a prudent individual would not have 
chosen to protect herself fully against the possibility of an airport expansion near her 
home. These types of infrastructure have an enormous impact on the economy and the 
development of various sectors of the society. One would have to pay an extravagant 
premium to ensure that no airport close to her home will allow regular night flights and 
seriously affect her sleep. Therefore, it is more plausible to suggest that a prudent 
individual would have chosen to pay the more reasonable premium that would ensure that 
she would get a fair amount or favourable conditions in compensation for relocation –if 
the noise had indeed such detrimental effect on their sleep. 
So, leaving such cases aside, Dworkin introduces the hypothetical insurance device 
as a 'safety-net device',34 based on certain principles of justice that flow from his 
interpretation of the abstract requirement to treat all with equal concern and respect and 
the dynamic conception of the values of liberty and equality. He offers a principled way 
of overcoming the intractable problem of distinguishing between outcomes of choices and 
outcomes of morally arbitrary circumstances in the real world. At this point, although I 
cannot discuss them in length in the context of this thesis, it is important to stress the 
reasons why I find the egalitarian criticism of Dworkin's emphasis on the responsibility 
for choice unjustified and misguided. This point is central to Dworkin's theory of equality 
of resources but also crucial for the analysis and twist to his theory that I wish to argue for 
in the following section.  
Firstly, it would be wholly unfeasible but also unfair to suggest that the distribution 
of resources should not be influenced by the choices that individuals make. This position 
rests on the argument that it is impossible to determine whether and to what extent 
                                                 
32 Hatton & Others v. the United Kingdom, (2002) 34 EHRR 1 
33 See Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, pp. 126-
130, who discusses Hatton v. the United Kingdom and concludes that for cases like this the states' 
margin of appreciation is infinite. I would agree that this policy falls within the margin of 
appreciation of the national authorities and does not violate Article 8 but for the different reasons 
that I explain in the text. The difference is significant because it could yield different outcomes in 
other cases. 
34 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, p. 121. 
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individuals are responsible for their choices, given that control over their preferences and 
tastes is illusory and rarely the act of free will. However, Dworkin’s insistence that 
individual responsibility for choice is essential for respecting equality does not rest on the 
latter assumption: indeed, individuals rarely have full control over the preferences and 
tastes that they develop through their upbringing and adult lives, through their family, 
social and cultural environment.35 Some, who are raised in an affluent environment, may 
develop expensive tastes, while others living in deprived socioeconomic conditions 
develop bad habits and work aversion. Dworkin’s crucial point here is that what matters 
is not the origin of these tastes and preferences but our choice to act upon them and assume 
responsibility for acting along or against them.36 If we overlook this distinction between 
choice and the psychological elements behind it, we underestimate 'ordinary people’s 
ethical experience',37 which involves a sense of freedom for choice and responsibility that 
people have for the direction of their own lives. 
Besides, our preferences and tastes may lead us to a particular range of choices but it 
is simplistic to suggest that they lead to very specific choices. Within this range, some 
choices may be abhorrent but others acceptable, some catastrophic for our lives while 
others just negative. One would have to be an incompatibilist, i.e. to believe that 
determinism is incompatible with free will,38 to argue that our inbred preferences and 
tastes dictate very specific choices, deny that we, eventually, stand critically against them, 
and pick one while rejecting other possible ones, forming our character and lives in this 
way. This would not just be contrary to the 'ordinary people’s ethical experience', as 
Dworkin argues, but it would also be at odds with the practice of human rights. People 
argue for their right to vote because they believe that they can and should be responsible 
for self-government and shaping the course of their political affairs. Similarly, people 
believe that they are and should be the ones responsible for directing their private and 
family lives when they argue for their freedom to make their own ethical choices about 
                                                 
35 Dworkin, ‘Do Liberal Values Conflict?’, p. 257, Sovereign Virtue, chs 6 and 7. 
36 Dworkin, 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited', p. 119. 
37 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 289-290 and 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited', p. 118-119. 
38 Roughly, one is an incompatibilist, if she believes that both natural phenomena and human choice 
and action are subject to the laws of causality and that, therefore, this excludes the possibility of 
free will. Compatibilists, on the other hand, distinguish the question of determinism from that of 
free will and argue that we can accept that the former does not extinguish the latter. For the 
distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism see T Honderich, How Free Are You? 
(Oxford: OUP, 1993) and R Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (Oxford: OUP, 
2005). The metaphysics of free will is a very important question underlying all theories that 
implicate ideas such as freedom of choice and action, see Flikschuh, Freedom, p. 6-9. It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to discuss and take a position in this debate but my analysis rests on the 
view that a significant range of people’s ethical experience and sense of self-direction suggests 
that, when designing distributive justice schemes and policies, we must accept an account of 
freedom of choice, in some sense independent from causal determinations that may shape our 
preferences and tastes.  
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who to form personal, sexual or professional relationships with or about the religious or 
political views that they hold and express, about procreating or about ending their lives.39 
Institutions, such as the legislature and the courts treat us as free and responsible in this 
sense too when they grant such rights and regulate the role of government (limit or require 
action) within these spheres of free choice. 
Secondly, the objection that the hypothetical insurance device is disrespectful to those 
who are disadvantaged due to disability, ill-health or deprived socio-economic 
circumstances40 is also misguided and at odds with human rights practice. Unlike the case 
of expensive tastes, where people normally identify themselves with the particular 
lifestyle and should be therefore required to pay the cost for it, people in deprived socio-
economic circumstances regret living in such conditions but also argue that these 
circumstances signify an injustice and that they have justified claims to resources against 
the society to remedy the injustice. Their claims against society are not based on an 
admission of inferiority or inability and request for pity but on an argument about what 
resources and opportunities a fair distribution would have made available to them. Indeed, 
such claims may be justified only on the basis that there is something deeply unjust and 
inegalitarian about the circumstances that these individuals find themselves in.  
Contrary to what the critics argue, the basis for rightful claims to compensation and 
redistribution in these cases is not a self-humiliating complaint of some individuals that 
they suffer from low welfare due to lack of talent, abilities or resources. Instead, it is an 
argument about equal concern and respect: i.e. that their share of resources is less than fair 
because it limits excessively the range of choices and effectively extinguishes the 
individual’s special responsibility to direct her own life.41 And this is not unfair against a 
standard of a minimum acceptable range of choices (which would have been a welfarist 
standard) but based on an argument about what we can reasonably assume that a prudent 
insurer would have insured herself for. In this sense, no humiliation or shameful revelation 
of disadvantage would be required on the part of individuals seeking compensation from 
the state. Recall that the hypothetical insurance device works with assumptions about the 
level of coverage that a reasonable and prudent person would have chosen to undertake 
against the risk of suffering certain forms of disadvantage. This kind of compensatory 
                                                 
39 See my examples from the ECtHR case law in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis. 
40 For instance Wolff argues that, in order to secure the aid offered some individuals will be required 
to make a ‘shameful revelation’ about the personal circumstances that place them in a 
disadvantaged position, in J Wolff, ‘Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos’, (Spring 1998) 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 (2): 97 Similarly, Anderson refers to the case that those claiming 
resources will have to make in their favour as a public declaration of ‘personal inferiority’, in E 
Anderson, ‘What is the Point of Equality’, (1999) Ethics 109 (2): 287-337, at p. 205. 
41 Dworkin, 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited', p. 116-117. 
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mechanism does not require on a person-by-person psychological or other factual inquiry 
about the cause (i.e through choice or circumstance) of their actual disadvantage.  
Notice that in human rights practice too, we may interpret the claims of applicants at 
an international court, such as the ECtHR, as complaints about an injustice in the 
distribution of resources and opportunities. Specifically, they appear to claim that a fair 
distribution of resources would have taken into account their circumstances and would 
have ensured the conditions necessary for actually exercising choices within the spheres 
of freedom granted to them. Recall the claims of applicants with disabilities that I 
discussed in Chapter 2: they argue that the state does not respect their right to private and 
family life because it fails to make or implement provisions (that require resource 
allocation decisions of course, but not necessarily significant) that are necessary to show 
due concern for their circumstances. For instance, they argue that the state ought to make 
special arrangements to ensure that access to public buildings is equally possible for 
people with impaired mobility as it is for other individuals, because the choice to access 
them should be available to all, as a matter of what effective respect for private and family 
life requires.42  
Still, to apply the hypothetical insurance device to the real-world realm of human 
rights adjudication, we need to be able to make justified and safe assumptions about which 
circumstances or forms of disadvantage could warrant claims to resources and which 
conditions for the exercise of choice and responsibility are essential and at what level.  
 
3. Claims to Resources and Positive Obligations to Fair Capabilities 
 
The question that runs through this thesis is how to determine the content of claims to 
resources and positive obligations under the ECHR: what principles can we use to 
approach this difficult task that raises issues of distributive justice and how can we apply 
them in practice to determine the precise content of such rights and duties? 
To shed light to the problem of how we can apply a distributive justice model from 
ideal theory to the non-ideal context of human rights adjudication, I suggest that we look 
closer at how the hypothetical insurance device is designed to compensate for injustice in 
the real world. As I explained earlier, we would not want it to remove risk from people’s 
lives, as this would also deprive them of the ambition and special responsibility for their 
lives. Besides, it would not be feasible to fully eliminate disadvantage in the distribution 
of resources. However, since the hypothetical insurance device aims to function as the 
                                                 
42 See for instance the cases of Botta v Italy, Zehnalova and Zehnal v the Czech Republic, Molka 
v Poland, discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2) of this thesis. 
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best possible safety net device that we can provide, it rests on an assumption: the 
assumption that people would have insured against certain circumstances of brute bad 
luck, in the form of various forms and causes of disadvantage (illness, disability, deprived 
socio-economic background, lack of talent, natural disasters, vulnerability etc). Some 
critics overlook this when they complain that equality of resources is unforgiving to those 
who suffer significant disadvantage from bad option luck or suggest that it is not sensitive 
to the difference in circumstances that are morally relevant for social justice purposes.43 
This could have been so in the absence of a hypothetical insurance device that makes an 
assumption, such as the one I described above. But Dworkin's equality of resources is very 
clear about this: the hypothetical insurance device assumes that people would have insured 
for at least a decent minimum standard of living and quite possibly for other circumstances 
or instances of disadvantage.44 Then, we need to reason about the precise conditions and 
level of that minimum standard of living or the other circumstances or instances of 
disadvantage that people would have insured for, in order to estimate how much 
compensation they may be entitled to in real-world situations, such as when they claim 
resources as a matter of rights. To this I now turn. 
To begin with, I take it that choice/ambition-sensitivity and endowment-insensitivity 
are both essential features of the principle of special responsibility. We cannot plausibly 
and justifiably assign responsibility on an individual for the outcome of her own life unless 
we respect her freely made choices but also, at the same time, show concern for removing 
morally arbitrary obstacles or compensating her for the choices that she would have had, 
if natural and social circumstances were more nearly equal. This means that the state may 
be required to undertake various forms of positive action to 'provide the circumstances in 
which it is fair to ask all citizens to take responsibility for their own lives.'45 Concern here 
would require compensation in any form of positive measures and socio economic 
entitlements, such as legislative provisions, operational measures or social or economic 
benefits. Such a scheme of socio-economic entitlements and positive state duties would 
come closer to treating people as equals by adding to the choices they have, choices they 
would have had were circumstances more nearly equal.46 These more-nearly-equal 
circumstances are, in a way, the enabling conditions of responsibility: without them, it 
may be impossible or unduly costly for individuals to make any free choices and, in the 
                                                 
43 See R Arneson, 'Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare', in (1989) Philosophical Studies 
56, pp. 77-93, G A Cohen, 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', in (1989) Ethics 99, pp. 906-
944, J E Roemer, 'A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner' , E Anderson, 
'What is the Point of Equality', in (1999) Ethics 109, pp. 287-337. 
44 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, ch. 2 and 9, Dworkin, 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited', p. 114. 
45 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 319. 
46 Ibid, p. 334. 
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absence of such conditions, it also seems unfair to hold people responsible for the 
disadvantaged position that they may find themselves in. But what are these enabling 
conditions of free choice and responsibility –required by equal concern and respect- and 
how can we determine their content? In what follows, I will suggest that we can model 
rights-claims to resources in the ECHR, as claims to such conditions and determine their 
content through a modified version of the hypothetical insurance device. 
Suppose that we try to determine the content of claims to resources and positive 
obligations in the ECHR through Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance device. Our 
arguments would have to take the form of the following two-stage hypothesis. Firstly, 
what kind of resources or which enabling conditions would an average prudent insurer 
have insured herself against the risk of lacking, in the specific social and economic 
conditions of a given member state to the ECHR? Secondly, at what level would she have 
insured for each condition or against the risk of each potential disadvantage or instance of 
brute bad luck? Dworkin offers very good examples of how to apply the hypothetical 
insurance test in areas such as health care or social security.47 But claims to resources 
based on the ECHR rights are more complex in terms of the nature and extent of positive 
obligations necessary to satisfy them. For instance, would a prudent insurer have insured 
against the risk of not being able to access public facilities or buildings in her home town48 
or polling stations49 due to impaired mobility?; for the risk of not being able to perform 
everyday personal and social activities autonomously without the assistance of another 
person?;50 for the risk of living in appalling or dangerous prison conditions?;51 for the risk 
of needing renal dialysis52 or access to HIV treatment?53 And supposing we can reasonably 
assume that people would have insured for these instances of brute bad luck, what is a 
reasonable premium that they would have paid and therefore what would be the reasonable 
burden that this would entail for others?  
To deal with these particular questions, it seems to me that it is not enough to form 
arguments aiming to guarantee 'the minimum conditions of a decent life'54 or a 'minimum 
core'55 of rights through the hypothetical insurance device. Such notions are vague and we 
                                                 
47 Ibid, ch. 8  
48 Botta v Italy and Zehnalova and Zehnal v the Czech Republic  
49 Molka v Poland 
50 Sentges v the Netherlands 
51 Pierce v Greece, Dougoz v Greece  
52 Valentina Pentiacova & Ors v Moldova. 
53 D v the United Kingdom, N v the United Kingdom.  
54 Dworkin, 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited'. 
55 For an application of Dworkin's hypothetical insurance device to determine the content of social 
and economic rights as those claims to basic, minimum core needs that we can safely assume that 
a prudent insurer would have covered herself for see O Ferraz, 'An insurance model for the 
justiciability of social and economic rights',  (PhD thesis, 2006). 
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will need to specify exactly what these minimum conditions are in real life with reference 
to specific abilities, disabilities, disadvantages etc. Besides, many of the claims raised 
above are beyond what many people normally understand as minimally decent life. Some 
are claims for protection against destitution or inhuman and degrading living conditions 
whilst in prison or for basic medical care but others are claims for a robotic arm, for access 
to public buildings, for basic education whilst in prison, for expensive medical treatments 
etc. However, all of them can be construed as claims to the essential conditions of freedom 
of choice and responsibility for choice, within the spheres of freedom granted by the 
ECHR provisions: and this may often be more than what we usually describe as the 
minimum conditions of a decent life. 
To construe claims to resources in this way has close affinities with the capabilities 
approach discussed earlier, in Chapter 4. Following Sen's theory of freedom as capability 
for functionings, distributive justice focuses on capabilities, as the conditions that enable 
individuals to exercise choices or functionings, within the spheres of freedom granted to 
them. In a nutshell, recall what I identified as the problem with this theory: the fact that 
both features that make it popular are also liable to make it morally unattractive. Firstly, 
while it draws attention to the pluralism of individual needs, disadvantages, capabilities 
and the functionings that people can actually achieve with them within their formal 
freedom spheres, it risks sliding into subjectivism and welfarism. Secondly, if it points to 
a list of essential capabilities shared by all human beings, it runs the risk of perfectionism. 
The alternative move, namely to view capabilities as the conditions that are essential for 
individuals to be able to plan and live a decent life according to their choices and not their 
personal or impersonal endowments, causes this theory to collapse into equality of 
resources.56 Still, I will suggest that it is not pointless to pay attention to certain features 
of the capabilities approach.  
In the analysis that follows, I assume that the most morally attractive and useful 
interpretation of the capabilities approach is actually one that causes it to collapse into 
equality of resources in the following sense. Indeed, as Dworkin puts it, 'people want 
resources not simply to have them but to do something with them.'57 But the way that the 
state must show concern for people's circumstances or for their capabilities for various 
                                                 
56 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, ch. 7. See also Pogge, 'A Critique of the Capability Approach'. Pogge 
does not argue, like Dworkin, that the capabilities theory is either welfarist or collapses into 
equality of resources; still, he concedes that the difference between the two approaches is 
'overstated' by capabilities theorists and that a better interpretation of an equality of resources 
theory can also be sensitive to natural human diversity, see p. 1 and pp. 32-53. Pereira also argues 
that Dworkin's hypothetical insurance device is sensitive to differences among people that are 
relevant to justice, in 'Means, Capabilities, and Distributive Justice', p. 60. See also my discussion 
of this issue in Chapter 4 ('The Capabilities Approach' section) of my thesis. 
57 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 302-303. 
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functionings is by seeking to mitigate the impact of differences in personal and impersonal 
resources through mechanisms such as the hypothetical insurance device, i.e. 'according 
to most people's understanding of the relative importance of different capability sets'58 and 
not through an objective ranking and equalization of capabilities (as aspects of well-
being). In fact, there are good reasons to suggest that we can better apply Dworkin's 
hypothetical insurance device in the real-world context of human rights adjudication if we 
incorporate in it certain features drawn from such an analysis of the capabilities approach. 
Let us develop these reasons and offer some examples. 
Suppose we construe the hypothetical insurance device as a mechanism that aims to 
determine which circumstances, conditions or capabilities a prudent insurer would have 
insured for and at what level. Understood in this way, the capabilities that must be the 
object of egalitarian concern are only those personal and impersonal endowments that we 
can safely assume that a prudent insurer would have insured against the risk of lacking. 
The content of a claim to resources in the form of compensation for actually lacking those 
capabilities is determined in relation to the premium that people would be willing to pay 
to insure themselves, if they had a fair opportunity to do so.  
This gives a significant benefit to the idea of freedom as capability. Linking the idea 
and content of compensation for disadvantage due to the lack of capabilities with the 
prudent insurer test in this way ensures that we do not run the risk of subjectivism and 
perfectionism. Because, following this interpretation, it is not an objective list of 
capabilities that warrant compensation because they are deemed important for the welfare 
of individuals. Rather, it is only those and to that level that we can assume people would 
have chosen to insure themselves for. This scheme offers a fair and principled way of 
determining the limits and priorities between competing claims to resources and setting 
the threshold of reasonable sacrifice and fair distribution of benefits and burdens.59 The 
prudent insurer test would most likely justify compensation for functionings, such as being 
adequately nourished or avoiding premature mortality, but would not take into account 
other welfarist notions, such as being happy or having self-respect.60 Again, what is crucial 
for the different outcome is the justification: the reason for compensating for the lack of 
certain capabilities is not that these are objectively important for achieving certain 
functionings but that we can reasonably assume that people would have insured (and up 
                                                 
58 Dworkin, 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited', p. 140. 
59 The 'limits-setting' problem is a complex and crucial one for human rights adjudication but also 
for theories of distributive justice, especially when they argue for a social minimum. See S White, 
'Social Minimum', who argues that welfarist theories, including the capabilities approach, have no 
criteria of fairness for limit-setting whereas Dworkin's hypothetical insurance device is a fair but 
also practical way of dealing with this problem. 
60 Sen, Inequality Re-examined, p. 39. 
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to a certain level) against the risk of lacking them. For instance, recall the Hatton case 
discussed earlier: following the prudent insurer test, applicants living close to a major 
international airport would have a justified claim to compensation for the sleep 
disturbance caused by a policy to allow regular night flights. Serious sleep disturbance is 
detrimental to various basic capabilities. However, as I explained earlier, we can 
reasonably assume that a prudent insurer would only have purchased insurance to cover 
the cost of relocation and not the extravagant premium required to block that policy from 
materializing altogether. 
But if we interpret the capabilities approach in this way, Dworkin is right to argue that 
this version of the theory is not distinct from equality of resources as, following 
application of the hypothetical insurance device, the only capabilities deemed worthy of 
compensation would be those covered anyway, i.e. personal and impersonal endowments 
as described by Dworkin's equality of resources. So what does reference to capabilities 
and functionings add to this theory or its application in the real world? 
To begin with, if it is true that people want resources to do or be something with them, 
then developing an account of what functionings, i.e. ' beings and doings '61 they would 
have insured themselves for, will certainly help the application of the hypothetical 
insurance device in a real-world context. Notice that claims to resources and positive 
obligations under the ECHR express a concern that is common in both the theory of 
equality of resources and the capabilities approach. This is the concern that, within the 
spheres of formal freedom of choice and responsibility, certain conditions are essential for 
people to have any meaningful or genuine freedom of choice and for society to assign 
them responsibility for the outcome of their lives.62 Several complaints of people with 
disabilities or people belonging to vulnerable groups, such as asylum seekers or Gypsies 
have reached the ECtHR. These applicants acknowledge that they should make their own 
choices in their private and social life and in developing their personality, in establishing 
relationships with other human beings and participating in the life of the community or in 
public education. However, they claim that states have positive obligations to ensure that 
their freedom of choice is not excessively diminished by morally arbitrary 
disadvantageous circumstances, such as being disabled or belonging to a vulnerable 
group. Specifically, they claim that the state ought to take those steps necessary to provide 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 A similar view is expressed by G Pereira in 'Means and Capabilities in the Discussion of 
Distributive Justice' Ratio Juris, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2006, p. 55-79 and White, 'Social 
Minimum', For a brief discussion and criticism of the idea to apply the theory of minimum 
capabilities up to the threshold of an 'autonomous person' and an equality of resources theory above 
that threshold, see Chapter 4 of my thesis. A similar proposal is put forward by E Anderson, 'What 
is the Point of Equality'. 
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the conditions that are essential to facilitate access to public buildings and spaces,63 as 
well as equal access to education64 or housing,65 in light of their particular needs, abilities 
and cultural background. The hypothetical insurance device aims to secure such 
conditions in a fair way but is highly abstract and underdeveloped. Namely, neither theory 
nor practice has invoked, developed or tested it as a method in identifying the various 
forms in which disadvantage appears in the real world and the conditions, resources or 
capabilities that could be necessary and fair for people to have in the form of compensation 
for real world injustices.  
Besides, it seems to me that any application of the hypothetical insurance device 
cannot avoid referring to capabilities and functionings. That will be necessary in order to 
explain and justify what counts as a disadvantage or a disability and assess the relevance 
and weight of disadvantages and of the lack of personal or impersonal resources in 
determining the kind and level of compensation owed to individuals. Still, that does not 
necessarily mean that our judgments about these questions must be guided by our views 
about the central importance to a decent human life of specific functionings and 
capabilities –this indeed would necessarily tie our theory to the welfarist interpretation of 
the capabilities approach.66 Instead of the criterion of importance, we may base our 
judgments, again, on the findings of the hypothetical insurance device to decide the lack 
of which functionings and capabilities a prudent insurer would have counted as a 
disadvantage. In the same way, we could also determine the level of insurance that a 
prudent insurer would have chosen to purchase for these functionings, i.e. how significant 
she would have judged the risk of suffering from the particular disadvantage to be and 
how much of her resources she would be willing to sacrifice in order to insure against it.  
                                                 
63 See Botta v Italy, Zehnalova and Zehnal v the Czech Republic, Molka v Poland, where applicants 
with impaired mobility claimed that, by failing to make the necessary adjustments in the built 
environment, the state showed no concern for their particular circumstances and needs and left 
them effectively unable to develop and enjoy their private and family life rights under Article 8 of 
the ECHR. Notice that the Court declares all such claims inadmissible and falling within a wide 
margin of appreciation of the national authorities. See my discussion and criticism of this approach 
in Chapter 2 (Section 2). 
64 See D.H. & Others v Chech Republic where the Court found that the difference in treatment in 
schooling arrangements between Roma and non-Roma children showed that the state had not taken 
into account their needs as members of a disadvantaged class and had a disproportionate impact on 
Roma children in particular. For these reasons, the Court found that the state failed to discharge its 
positive obligations for an effective respect of the applicants' right to education.  
65 See Buckley v the United Kingdom and Chapman v the United Kingdom, where the applicants 
claimed that the state had an obligation to offer alternative suitable sites for their caravans to settle, 
in order to mitigate the impact that town planning policies and the denial of planning permission 
had on them in particular as Gypsies. 
66 White argues that Dworkin's theory needs to make reference to capabilities and functionings and 
this means making judgments about their importance to a decent human life, see his 'Social 
Minimum'  
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Applied in this way, an equality of resources approach would not 'dispense with 
judgments about the kind of "'beings' and 'doings' that make a decent human life'"67 but 
could form such judgments in a more impartial and fair way through the hypothetical 
insurance device. In addition, this would allow for much greater variation and adjustment 
to the real-life empirical data of particular communities, cultural priorities and socio-
economic conditions.68 This would accommodate the need for an international court, such 
as the ECtHR to ensure respect for human rights standards, while at the same time drawing 
the limits of the national authorities' margin of appreciation following principles of 
fairness and equal respect and concern for all.69 
Moreover, when trying to apply the hypothetical insurance device to the real world 
context of human rights adjudication we could benefit enormously from the significant 
insights of political philosophers, lawyers, economists and social theorists into the nature, 
variety and impact of disadvantage. For instance, Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit 
have developed a pluralist analysis of disadvantage, revealing through analytical 
philosophy, social theory and empirical research, how disadvantages and risks associated 
with the exercise of choice and opportunity compound each other and cluster together.70 
This has the effect that some people are disadvantaged and insecure in several different 
aspects and functionings and have to bear an impossible or unreasonable cost in order to 
exercise their formal opportunities and choices. For this reason, they propose a 
modification of Sen's and Nussbaum's capabilities approach that also aims to avoid the 
problem of indexing or prioritizing among capabilities (which ones we ought to secure 
and at what level) and determining what equality means with reference to capabilities. 
According to this, government should aim to break up clusters of disadvantage, so that no 
                                                 
67 White, 'Social Minimum'. 
68 Pogge, in his 'A Critique of the Capabilities Approach', in Measuring Justice agrees that although 
capability theories have much more developed accounts of these valuable judgments, i.e. of the 
determinants that influence how people can convert capabilities/endowments into 
functionings/ends (in general, their means into whatever ends they find valuable), equality of 
resources theories too can and need to incorporate such judgments through mechanisms such as the 
hypothetical insurance device. In fact, Pogge argues that resourcist theories can better 
accommodate these judgments within a more plausible public criterion of social justice. In this 
chapter of my thesis I also argue that an interpretation of Dworkin's equality of resources that 
accommodates such judgments is not only more plausible but also a fairer criterion of social justice, 
compared with capabilities theories. 
69 On the 'evidentiary role' that an account of human capabilities may play in providing data about 
important functionings even if that will be used to apply or revise our resourcist criterion of justice 
see Pogge, 'A Critique of the Capabilities Approach', p. 50 and I Robeyns, 'The Capability 
Approach in Practice', (2006) The Journal of Political Philosophy, 14 (3), p. 351-376, who argues 
that, although the capabilities approach is 'radically underspecified' (in that debates are ongoing on 
whether the focus should be on functionings or capabilities, which matter, how much, how to set 
the priorities and solve the indexing problem), it may have 'relative usefulness' depending on the 
context and need not supplement other approaches but instead provide complementary insights to 
more established approaches. 
70 Wolff and De-Shalit, Disadvantage (OUP, 2007) 
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group is overall worst off, and guarantee 'genuine opportunity for secure functionings': for 
the purposes of distributive justice they suggest that we should ask whether it is reasonable 
to expect someone to act one way rather than another.71 They argue that, in order to 
determine the question of burden, this criterion of 'reasonableness' helps us set aside 
questions of moral responsibility and, in this way, helps us avoid the 'metaphysical swamp' 
of trying to identify which individual decisions are down to free choice and which are a 
consequence of some form of disadvantage.72 
To be sure, this is a prioritarian version73 of the capabilities approach: that is, it entails 
that government must give priority to the most urgent task of improving the lives of the 
least advantaged in society by declustering disadvantage as explained above. Furthermore, 
this version disconnects, in part at least, the question of personal responsibility from the 
question of what burdens it is reasonable for society to impose on individuals.74 With this 
move, Wolff and De-Shalit aim to avoid what they consider an unappealing feature of 
Dworkin's theory of equality of resources, when applied in the circumstances of the real 
world, where people make their choices against the background of inequality. In real-
world scenarios, they claim, it is too harsh to hold people responsible for the cost of their 
choices without first equalizing their circumstances.75  
However, this objection clearly overlooks the crucial role and function of the 
hypothetical insurance device in Dworkin's theory of equality of resources, as I explained 
it in the previous section.76 The proper use of equality of resources as a model for a fair 
distribution of resources in the real world presupposes that we first apply the hypothetical 
insurance device. Crucially, and contrary to what Wolff and De-Shalit argue, this does not 
entail an intrusive and implausible inquire about actual personal responsibility: i.e. 
whether particular individuals identify with their choices or tastes. Rather, it requires that 
we make a reasonable assumption about whether and to what extent the average prudent 
insurer would have insured against the risk of suffering various forms of disadvantage. 
Then, based on this assumption we can determine the kind and amount of compensation 
that should be added to the share of resources that individuals receive: now this will be a 
fair share, as it will be the outcome of a device that applies both principles of equal concern 
and respect.  
                                                 
71 Ibid, p. 79-80. 
72 Ibid. 
73 For a prioritarian theory of distributive justice, i.e. giving 'priority to the worst off', see D Parfit, 
'Equality and Priority', in A Mason (ed.), Ideals of Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). 
74 Wolff and De-Shalit, Disadvantage, p. 79 
75 Ibid, p. 13 and 77-78. 
76 Dworkin explains and defends the important role of the hypothetical insurance device in his reply 
to critics who argue that equality of resources is unforgiving in 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited', pp. 
113-118. 
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Moreover, following the 'reasonableness test' that Wolff and De-Shalit suggest, in 
order to justify a claim to compensation, individuals would have to argue that the impact 
of exercising their choices and opportunities, i.e. of acting in this rather than the other 
way, places an undue cost or risk to their functionings and therefore that they lack genuine 
opportunity. This view has some appeal: it makes moral sense to distinguish between 
formal and genuine opportunity for choice and functioning and shift the focus of our 
egalitarian concern to the latter. The principle of effectiveness in the ECtHR case law has 
its roots in the similar idea that states ought to secure 'practical and effective' rather than 
'theoretical and illusory' rights.77 However, as I have tried to demonstrate throughout this 
thesis, the problem lies in determining what is an undue cost, risk or burden. In this 
respect, when applied in a real world context, Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s strategy seems to 
me more indeterminate and potentially humiliating than Dworkin’s hypothetical prudent 
insurer test. According to their theory, an individual seeking compensation would have to 
focus on the details of her actual circumstances and explain the impact that exercise of a 
particular choice or opportunity would have on her various functionings, in order to 
establish in what ways and how much this makes her worst off than others.78 To the 
contrary, the focus of the prudent insurer test is not to establish the degree of inferiority 
of some compared to others in society. Instead, it aims to determine what a fair distribution 
of resources that shows equal concern and respect for all would entail for those particular 
individuals who suffer from bad luck, if they had a fair opportunity to protect against it.79 
This is achieved only through reference to an impartial criterion of fairness, such as the 
assumption embodied in the prudent insurer test. 
Therefore, we may still show concern for genuine opportunity by seeking to determine 
the reasonable cost or burden associated with the exercise of individual choice and 
responsibility through a modified hypothetical insurance device. Specifically, we can try 
to make safe assumptions about how the average hypothetical prudent insurer would have 
determined the relative importance of different capability sets80 and what premium she 
would be willing to pay, in order to insure herself for these different capability sets. 
Following this scheme, our compensatory mechanism will not rely on a definitive list of 
important or universally significant capabilities and functionings but will seek to 
guarantee fair capabilities.  
                                                 
77 In the ECtHR's own words in the cases of Airey, Marckx etc. See Chs.1 and 2 of this thesis. 
78 To be fair, Wolff and De-Shalit explore ways in which their theory can be applied through social 
policy while respecting people in Ch. 10 of their book Disadvantage but I believe that their very 
interesting points do not deal with the problem of establishing the reasonableness of the cost, risk 
or burden.   
79 Dworkin, 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited', p. 116-117. 
80 Dworkin, 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited', p. 140. 
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For instance, let us reconsider the case of Sentges v the Netherlands,81 where the 
young sufferer of a terminal neurological condition was unable to perform everyday 
activities and claimed that the state's health system ought to provide him with a robotic 
arm. I suggest that we should not construe the applicant's right as a claim to a key 
capability that all humans are entitled to because of its importance to their autonomy. As 
I explained in Chapter 4, this would not take into account the idea of personal 
responsibility or the reasonableness and fairness of allocating the cost of such a provision 
to others in society. To the contrary, if we follow a theory of fair capabilities we could 
rely on a reasonable assumption that, in many of the countries where the ECHR applies, 
it is only fair that the state ought to secure that capability because an average prudent 
person would have chosen to ensure against the risk of lacking it. In particular, she would 
have chosen to insure so as to have access to a robotic arm in case she suffered from a 
devastating disability that left her unable to perform any personal everyday action 
whatsoever without the assistance and presence of others and could, only with the help of 
this device, gain some valued autonomy in these personal actions and enjoy some form of 
private life. 
Furthermore, we would not claim that a state violates the right of individuals under 
Article 3 ECHR to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment if it does not provide 
for certain universally accepted minimum living conditions in prisons or if it does not 
ensure the basics of subsistence or a list to key capabilities to the poor. Instead, we would 
make an assumption about the level of insurance that an average prudent person would 
have purchased to cover for certain living conditions, such as for sleep and nutrition, 
hygiene, health etc., in case she faced extreme poverty and deprivation. Not because this 
is what we owe individuals irrespective of any account of personal responsibility and 
based on a universal standard of minimum core obligations82 or set of minimum conditions 
or capabilities. But because this is what an average prudent person would have chosen to 
insure for if she had a fair opportunity to do so, considering the risk and impact of being 
imprisoned for her health, dignity, private and family life but also taking into account the 
specific socio-economic conditions in her society.  
Following this scheme, we could reasonably assume that an average prudent person, 
especially in the socio-economic conditions of most countries that are Members to the 
ECHR, would have insured against the risk of being left for a prolonged period of time 
unable, as a vulnerable asylum seeker, to cater for her most basic capabilities and needs - 
                                                 
81 See Sentges v. the Netherlands, discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
82 As Leijten argues in, 'Defining the Scope of Economic and Social Guarantees in the Case Law 
of the ECtHR', p. 131. It is unclear what principles could help the Court determine what is fair for 
people to claim as part of this minimum core. 
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food, hygiene and a place to live. Finding a violation of Article 3 ECHR in M.S.S. v 
Belgium and Greece could be justified on the grounds that the failures of the Greek 
authorities in the application of their legislation on asylum effectively left (or forced to 
return) the applicant in inhuman or degrading living conditions that a prudent insurer 
would have protected herself for.83 Considering the factor of vulnerability could raise the 
premium that a prudent insurer would have been willing to pay to ensure protection and 
this criterion could be relevant in determining the level of protection owed to other 
individuals in a vulnerable position, e.g. children in abusive or neglectful environments, 
the elderly in care homes, individuals with mental or physical disabilities in detention etc. 
Indeed, the ECtHR has, on numerous occasions, found that states had failed to discharge 
their positive obligations and protect effectively individuals in similar circumstances.84 In 
this way, it acknowledges that respect for the rights of these individuals required more 
concern to be shown, through positive steps, to mitigate the impact of their 
disadvantageous circumstances. 
We can make similar assumptions in other cases of vulnerable individuals, such as the 
applicant in N v the United Kingdom, who was an immigrant facing expulsion and the 
consequent withdrawal of vital HIV treatment that kept her alive.85 That is, it seems 
reasonable to assume, contrary to the Court's finding in that case, that an average prudent 
person within the jurisdiction of most states members to the ECHR would have chosen to 
protect herself against the risk of facing expulsion and discontinuation of essential medical 
treatment for her life-threatening condition. More specifically, given the socio-economic 
conditions in the United Kingdom, we can reasonably assume that, allowing the applicant 
to remain in the country to continue to receive life-saving treatment and not sending her 
to a country where her health would deteriorate rapidly and she would face untimely death, 
is a reasonable and fair burden to impose on others in the particular society. Notice that, 
if we construed the applicant's complaint in this way, we would not be claiming that 
Article 3 ECHR imposes on the state 'a duty to rescue the nearby needy.'86 Rather, we 
                                                 
83 See M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, discussed in Chapter 2. The Court found that Greece had 
failed to discharge its obligations under Article 3 ECHR to ensure that applications for asylum were 
promptly processed and their result communicated to the asylum seeker to mitigate the impact that 
the uncertainty, vulnerability and deprivation would very likely have on their living conditions as 
asylum seekers. Belgium was found to be in breach of the obligation not to return an individual in 
a country where she is likely to suffer inhuman and degrading treatment. 
84 See the cases cited and discussed earlier in Chapter 2, note 23, 27 and 28. 
85 See my discussion of N v the United Kingdom in Chapter 2 (Section 2). 
86 See Mantouvalou, 'N v UK: No Duty to Rescue the Nearby Needy?', pp. 721-724. The author 
points to various criteria that could support an argument for a 'duty to rescue', such as physical 
presence within the jurisdiction of a Member State to the ECHR, such as being in an advanced 
stage of a terminal and incurable illness or other medical condition of similar gravity, the 
availability of medical treatment and support in the receiving country that would ensure a decent 
standard of health and the dramatic deterioration and untimely death in case of removal from the 
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would be claiming that she has a right to those opportunities (avoid expulsion, remain in 
the country) and resources (continue to benefit from medical treatment) that are deemed 
to be part of the applicant's fair share under a fair scheme for the distribution of resources 
in that society. Besides, the fact that the applicant had no entitlement to remain in the 
United Kingdom for other reasons relating to immigration policy is irrelevant here. Her 
justified claim, which is enough to block deportation, is that she is entitled to remain in 
the country because this is what respect for her dignity requires: to be treated with equal 
respect and concern for her particular circumstances. Recall that the Court, on various 
instances, has scrutinized the states' decision and act of deportation and found that it would 
be in violation of the rights of the individual under Article 3, as it would put her at a real 
and foreseeable risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment in the destination 
country.87 
To be sure, application of the hypothetical insurance device to real case law examples 
would require careful reconsideration of all the facts in support of the applicant's 
complaint, the nature and extent of the disadvantage complained of, as well as an 
assessment of the social and economic conditions pertaining in the respondent state. So, 
in cases other than those discussed above, it may be more difficult to make safe 
assumptions about which conditions, capabilities or resources individuals would have a 
fair entitlement to. For instance, we may be able to argue that a case such as Pentiacova 
and Others v Moldova should have been found admissible based on the reasonable 
assumption that an average prudent person would have chosen to insure against the risk 
of suffering from chronic renal failure. Moreover, the assessment of whether the state had 
an obligation to provide comprehensive haemodialysis treatment, as the applicants 
claimed, or partly funded by the individual, as the government argued, and at what 
percentage, should not have been left to the margin of appreciation of the national 
authorities. Instead, the Court should have discussed and assessed the socio-economic 
conditions pertaining in Moldova and could have attempted to determine the level at 
which an average prudent person would have insured against the risk of suffering from 
                                                 
country and withdrawal of treatment. She also suggests a moral justification for grounding a duty 
to rescue the nearby needy, as opposed to any weaker obligations that we may have to rescue or 
help the distant needy. However, as I try to show in the text, these significant considerations, as 
well as considerations about the cost of this treatment should better be incorporated in an argument 
about the share of resources that an individual is entitled to as a matter of respect for her dignity, 
specifically determined through a scheme such as Dworkin's hypothetical insurance device. This 
scheme would ensure that the applicant would be treated with respect for her dignity rather than 
with pity or humanitarian concern. In this way, the duty under Article 3 ECHR is not to rescue but 
to respect the nearby needy: in particular, to secure her rights to resources properly understood and 
fairly determined. 
87 See for instance Soering v the United Kingdom, Chahal v the United Kingdom, Saadi v the United 
Kingdom, discussed in Chapter 2. 
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such an illness. This could produce a finding such as that finally reached by the Court but 
its fairness would have been examined and justified in a more thorough, coherent and 
principled way.  
Besides, note that, contrary to what some critics falsely assume, such a fair capabilities 
scheme would also distinguish between two persons with identical incomes and other 
primary goods and resources. It would compensate the one who is formally free but unable 
to avoid undernourishment or exclusion from all aspects of social life due to disability or 
a particular cultural or identity difference or vulnerability: because this device seeks to 
compensate for personal and impersonal resources but through a different compensatory 
mechanism.88  
Moreover, equality of resources supported by a hypothetical insurance device, such 
as that described above, would not merely entail cash transfers through taxation. To the 
contrary, we may interpret the hypothetical insurance device as requiring compensation 
that may take various forms, other than cash handouts. It could take the form of legislative 
measures, institutional or social policy changes etc.89 Dworkin rightly protests against the 
critics that 'a distribution that a society achieves is a function of its laws and policies, not 
only its property and tax laws, but the full, complex legal structure that its citizens and 
officials enact and enforce.'90 When conducting the prudent insurer test, we ask whether a 
prudent insurer would have insured against a particular disadvantage and up to what level 
or premium. But we may also inquire as to what is the best way to use the resources that 
society collects through taxation: it could be benefits, better regulation in an area of human 
activity or alterations of certain aspects of the social structure, so that certain conditions 
no longer represent a disadvantage.91 And to this latter task, our inquiry about 
                                                 
88 See A Brown, who defends in this way Dworkin's equality of resources against Sen's 'capabilities 
objection' in his Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Equality. Domestic and Global Perspectives 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 70-73.  
89 As I explain in the text, given that this is a plausible understanding of the hypothetical insurance 
device it seems unfair to treat Dworkin's equality of resources as offering 'external resources to 
make up for a lack of internal resources'. For this charge, see J Wolff, 'Disability Among Equals' 
in K Brownlee and A Cureton, Disability and Disadvantage, (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Besides, equal concern may require that, in applying the hypothetical insurance device, we must 
also attend to some, but not all, of the concerns expressed by a strategy of status enhancement, i.e. 
the strategy to modify technology, laws, the built environment or social attitudes out of respect for 
people with disabilities. Again, the prudent insurer test is not meant to calculate what should be 
handed out to individuals but to determine the fair cost of any measure (of any kind) that individuals 
may claim or the society may decide to undertake. For the strategy of 'status enhancement' see 
Woff, as above, esp. p. 127-132. 
90 See R Dworkin, 'Equality, Luck and Hierarchy', p. 197-8. 
91 This could be the focus of positive measures that aim to show respect for people's 'unpopular' 
choices (such as gender reassignment) through recognition, adaptation of legislation and social and 
cultural policies. See S Segall, 'Is Health (Really) Special? Health Policy between Rawlsian and 
Luck Egalitarian Justice', (2010) Journal of Applied Philosophy, p. 10. 
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disadvantage or the conditions necessary to overcome it could converge with that of those 
working in versions of the capabilities approach, such as that discussed above. 
Interpreted this way, it is unfair to say that equality of resources adopts a 'medical' or 
an 'economic model' of disability, i.e. one that assumes that disability is a purely physical 
and mental condition or a condition that makes life economically harder.92 To the contrary, 
in its best moral light, the hypothetical insurance device is closer to the 'social model' of 
disability. That is, it could acknowledge that much of disability policy should be directed 
at a whole range of social, cultural and material factors, e.g. facilitating accessibility to 
public buildings and spaces through public investment, but also through changes to 
building codes, adjustments in the workplace, the language used, education about 
disability and difference and various other measures that aim to reduce the impact of 
impairment.93 Most importantly, it is the only egalitarian strategy that does not pre-
determine specific circumstances, e.g. deafness or autism, as instances of brute luck but 
allows the hypothetical insurance device to determine whether and to what extent a 
prudent insurer would have seen that as a source of disadvantage or as just a difference. 
Following this, in a social environment that is structured to respect, accommodate and 
celebrate difference and diversity, a prudent insurer may have chosen to spend less or none 
at all to insure herself against the risk of those circumstances. Whereas, we can safely 
assume that one would have chosen to pay a great premium to insure against the risk of 
finding herself in such circumstances in a society that discriminates against or excludes 
people with disabilities.  
For instance, most Member States to the ECHR claim to be or aspire to become 
inclusive societies that respect and seek to accommodate the needs of people with 
disabilities. In Chapter 2, I discussed examples of the case law where the ECtHR 
acknowledges that states may have positive obligations to accommodate the needs of 
people with disabilities. However, I highlighted the fact that the Court is reluctant to 
scrutinize these cases, as it has no principles at hand by which to determine the precise 
content of such claims to resources and positive obligations. Consequently, any existing 
legislative framework is not applied in practice, the Court's reasoning is incoherent and 
leaves these issues to a wide margin of appreciation of the national authorities and the 
individual remains effectively unprotected. The reasoning in these cases would be more 
consistent and the outcomes of these cases more likely fair if based on arguments formed 
through Dworkin's hypothetical insurance device.  
                                                 
92 J Wolff, Ethics and Public Policy, A Philosophical Inquiry, (Routledge, 2011), ch. 7 'Disability', 
esp. p. 149-151. 
93 Contrary to what Wolff argues in, Ethics and Public Policy, A Philosophical Inquiry (2011), p. 
151. 
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Applying this hypothetical scheme, we could make a reasonable assumption that an 
average prudent person would have chosen to insure herself against the risk of lacking the 
conditions and capabilities necessary to access public buildings and facilities open to the 
public or public beaches and polling stations. Based on this, for example, in Zehnalova 
and Zehnal and in Botta the Court could have found a direct and immediate link between 
the applicants' private life and their ability to access the post office, police station, 
specialist doctors' surgeries and lawyers' offices, cinemas and the town swimming pool in 
their home town or to public beaches, because it seems very reasonable to assume that an 
average prudent person would have considered access to these buildings, facilities and 
public spaces as an essential capability or condition of her 'right to personal development 
and her right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the 
outside world.'94 Also, we can reasonably assume that the average prudent person would 
not have made that choice dependent on whether she would need to use these facilities 
frequently or use only those close to her home. This condition would defeat the very point 
of having a right to develop her personality and participate in the social life of the 
community: she would want to ensure that, like all other individuals, she too would have 
access if, whenever and to whatever buildings or spaces she chooses to visit. The precise 
coverage that a prudent insurer would have chosen to purchase and the corresponding 
level of compensation justified would have to be determined also with reference to the 
social and economic conditions in the particular state. But it seems reasonable to assume 
that it would have covered the cost of making necessary arrangements for disabled access 
in public buildings or the minimal cost of overseeing the application of existing legislation 
by private parties that offer services to the public.  
In the same way, in Molka v Poland, the Court could have found a violation of the 
applicant's rights as the cost of ensuring adequate access to polling stations in particular 
for people with disabilities could be minimal and would have definitely been worth 
insuring for under a hypothetical insurance scheme. We can make a safe assumption that 
an average prudent person would have chosen to ensure that she would be facilitated in 
exercising the fundamental right to vote. After all, that could have been achieved not only 
through installing ramps to polling stations but also through cost-free provisions in the 
relevant legislation to facilitate voting, e.g. by allowing a member of the polling station 
staff to cast the vote on behalf of a disabled person.  
In all these cases, it is true that the national authorities, as the Court often states, are 
in direct and continuous contact with the vital forces and socio-economic conditions of 
                                                 
94 Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic, section A and also Botta v Italy, both discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2 (Section 2). 
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their countries and are entrusted with protecting the ECHR rights while evaluating and 
observing local needs and conditions.95 However, that does not necessarily mean that they 
should be afforded a margin of appreciation in the assessment of whether their choices in 
the distribution of resources and opportunities unfairly disadvantage some individuals, in 
that they show less than equal respect and concern for the circumstances, conditions or 
capabilities that they are left with within their formal spheres of freedom. Indeed, the 
applicants' complaints can be seen as challenging the distribution of resources in their 
society as unfair. In fact, if we view their claims through Dworkin's hypothetical insurance 
scheme, as I propose, many of them would have to have been substantively examined, and 
possibly justified, as it seems reasonable to assume that a fair distribution of resources in 
the particular countries would have mitigated the disadvantage suffered by the particular 
applicants.  
Moreover, through the hypothetical insurance device, individuals and groups that find 
themselves in disadvantageous circumstances could have justice claims not only to 
resources equivalent to what others have but also to additional compensatory resources, if 
that were deemed necessary to show equal concern and respect for their very particular 
circumstances despite living in an otherwise inclusive and favourable social 
environment.96  In this way, this approach could also incorporate some of the concerns of 
'difference'97 and 'recognition'98 theorists. There is nothing in the structure of the 
hypothetical insurance device that prevents it from paying attention to the cultural or 
'relational' aspect of equality,99 i.e. in creating and fostering equality respecting relations 
                                                 
95 See for instance Chapman v the United Kingdom discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2). Also note 
that the Court has, on many instances substantively examined and found that national policies that 
deprived individuals of certain social benefits or reduced them significantly imposed a 
disproportionate or excessive burden on them and, therefore, violated their rights. See for instance, 
Asmundsson v. Iceland and Moskal v Poland, discussed in Chapter 4, note 49, where the Court 
found that the national authorities had not struck a fair balance: no matter how well justified by a 
legitimate aim, a policy that divested the applicants of social security benefits that they were 
receiving was excessive and disproportionate. 
96 Pogge, in 'A Critique of the Capability Approach', p. 52-53, does not explain why a resourcist 
like Dworkin could not justify such justice claims through his hypothetical insurance device (that 
could give rise to perfect duties that correlate with rights).  
97 I M Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
98 N Fraser and H Axel, Recognition or Redistribution? (London: Verso. 1998). 
99 For social equality and social egalitarianism and a discussion of how they are supposedly distinct 
from but not incompatible with liberal egalitarian theories of distributive justice see C Fourie, F 
Schuppert and I Wallimann-Helmer, 'The Nature and Distinctiveness of Social Equality: An 
Introduction' in C Fourie, F Schuppert and I Wallimann-Helmer (eds.), Social Equality. On What 
It Means To Be Equals, (Oxford University Press, USA, forthcoming 2015), now available in 
http://www.academia.edu/8036895/The_Nature_and_Distinctiveness_of_Social_Equality_-
An_Introduction. As I briefly suggest in the text, it seems to me that charges about the inadequacy 
of Dworkin's theory of equality to accommodate concerns about relations of equality among 
members of a society by theorists of social or relational equality are misplaced, if they assume that 
this theory is solely focused on some 'thing' that must be distributed equally. This underestimates 
the point that Dworkin's overarching principle of equal respect and concern entails a fundamental 
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between individuals. That is, of course, as long as we can make safe assumptions that an 
average prudent person would have insured herself against a racist, xenophobic, 
homophobic, sexist or discriminating environment. Or, as long as we can reasonably 
assume that a fair distribution of resources and opportunities would provide a careful 
regulation of the private sector and relations, the public administration, the natural or built 
environment or the 'food environment',100 in an attempt to show equal concern and respect 
for vulnerable groups, such as the LGTB community, Roma,101 people with disabilities102 
or those at risk of exploitation, forced labour or trafficking.103  
For instance, we can reasonably assume that, within liberal, tolerant societies that 
generally value and protect the freedom of choice of individuals in how best to develop 
their personality and form personal relationships, an average prudent person would have 
insured to have her post-gender reassignment identity fully recognized, respected and 
protected in practice.104 Likewise, having had a fair opportunity to do so, a prudent person 
living in a society that has a constantly evolving understanding of the institution of 
marriage and of family relationships would certainly have insured to have equal access to 
institutions such as civil union and marriage, irrespective of her sexual orientation or 
gender changes.105 Dworkin's hypothetical insurance device would also entail 
                                                 
right and obligation to be treated with a certain attitude. Besides, this criticism underestimates the 
fact that the distributive aspect of Dworkin's principle of equal respect and concern is meant to be 
indicative of and reflecting that attitude and not the other way around. This requires further 
discussion that is beyond the scope of my argument in this thesis. 
100 UK campaign group Action on Sugar (www.actiononsugar.org) has recently called for 'sugar 
tax' to reduce child obesity rates but also for better regulation of the food industry, marketing and 
advertisement targeting children. See BBC Health News report 'Health Group calls for 'sugar tax' 
to cut child obesity', 22 June 2014. Notice that a low cost measure, such as passing the relevant 
legislation or amending existing policies, could benefit certain vulnerable groups (e.g. children) 
enormously and significantly relieve the public health services' budget at the same time. Of course, 
this will come at a loss of income for the profitable business of marketing, advertising and selling 
this type of food (for the state too in the form of revenue) but such considerations cannot be valid 
reasons for allowing a harmful food environment (if this is so). 
101 See for instance, my discussion, in Chapter 2, of cases relating to the concern and respect owed 
to Roma people by the state assess the particularly disadvantageous impact that land regulation or 
educational policies may have on their rights to private and family life or their right to education, 
e.g. in Chapman v the United Kingdom and D.H. & Others v. Chech Republic respectively. 
102 See my discussion of how we can construe ECtHR cases relating to the rights of persons with 
disabilities in light of Dworkin's hypothetical insurance device earlier in this chapter. 
103 The ECtHR has taken such an approach against exploitative relationships and activities in 
Siliadin v France (2006) 43 EHRR 16 and Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, where it found that states 
have positive obligations to put in place clear criminal law legislation and adopt all operational 
measures to protect vulnerable individuals sufficiently from being enslaved or trafficked. 
104 See Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom, discussed in Chapter 1, where the Court also 
noted that 'where a State has authorised the treatment and surgery…financed or assisted in 
financing the operations…it appears illogical to refuse to recognise the legal implications of the 
result to which the treatment leads', in para. 78. 
105 In Vallianatos & Others v Greece (2014) 59 EHRR 12, the Court found that the Greek state had 
not shown it to have been necessary, in pursuit of the legitimate aims invoked by the law 
introducing civil unions, to bar same-sex couples from entering into such unions. The Court's 
approach has been more restrained in allowing post-operative transsexuals to remain married, e.g. 
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compensation or protection in the form of social policy change to allow homosexuals to 
adopt children: living in a society that fully recognizes and shows equal respect to all 
irrespective of their sexual orientation an average prudent person would also have ensured 
that she would be given an equal opportunity in the adoption process.106 Of course, under 
such a scheme for the distribution of resources and opportunities in a society that does not 
allow the prejudices of some to influence what others are entitled to, an average prudent 
person would have protected herself against dismissal from work on the grounds of the 
prejudices of others related to gender, sexual orientation or HIV-positive status.107  
Only, under equality of resources any state action aiming to establish and protect 
relationships of equality among individuals would have to respect the special 
responsibility of each individual for the ethical choices in her life. This means that any 
measures aiming to foster more 'equal' relations between members of a society would be 
justified only so long as they do not rest on a choice about the personal virtues that a good 
life reflects or violate ethical independence by denying people the freedom and 
responsibility to make their own decisions about matters of ethical foundation.108As I 
explained earlier in this thesis, ethical arguments will not be permissible in forming 
assumptions such as those I briefly sketched throughout this chapter. Instead, arguments 
and principles of political morality about conserving scarce resources or respecting the 
moral rights of others or forcing people to pay taxes, in order to fund fair education or 
health schemes, will not just be permissible but, also, essential.  
                                                 
in Parry & Anor v. United Kingdom, Schalk and Kopf v Austria and the very recent Hamalainen v 
Sweden, discussed in Chapter 1.  
106 See these cases discussed earlier in Chapter 2: Frette v. France, where the Court found no 
violation of the applicant's rights not to be discriminated against in the exercise of their Article 8 
right to private and family life. In this case, the limitation of the applicants' right was deemed 
justified because it was in pursuit of a legitimate aim – i.e. the protection of the health and rights 
of children. Contrary to this, in EB v France, para 91, the Court declared that 'where sexual 
orientation is in issue, there is a need for particularly convincing and weighty reasons to justify a 
difference in treatment regarding rights falling within Article 8.' Following this, it decided that 
French authorities violated the applicant's rights because they rejected her application for an 
authorization to adopt largely based on her homosexuality and the lack of parental referent in the 
household, which were both not legitimate reasons for the different treatment. 
107 See respectively Emel Boyraz v Turkey, (2015) 60 EHRR 30 and Smith and Grady v the United 
Kingdom, discussed in Chapter 1 and I.B. v Greece, Application No. 552/10 (3 October 2013). 
108 Such as those related to religious beliefs and in personal commitments of intimacy and to ethical, 
moral and political ideals, except when necessary to protect the life, security, or liberty of others. 
See Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 368-369. Of course, the question then arises whether, if 
they follow this fundamental principle, theories of relational or social equality are indeed distinct 
from Dworkin's egalitarian theory of distributive justice. It seems to me that they can either collapse 
into equality of resources (with emphasis on a development of the hypothetical insurance device 
as I argued in this chapter) or risk sliding into perfectionism or paternalism. But it is beyond the 
scope of my thesis to discuss this in detail. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this thesis, I set out to explore the question of what positive obligations and claims to 
resources are inherent in an effective respect for the ECHR rights. My aim was twofold: 
firstly, to establish that we must look for answers to this question within a theoretical 
framework outlined by certain values and principles of political morality; secondly, to 
suggest an answer based on a particular interpretation of the values of liberty and equality 
and the fundamental principle of equal concern and respect. Before setting out to advance 
my thesis, I made sure to clarify and stress where we cannot and should not look for 
answers: in flawed categorizations and distinctions between different types of rights and 
duties and in formalistic or conventional interpretations of the ECHR. 
In particular, I explained in the Introduction to this thesis that all rights, civil and 
political or social and economic, may entail both negative and positive obligations and 
that both kinds of rights and obligations depend on resources and involve resource 
allocation decisions. I argued that it is a fundamental interpretive question about the 
content of ECHR rights to distinguish which claims with resource allocation implications 
fall within the legitimate role and the institutional competence of the ECtHR to decide and 
which belong to the margin of appreciation of the national authorities. Reference to the 
very notion of the margin of appreciation is part of the question and not the answer to our 
problem. On the other hand, neither the so-called principle of effectiveness can provide 
us with guidance, as it lacks any normative content: it merely tells us that states must 
protect the ECHR rights in a 'real and practical' way and not render them 'theoretical or 
illusory.' This promise for a proactive human rights ethic remains unfulfilled or 
misguided, if not underpinned by a set of principles, by which we could coherently decide 
which positive obligations in particular are inherent in an effective respect for the ECHR 
rights.  
To begin with, in Chapter 1, I highlighted the flaws of a 'conventional effectiveness 
approach' adopted by some scholars and judges who are eager to set limits to a potentially 
far-reaching quest for effectiveness and to what they see as the exercise of judicial 
discretion beyond the Court's institutional role. I explained that neither the plain meaning 
of the text nor the concrete intentions of the drafters can help us answer the question of 
what effective respect for the ECHR requires. Theory and practice point to the argument 
that choices in interpretation are necessary and within the role of the ECtHR judge in easy 
and hard, controversial cases and we need substantive moral reasoning to resolve 
disagreement about the meaning and requirements of the ECHR provisions. I explained 
how formalist and originalist approaches have largely been abandoned in the practice of 
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the ECtHR and discredited in theory. They have given way to a 'substantive effectiveness' 
approach: an evolutive interpretation of the Convention, as a living instrument, i.e. trying 
to discover what effective respect requires in the present day conditions and in light of 
substantive moral arguments about the essence of the rights at stake and the values that 
underpin them. Still, judges and scholars are keen to point to other conventional limits, 
such as the lack of consensus, especially in positive obligations cases that are considered 
more sensitive and controversial, in that they have budgetary or social policy implications. 
Besides, reference to a wide margin of appreciation in these difficult cases usually implies 
uncertainty and unease about whether these matters should really be treated as human 
rights issues that the ECtHR should decide.  
For this reason, I critically reviewed case law examples that rely on the idea of 
consensus as a justification to deny the existence of certain positive obligations and grant 
states a wide margin of appreciation. I explained how this contradicts the Court's admitted 
role as the ultimate guardian of the substantive effectiveness of certain fundamental rights 
of individuals: these rights are meant to offer certain fundamental, inviolable moral claims 
against more powerful authorities and would therefore remain illusory if their content and 
limits were ultimately determined by national or international majorities. Finally, I noted 
that, although there is a noteworthy shift towards substantive moral reasoning, the Court's 
reluctance to apply this in positive obligations cases is due to the difficulty in dealing with 
questions about what claims to social policies or resources individuals are entitled to under 
the ECHR rights.  
In Chapter 2, I discussed representative examples of two categories of cases that 
illustrate this disparity between, on the one hand, the progress in some areas of the case 
law in the search for substantive arguments and criteria about what positive obligations 
are inherent in effective respect and, on the other hand, the problems in identifying the 
principles for those claims that the Court fears may have significant resource allocation 
implications. I demonstrated how the Court reviews substantively claims to procedural 
obligations relating to the administration of justice or the conduct of public authorities, 
the police and the military services and has even developed certain criteria, by which to 
judge whether states have failed to comply with these typical state functions and 
responsibilities. I then drew attention to the fact that the Court is much more restrained 
when dealing with claims that appear to be closer to welfare state responsibilities or have 
wider social policy or resource allocation implications. My aim was to reveal how the lack 
of a set of principles about which claims to resources and positive obligations are justified 
as a matter of ECHR rights dissuades the Court from dealing with many of these claims 
altogether or leads it to grant states a wide margin of appreciation based on poor reasoning 
and justification. My close examination of how these claims are, or could be, understood 
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was intended to point to the need to focus our discussion to the substantive interpretive 
work that is required in order to determine the content of claims to resources and positive 
obligations, in light of the values and principles underlying the ECHR rights. 
My analysis then turned on the value of liberty as the core value underlying the ECHR 
rights. My aim in Chapter 3 was to appraise three different conceptions of the value of 
liberty that could be or have been used to tackle the interpretive question of what effective 
respect for the ECHR rights requires and defend the one I believe could provide a 
principled account of claims to resources and positive obligations under the ECHR. I 
examined Isaiah Berlin's interpretation of the value of liberty, which is often impliedly 
relied upon by scholars and judges. My aim was to reveal the unappealing implications of 
Berlin's account of liberty construed independently of the moral demands of other values 
–implications that those who subscribe to this account of liberty and rights often 
underestimate. This distinctive feature of Berlin's theory, I argued, divests a conception 
of liberty of any evaluative considerations of what it is that we value about liberty and, 
therefore, of what is morally worthy of respect and protection.1 In this way, it offers an 
implausible and unattractive account of freedom, whereby claims to choices, 
opportunities, resources and positive obligations are formed in disregard of morally 
relevant considerations about what is rightful for people to claim. In this way, it offers no 
solution to our problem, which I have identified as distinctively moral: how much and 
what kind of choices, opportunities or resources individuals are entitled to as a matter of 
effective respect for the ECHR rights.  
On the other hand, I argued against scholars who appeal to Joseph Raz's interest-based 
theory of rights as a basis for an account of positive obligations under the ECHR. I closely 
examined its moral foundations and found that it poses a challenge for our understanding 
of the moral point of human rights because it relies on a conception of liberty in light of 
the value of autonomy, understood as a social and perfectionist value. The importance of 
individual choice is downplayed and rights lose their distinctive moral force. Individuals 
will have rights or claims to resources (and the state corresponding duties) based only on 
those autonomy interests that have emerged as valuable in social practices and are 
established as worthy of protection and promotion according to the particular conception 
of the good favoured by the perfectionist state. Following Dworkin, I argued that this 
approach disregards the fundamental principles of liberal neutrality and the principle of 
special responsibility of each individual for matters of ethical foundation, i.e. about the 
right way to live one's life and about what adds value or brings success to one's life. At 
                                                 
1 Recall here my clarification in the Introduction that my reference is to political morality, i.e. the 
principles about how we should treat others and not to personal morality or ethics, that is the best 
way to live one's own life.  
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the same time, I tried to show that although this approach entails wide-ranging duties to 
promote the conditions of autonomy, it allows the perfectionist state to provide the 
resources or opportunities necessary for the options and choices that it finds conducive to 
autonomy. This, I suggested, is at odds with the very point of human rights and the purpose 
and practice of the ECHR, which is aimed at guaranteeing certain fundamental moral 
rights of individuals against the preferences or competing interests of the majority or the 
prevailing social norms, practices and conceptions of the good.  
In contrast to these two approaches, I developed and reinforced Dworkin's integrated 
account of liberty and equality. Construed as integrated with equality, liberty includes the 
ways in which we believe people ought to be free, having taken into account the demands 
of equality, fairness and social justice. I argued that the most attractive feature of this 
theory is that claims to resources and positive obligations depend on a prior theory about 
what people are entitled to according to a fair and equitable distribution of resources. That 
is, once their content is determined in this way, as fair shares in a just distribution of 
resources, they can be strong and justiciable claims, as we want rights to be. Besides, my 
analysis in the last section of Chapter 3 was intended to reveal a further appealing 
consequence of interpreting liberty and rights in this way. Unlike Berlin's theory, this 
conception of freedom and rights depends on moral evaluative judgments and unlike Raz's 
outlook, these moral evaluative judgments are not framed according to a particular 
conception of the good, such as well-being or autonomy. Instead, they are shaped by what 
Dworkin famously calls the fundamental ideal of equal respect and concern. This, firstly, 
requires that government allow and respect the freedom and special responsibility of 
individuals to make their own choices regarding matters of ethical foundation. Secondly, 
and most crucially for my thesis, this ideal also demands government to show concern for 
the morally arbitrary disadvantageous circumstances that render this freedom of choice 
worthless and prevent individuals from exercising it in any meaningful way. My analysis 
aimed to establish that it is essential to shift the focus of the debate about the content of 
claims to resources and positive obligations to this question: which disadvantageous 
circumstances indicate an unfairness in the distribution of resources or that some are left 
with less than a fair share of resources. 
Having established that we better understand claims to resources and positive 
obligations as claims to fair shares according to a just distribution of resources I examined, 
in Chapter 4, three approaches that appear to offer a way to determine what people may 
claim as a fair share. Firstly, I explained that the idea of proportionality and a fair balance 
between competing interests, that is prevalent in constitutional and human rights practice, 
is best understood as expressing a concern about determining a reasonable or fair 
relationship (a 'fair balance' as the ECtHR puts it) between competing claims to freedoms 
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and resources. However, I tried to show that the proportionality test is used in practice as 
an institutional tool that often falls short of serving this purpose. This happens because it 
is usually conducted in the absence of what is essential to make the balancing actually 
fair: a coherent set of principles about what is a fair and equitable distribution of benefits 
and burdens in society. Without such a theory, we risk using the proportionality test in an 
ad hoc and arbitrary way, hoping only, rather than ensuring that we come up with correct 
and fair outcomes. Indeed, the practice of the ECtHR has come under intense criticism for 
the incoherent outcomes in the application of the balancing test of and proportionality.  
Furthermore, I argued, in the same vein as others have done, that a utilitarian or cost-
benefit outlook does not provide an attractive theory to underpin the proportionality test 
as it is contrary to the point of this test, properly understood, violates the fundamental 
principle of equal concern and respect and is incompatible with the very idea of human 
rights. Neither can a subjective account of autonomy interests help us determine the 
rightful claims of individuals to a fair share of the available resources. Because it allows 
prima facie rights to pretty much everything that is considered as essential from the point 
of view of the agent, without clear guidance about where to draw the fair and reasonable 
limits of these claims in the second, balancing stage. Instead, following up the discussion 
from the last section of Chapter 3, I explained that the moral concern behind the idea of 
proportionality is best served by liberal egalitarian principles, which draw our attention to 
the fairness than the (ad hoc) balancing feature of the proportionality test. Specifically, I 
argued that to use this institutional tool in an effective way, the Court should aim to 
establish that an individual's claim is reasonable or proportional if it is justified under a 
fair scheme of distribution of benefits and burdens in society.  
I examined two such theories of fair distribution of resources that are broadly 
egalitarian, in that they are both interpretations of the fundamental egalitarian principle 
that government must treat all with equal concern and respect. The minimum core 
approach, I explained, would fix the content of claims to resources and positive 
obligations only with reference to the importance of certain interests, needs or goods, 
independently of morally relevant considerations of personal responsibility and the 
reasonable burden that may be imposed on others in light of the overall available 
resources. I argued that determining the share of resources that individuals are entitled to 
in this way violates the fundamental principle of equal concern and respect since it treats 
as unfair distributions that are not necessarily inherently unfair. Because it does not 
somehow accommodate the possibility that differences in people's ability to satisfy these 
basic needs or have these basic good may be due to their free and responsible choices. 
The capabilities theory too, as developed by Amartya Sen, attempts to answer the 
question of what share of resources individuals can rightly claim. But, it rests on welfarist 
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notions to define the rightful claims of individuals and therefore suffers from the problem 
of subjectivism: a great variety of personal preferences about what increases that welfare 
would be deemed morally relevant in determining a share of resources as fair and rightful. 
On the other hand, I clarified that we run the risk of perfectionism if we follow Martha 
Nussbaum's capabilities theory and determine claims to resources based on a list of key 
capabilities that are deemed universally important. Specifically, such a list can only be 
drawn with reference to a particular conception of what is good or valuable in life but this 
contradicts the principle of special responsibility, which stipulates that people must make 
ethical choices for themselves. Still, I argued, we have good reasons not to abandon the 
capabilities approach altogether. In fact, I suggested that it could offer significant 
complementary insights to other theories of distributive justice. For instance, it can help 
us determine the various ways in which morally arbitrary circumstances and 
disadvantages affect the actual enjoyment of rights and freedoms formally granted to all. 
But, notice, my suggestion was that these considerations are meant to be complementary 
in the sense that they will have to be incorporated in and justified on the basis of a theory 
that integrates the demands of liberty and equality better than both the capabilities and the 
minimum core approach. 
This analysis opened the way for following up on my discussion (in Chapter 3) of an 
account of claims to resources and positive obligations based on Dworkin's integrated 
conception of liberty and equality. In Chapter 5 I set out to further explore the better 
justification, greater attractiveness and possible application in a real world context of this 
ideal account, that integrates respect for personal responsibility for the free choices of 
individuals about their lives with concern for mitigating the impact of morally arbitrary 
circumstances and disadvantages that hinder the effective exercise of these choices within 
their spheres of freedom. I closely examined Dworkin's theory of equality of resources 
with a view to defend an interpretation of his hypothetical insurance device as a strategy 
for determining the content of claims to resources and positive obligations under the 
ECHR. Against those who criticize it as ungenerous and unforgiving, I argued that the 
great importance this theory attaches on the principle of special responsibility does not 
exclude but justifies and determines, in a different way, certain minimum conditions of 
dignity, even  to those who make bad choices. Much of this kind of criticism, I claimed, 
is due to a misinterpretation of the function of the hypothetical insurance device within 
Dworkin's theory of equality of resources. In light of the principle of equal concern, the 
principle of special responsibility presupposes those conditions that are essential for 
freedom of choice and responsibility to be meaningful –and the hypothetical insurance 
device aims to determine what these conditions are. Moreover, I revealed how, applying 
Dworkin's prudent insurer test, we can construe claims to resources and positive 
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obligations based on interpretive judgments about which disadvantages we can reasonably 
assume people would have insured themselves against the risk of suffering and at what 
level. 
At this point, I suggested complementing the application of the prudent insurer test in 
the real world context of human rights adjudication by employing the significant work of 
capabilities theorists in identifying the various forms in which disadvantage appears and 
the policies, measures or resources that can be used to mitigate it. I proposed an account 
of positive obligations and claims to choices, opportunities or resources under the ECHR 
as claims to fair capabilities, i.e. not to a specific list of capabilities but only those and at 
that level that we can reasonably assume people would have chosen to guarantee for 
themselves, if they had had a fair opportunity to do so.  
It is beyond the scope of my research to explore in depth the implications of this thesis 
for the practice of the ECtHR and for the interpretation of specific provisions of the 
Convention. Nevertheless, I will briefly outline how certain features of this practice may 
be reconsidered in light of my main arguments, acknowledge some of its weaknesses and 
identify areas for further research.  
Throughout this thesis, I have tried to reinforce the view shared by many critics that a 
mere general reference to the potential resource allocation implications of a certain claims 
cannot be sufficient reason for dismissing these claims outright at the admissibility stage. 
Unless, of course, it can be justified how they fail to satisfy the admissibility criteria, 
especially whether they are 'manifestly ill-founded' or whether the applicant has not made 
a reasonable case that she has suffered a 'significant disadvantage'.2 My argument was 
intended to emphasize that it is an abnegation of its power and role as the ultimate guardian 
of the ECHR rights to find inadmissible some claims with supposedly far-reaching 
implications, without any substantive justification (other than a general reference to 
resource allocation implications) of why a particular claim to resources does not seem to 
                                                 
2 See my discussion of a characteristic group of such inadmissible cases in Chapter 2. For the 
Court’s Practical Guide on the Admissibility Criteria see 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf, especially pp. 68-77 for the reasons 
for finding through a preliminary examination of the substance of the application whether it is 
'manifestly ill-founded' or whether the applicant may have suffered a 'significant disadvantage'. For 
a criticism of the Court's practice with regards to the admissibility criterion of 'manifestly ill-
founded' see J Gerards, 'Inadmissibility Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A 
Critique of the Lack of Reasoning', (2014) Human Rights Law Review (1): 14. For a review of the 
Court's practice on the 'significant disadvantage' admissibility criterion so far see A Buyse, 
'Significantly Insignificant?' The Life at the Margins of the Admissibility Criterion in Article 35 
(3)(b) of the ECHR' in B McGonigle Leyh, Y Haeck, C Burbano Herrera, and D Contreras Garduno 
(eds.), Liber Amicorum for Leo Zwaak, (Antwerp: Intersentia 2013) as well as the ECtHR's 
Research Report on the New Admissibility Criterion under Article 35 (3)(b) of the Convention: 
Case Law Principles Two Years On, (2012) available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_admissibility_criterion_ENG.pdf  
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raise a human rights issue but is deemed to be a social policy issue that should better be 
left to the margin of appreciation of the national authorities. Notice that the Court explains 
the substantive feature of this criterion to be whether it discloses an appearance of a 
violation of an ECHR right. It further explains that this conclusion will be reached and an 
application may then be dismissed if, after the Court examines the merits of the complaint, 
it finds that the decision-making process in the national context that resulted in the act (or 
omission) 3 complained of by the applicant was fair and not arbitrary and whether any 
interference complained of was proportionate. This, as the Court mentions, is out of 
respect for the principle of subsidiarity but also of the principle of effectiveness: the 
national authorities are those primarily entrusted with the protection of the ECHR rights; 
however, it is the Court's role to review whether the national authorities' decisions, 
practices and policies had been fair in these respects.4 At this point, I was less ready to 
condemn the Court's reluctance to enter this discussion in difficult cases and in the face 
of uncertainty about how to establish fairness. 
I observed that the lack of appropriate justification and poor reasoning in positive 
obligations cases that the Court finds inadmissible is understandable. In particular, I tried 
to show that the Court lacks a coherent set of principles by which to decide these 
interpretive questions that raise difficult issues related to distributive justice, about what 
kind of treatment or share of resources people are entitled to as a matter of effective respect 
for the ECHR rights. In light of my analysis in this thesis, we could reconsider these 
criteria of admissibility. We could construe them as inviting the Court to establish whether 
the interference or disadvantage complained of by the applicant is potentially unfair in the 
following sense: although it is unfeasible (and potentially unfair) to strive to eliminate all 
limitations or all disadvantage, which disadvantages or which capabilities/conditions of 
choice and at what level can we reasonably assume that people would have insured 
themselves for under a broadly just scheme for the society's available resources? The 
question would then turn on whether the applicant makes a reasonable claim for a 
connection, link or relationship between the disadvantage that she complains of and the 
actual exercise of choice within one of the spheres of freedom granted by the ECHR, such 
as private or family life. Notice that, as I argue throughout this thesis, this link is primarily 
moral and would have to rest on substantive moral arguments about the essence of the 
ECHR rights.  
                                                 
3 My addition. 
4 See the ECtHR's Practical Guide on the Admissibility Criteria, p. 71. 
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The same principles should apply when the Court reviews substantively the merits of 
complaints, when it examines whether there has been an interference with one of the 
Convention freedoms and whether that is justified or proportionate. 
With regards to claims to positive obligations the Court could, firstly, inquire whether it 
is reasonable to assume that a prudent individual would have deemed the circumstances 
complained of as a disadvantage in the effective enjoyment of a particular freedom –a 
capability that she would have considered as essential condition for the exercise of choice 
and would have insured against the risk of lacking, by sacrificing some of the overall 
resources available to her. 
The second point of inquiry, i.e. whether the action or omission of the state is justified 
as proportionate, could better be construed as an inquiry about how much or what kind of 
measures or resources can we reasonably assume that a prudent individual would have 
deemed as enough to compensate for the particular disadvantage or condition/capability 
for choice. Interpreted in this way, this inquiry has nothing to do with balancing the 
individual's claim to resources or positive obligations against conflicting considerations, 
such as the rights and interests of others or the economic well-being of the country. To be 
sure, recall that in Dworkin's hypothetical insurance device the cost of mitigating the 
impact of disadvantage and guaranteeing certain capabilities or conditions of freedom is 
crucial when determining the kind and level of protection that people would have 
guaranteed for themselves. However, the way it is taken into account satisfies certain 
conditions of fairness and equal concern and respect and it is a test that invites interpretive 
judgments about what it is that we value about various freedoms and what conditions we 
would consider worth protecting and ensuring. 
At the same time though, as well as being a moral test, recall that an application of the 
prudent insurer test in order to determine the fair capabilities as the fair shares that people 
are entitled to, allows for great flexibility with regards to the factual basis of other morally 
relevant circumstances (within the boundaries of fairness). Specifically, our inquiry would 
have to look for a link or connection in light of the social and economic conditions in each 
state, taking into account the level of social, economic, institutional and infrastructural 
development or any special conditions of austerity and extreme scarcity of resources. This 
seems to accommodate well the concern about the diversity of practices or the difference 
in socio-economic conditions among the Member States to the Convention.  
It also accommodates the idea that what counts as a disadvantage and the level of 
compensation that it warrants should be sensitive to how people in a particular society 
perceive of certain circumstances, what priority or urgency they attach to claims to 
compensate for them and at what level. The abstract moral requirement to treat all with 
equal concern and respect is the same, albeit the interpretive judgment of what positive 
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obligations and claims to resources that fundamental principle yields must be dependent 
upon the particular social and economic context, in which the strategy of the modified 
hypothetical insurance device will be applied. Again, as I explained in Chapter 5, this is 
not a flaw of this strategy to be regretted but a requirement of fairness and proper 
understanding of the demands of equality. 
I find it quite possible that such an assessment of facts and moral arguments would 
have led the Court at least to review substantively or even decide differently certain claims 
to resources and positive obligations, such as the hard cases discussed in Chapter 2. In 
Chapter 5 I provided some examples of how Dworkin's hypothetical insurance device 
could alter the reasoning or produce a different outcome in ECtHR cases. Of course, each 
individual case would require careful re-examination and I acknowledge that the main 
weakness of my thesis is that it only provides a theoretical framework for a different 
approach to the content of positive obligations and not a detailed method of how to apply 
the modified hypothetical insurance device. So, the question of exactly how to determine 
the precise content of fair capabilities or conditions and resources necessary for an 
effective respect of the ECHR rights remains open. And it requires interdisciplinary work 
at the intersection between human rights law and theory, political philosophy, economics 
and social policy. Equally, any project of applying human rights considerations to 
budgetary analysis and seeing how claims to resources and positive obligations can 
influence resource allocation decisions5 largely depends on a clear and coherent set of 
principles about how to determine their content. My aim was to demonstrate the need for 
and justify such a framework for determining the content of claims to resources and 
positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for the ECHR rights. At the same time, 
I acknowledge the considerable difficulties in setting out how it could be applied by the 
ECtHR in general and in the context of specific provisions in particular. In this respect, 
my research endeavours are to be continued. 
 
                                                 
5 See the very interesting recent book in this area by R O'Connell, A Nolan, C Harvey, M Dutschke 
and E Rooney, Applying an International Human Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations: 
Rights and Resources. (Routledge, 2014) 
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